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"It's frustrating that we have solved the problem of sending men to the moon, and
we can't solve a problem of school funding.... We're going to keep on fighting
until we prevail. " 1
A. A Tale of Two Schools
If he arrived at work half an hour early, the janitor would have time
to rip the bats from the eaves of Edgewood Elementary School before
the children filled the crumbling building's halls. Meanwhile, just ten
minutes away, in neighboring school district Alamo Heights, a custodian
might be arriving early to double-check the chlorine level in Alamo
Heights High's Olympic-sized, indoor swimming pool.
In 1968, Edgewood Independent School District employees spent one
afternoon blocking off the staircases that led to the condemned top two
floors of the non-air-conditioned school. That same day, just a few miles
away, the Alamo Heights employees might have polished the disco ball
hanging from the ceiling of the high school's air-conditioned "club
house." 2
In the early 1970s, almost half of the teachers at Edgewood Elemen-
tary School lacked the official state certification they needed in order to
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at 1 (quoting Demetrio Rodriguez, plaintiff in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)).
2. Barry Siegel, Parents Get a Lesson in Equality, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 13,1992, at 1.
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teach.3 Meanwhile, the rare open teaching position in Alamo Heights In-
dependent School District might have attracted a stack of credential-
laden applications.
Edgewood, one of the many independent school districts ("I.S.D.s")
in the city of San Antonio, Texas, had a hard time recruiting quality
teachers when its neighbor, Alamo Heights I.S.D., paid its faculty thou-
sands of dollars more per year. Edgewood had as difficult a time keeping
those teachers as it did recruiting new ones. One out of every five of
4Edgewood's teachers would leave each year.
Both are public school districts in the state of Texas, and yet, for dec-
ades, Alamo Heights's resources far surpassed those of its neighbor's.
Under the Texas school-finance system, rich school districts such as
Alamo Heights could spend as much as nine times the money per pupil
that a poorer district such as Edgewood could
By the late 1960s, Edgewood's students, parents, and teachers-most
of whom were poor and Mexican-American-organized to voice their
dissatisfaction with an education system that valued the education of
some students more than others. On a Thursday morning in May 1968, a
group of students became so frustrated with the poor conditions of
Edgewood campuses that they simply walked out. Four hundred chant-
ing parents and students marched in protest from the dilapidated halls of
Edgewood High School to the school district's main offices, demanding
an equal opportunity for education.6
A few more minutes of marching and they might have been able to
cool off in Alamo Heights' pool-instead, those protesters have contin-
ued their march of protest for over a quarter of a century. Taking many
forms over the years, the quest they began that Thursday morning would
lead not only up the state capitol steps but eventually up the steps of the
United States Supreme Court and back again to Texas.
Over the past decade, the Texas Supreme Court has adopted those
marchers' cause as its own in a landmark series of decisions known as the
Edgewood cases. The court first declared in 1989 that the school-finance
system violated the Texas constitution in Edgewood 1.7 The court would
revisit the school-finance issue four times. After each of the first three
Edgewood cases, the Texas Legislature responded with a reformed fi-
nance system.
3. See id.
4. See Peter Hong, Is Equal Spending One Cure for the Woes of U.S. Education?, BUS. WK.,
June 4, 1990, at 98.
5. See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 392 (Tex. 1989) [hereinafter
Edgewood I] (describing per-student spending as ranging from $2,112 to $19,333).
6. See Siegel, supra note 2.
7. See 777 S.W.2d 396.
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The dramatic dissimilarity between the financial resources of the
Edgewood and Alamo Heights I.S.D.s are well known to students of
school finance. The combination of their glaringly disparate resources
and their close geographical proximity creates an ideal backdrop not only
for debating issues of equity and adequacy in the Texas education system
but also for analyzing the formidable challenge of equitable school
funding that faces each and every state in the Union. As the impetus for
the landmark United States Supreme Court cases and a pioneering and
incessant procession of state litigation and legislation, the neighboring
districts of Edgewood and Alamo Heights have come to serve as an al-
most allegorical reminder of the grand failures of traditional avenues of
school finance.
B. A Tale of One Nation
Today, twelve years after the state litigation began and five years af-
ter the Texas Supreme Court placed its seal of approval on a new school-
finance system, Edgewood schools spend $6060 per pupil per year, ap-
proximately $500 more than the state average.9 At its core, this Article is
about how and why the Texas school-finance system evolved from a na-
tionally notorious example of disparate education funding to the rela-
tively equitable program it is today. At the same time, however, it is a
dramatic narrative of tensions based on wealth, class, and race that have
arisen in similar education-finance battles across the country.
Since the United States Supreme Court's Rodriguez decision in
1973,1' almost every state in the country has grappled with state court
challenges to its school financing method. Approximately half of all state
school-finance systems have been, at some point, judicially overturned.
Among the states in which plaintiffs have succeeded at least in part are:
Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Idaho, Kansas,
Kentucky, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jer-
sey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Tennessee, Texas,
Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming." Some
of these state's systems have been rejected on more than one occasion. 2
8. See infra Subsection III.A.1.
9. See Thaddeus Herrick, Edgewvood: After the Money, HOUS. CHRON, Nov. 22, 1998, at
20A.
10. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
11. See Alexandra Natapoff, 1993: The Year of Living Dangerously: State Courts Expand
the Right to Education, 92 EDUC. LAW REP. 755,762 n.36 (1994); Michael A. Rebell, Fiscal Eq-
uity Litigation and the Democratic Imperative, 24 J. EDUC. FIN. 23, 26-27, nn.9 & 14 (1998);
Joshua S. Wyner, Toward a Common Law Theory of Minimal Adequacy in Public Education,
1992/1993 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 389,397-98 nn.64-65.
12. For example, in 1977, the Connecticut Supreme Court held Connecticut's inequitable
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In about the same number of states (although the listing is not mutu-
ally exclusive), courts have upheld the constitutionality of education-
finance systems. These states include: Arizona, Colorado, Georgia,
Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota,
Montana, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Ore-
gon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Virginia, and Wiscon-
sin.3 In fact, only a small handful of states have managed to remain un-
disturbed by education-finance litigation.
These state-constitution-based challenges to school-finance reform
have generally fallen into two categories-equity-based approaches and
adequacy-based approaches. An equity-based reform focuses on the
problem of disparate resources. These suits are usually based on a provi-
sion in the state constitution requiring equity in the state's education sys-
tem1 4 or are modeled after civil rights equal-protection claims. The goal
of equity litigation is to equalize educational opportunities across all dis-
tricts and students. The other approach involves establishing a minimum
level of education (often via interpretation of some state constitutional
provision) and then showing that some or all districts do not meet that
minimum level of "adequacy." 15
Academic commentators have repeatedly described the various
trends in education reform litigation as "waves.' ' 16 The "first wave," dur-
school finance system unconstitutional on the grounds that public education is a fundamental
right under the Connecticut Constitution, that students attending those schools are entitled to
equal enjoyment of that right, and that Connecticut's system failed strict-scrutiny analysis. See
Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 374 (Conn. 1977). Almost twenty years later, the same court
again declared the Connecticut system unconstitutional in Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1289
(Conn. 1996). New Jersey's system has been denounced by courts on at least seven separate
occasions, most recently in May 1998. See Abbott v. Burke, 710 A.2d 450,489 (N.J. 1998).
13. See Natapoff, supra note 11, at 762 nn.36-37; Rebell, supra note 11, at 26-27 nn.9 & 14;
Wyner, supra note 11, at 397-98 n.65. Some of these states' educational systems had been up-
held initially only to be overturned in subsequent challenges.
14. A mandate of equity might be derived from constitutional requirements that legisla-
tures create a "free," "uniform," "thorough," or "efficient" education system, to name a few.
See Natapoff, supra note 11, at 764. For an extensive list of state education clauses, see id. at
784.
15. For general, and somewhat varying, descriptions of the trends of equity- and adequacy-
based school-finance litigation, see Robert M. Jensen, Advancing Education Through Educa-
tion Clauses of State Constitutions, 1997 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 1; Frank J. Macchiarola & Joseph
G. Diaz, Disorder in the Courts: The Aftermath of San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez in the State Courts, 30 VAL. U. L. REv. 551 (1996); Richard J. Stark, Education Re-
form: Judicial Interpretation of State Constitutions' Education Finance Provisions-Adequacy vs.
Equality, 1991 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 609; Julie K. Underwood, School Finance Adequacy as Ver-
tical Equity, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 493 (1995).
16. See Gail F. Levine, Meeting the Third Wave: Legislative Approaches to Recent Judicial
School Finance Rulings, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 507 (1991); William E. Thro, Judicial Analysis
During the Third Wave of School Finance Litigation: The Massachusetts Decision as a Model, 35
B.C. L. REv. 597 (1994); Julie K. Underwood & William E. Sparkman, School Finance Litiga-
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ing the 1960s and early 1970s, grew out of the United States Constitu-
tion's Equal Protection Clause. After the Supreme Court rejected that
approach in 1973,17 the "second wave," which lasted through the 1980s,
was based on state equal protection clauses. The "third wave"-of which
Texas's Edgewood litigation is considered a harbinger-has been based
on education clauses of state constitutions." Both equity and adequacy
claims have made up that "third wave" of litigation.19
As one of the earliest-and arguably the most complex and pro-
tracted-"third wave" battles for education equity in the nation, Texas's
Edgewood drama20 continues to serve as a crude but informative map for
educators, litigators, judges, and politicians saddled with the task of
achieving equity in school financing. In hopes of providing such a map,
Part HI of this article provides a narrative account of the Edgewood
drama itself. Percolating within that narrative are the patterns and
themes that inspire Part IV's analysis. Not only does the Edgewood
drama illustrate alternative strategies for using equal protection provi-
sions and public education provisions of state constitutions to challenge
the equity of existing finance systems, it also brings into full relief the
competing but inseparable notions of adequacy and equity that have re-
curred in courtrooms and decisions across the country. Such themes will
ring familiar to education reformers. Other familiar controversies, in-
cluding the role of local control and the often subtextual influence of
race, class, and wealth, permeate the Edgewood drama. The Edgewood
cases also pose difficult theoretical dilemmas regarding the relative re-
sponsibilities and competencies of the judicial and legislative branches of
government.
tion: A New Wave of Reform, 14 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 517 (1991); Kevin Randall McMil-
Ian, Note, The Turning Tide: The Emerging Fourth Wave of School Finance Reform Litigation
and the Courts' Lingering Institutional Concerns, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1867 (1998).
17. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973).
18. See Macchiarola & Diaz, supra note 15, at 555; Thro, supra note 16, at 603-04.
19. As will be discussed below, equity claims based on education clauses in state constitu-
tions are attractive to plaintiffs for a number of strategic reasons, including the strategy's avoid-
ance of the baggage created for state equal protection claims by the United States Supreme
Court's rejection of the federal equal protection claim in Rodriguez.
20. It is the federal Rodriguez litigation that actually opens the Edgewood drama. See
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 19; see also infra Subsection III.A.1. Before the Supreme Court heard
Rodriguez, the California Supreme Court held, under both federal and state equal protection
provisions, that education was a fundamental interest and that strict scrutiny of the wide dispari-
ties in funding per pupil required an overhaul of the state school finance system. See Serrano v.
Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971). Serrano may be considered the pioneering state education
litigation.
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II. THE EXPOSITION: TEXAS EDUCATION BEFORE EDGEWOOD
A. A School-Finance Primer
We begin with the premise that the Texas public education system
was unjustly inequitable before the Edgewood litigation. While the ulti-
mate durability and degree of the plaintiffs' success remains to be seen,
we feel little need to dwell on the injustice of a system that allowed such
vast discrepancies among average expenditures per pupil. As an intro-
ductory matter, however, we believe a cursory discussion of the tradi-
tional means of financing public schools is in order. Only in light of the
long-standing system of funding schools in America can Edgewood's ef-
fects be appreciated.
The motivations for education equity include lofty, romantic ideals of
equality and excellence. The actual machinery ot education equity in any
particular state, however, relies on the decidedly unromantic processes of
taxes, district boundary lines, state constitutional provisions, and legisla-
tive appropriation and redistribution of wealth.
These processes-at least as they relate to education-have been
delegated to state governments for reasons that we will cryptically de-
scribe here as historical.2' No less an authority than the United States Su-
preme Court, in no less a case than Brown v. Board of Education,2 de-
clared that "education is perhaps the most important function of state
and local governments." 3
The Texas Constitution, like the constitution of every other state,
24
includes a mandate that the state provide public schools. Article VII pro-
vides, "[a] general diffusion of knowledge being essential to the preserva-
21. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 583 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating
that education has traditionally been the responsibility of the states because of historical exper-
tise in the area); Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 49-50 (stating that local control over education involves
citizens in decisionmaking, allows communities to structure educational programs in accordance
with local needs, and encourages "experimentation, innovation, and a healthy competition for
educational excellence"); Martin D. Carcieri, Democracy and Education in the Thought of Jef-
ferson and Madison, 26 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 2 (1997). In such contexts as desegregation, disabilities
law, and, more recently, national standardization of curriculum and evaluation, the relative
roles of state and federal government have been hotly debated. "Nowhere is the debate over
the optimum balance of responsibilities among local, state, and federal governments more
lively, significant, or just plain loud than in education." Jamienne S. Studley, Lawyers at the
Education Crossroads, 31 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1049, 1049-50 (1998). While several of the
themes that we will pull from the Edgewood drama speak to that controversy, this Article will
not address the prudence of assigning responsibility for school finance and education equity to
the state.
22. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
23. Id. at 493.
24. See Natapoff, supra note 11, at 757. For a list of 30 states' education-related constitu-
tional provisions, see id. at 784.
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tion of the liberties and fights of the people, it shall be the duty of the
Legislature of the State to establish and make suitable provision for the
support and maintenance of an efficient system of public free schools."
The Texas Legislature (like many state legislatures 6) is thereby faced
with the relatively vague duty to create "efficient" schools.
Although not by constitutional mandate, Texas is similar to most
states in the Union in its historical dependence on property taxes for
school finance. The property tax "has long been... a prime source of
revenue for schools and other local governmental entities. ' 27 Even today,
"[m]ost states generate a substantial portion of the education budgets
from local property taxes.""
Today's financing structure originated with the Gilmer-Aikin propos-
als in 1947-1949, which called for the provision of an equal minimum
educational opportunity to every student to be financed by equalized lo-
cal tax effort and supplemented by state aid sufficient to compensate for
the variations in local tax bases.2 The minimum foundation program
("MFP"), embodied in the Gilmer-Aikin proposals, assigned a propor-
tionate share of the local financing requirement to each school district
and allowed local districts to enrich their programs beyond the guaran-
teed minimum.30 While institutionalizing a state-local partnership in the
financing of education, the MFP never reached its stated goal of provid-
ing an adequate minimum education for Texas students due to flawed
funding formulas and inadequate financing.3'
Renamed the Foundation School Program by the time the Edgewood
litigation started in 1987, the state aid program "distributed [funds] to the
various districts according to a complex formula such that property-poor
districts receive[d] more state aid than [did] property-rich districts.
32
Districts had to tax at a legislatively-set minimum level to receive extra
25. TEx. CONST. art. VII, § 1. For a carefully researched account of the legislative intent
behind Article VII of the Texas Constitution, see Mikal Watts & Brad Rockwell, The Original
Intent of the Education Article of the Texas Constitution, 21 ST. MARY'S L.J. 771 (1990).
26. See Natapoff, supra note 11, at 784.
27. BILLY D. WALKER & DANIEL T. CASEY, THE BASICS OF TEXAS PUBLIC SCHOOL
FINANCE 85 (6th ed. 1996). Walker and Casey go so far as to assert that the "[u]se of the prop-
erty tax to support public education is an Anglo-Saxon tradition and constitutes one of the
greatest influences of the Protestant Reformation on Western culture." Id.
28. Erin E. Kelly, Note, All Students Are Not Created Equal: The Inequitable Combination
of Property-Tax-Based School Finance Systems and Local Control, 45 DUKE L.J. 397, 397 n.3
(1995) (citing William E. Thro, The Significance of the Tennessee School Finance Decision, 85
EDUC. L. REP. 11, 11 n.2 (1993)).
29. See William P. Hobby, Jr. & Billy D. Walker, Legislative Reform of the Texas Public
School Finance System, 1973-1991,28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 379,382 (1991).
30. See WALKER & CASEY, supra note 27, at 9.
31. See Hobby & Walker, supra note 29, at 383.
32. Edgewood 1, 777 S.W.2d 391, 392 (Tex. 1989).
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funding.33 Through such a system, the state provided approximately forty-
two percent of a district's money in the mid-1980s, and local taxes raised
approximately fifty percent.4
This scheme, however, was designed merely to provide a
"foundation" for district financing. The state earmarked funds for certain
purposes, and the Foundation School Program did not provide for school
facilities and debt repayment.' Transportation costs and career ladder
salary supplements were under-funded. 3' In fact, funding under both the
older "Minimum Foundation Program" and the newer "Foundation
School Program" failed to provide districts with enough money to meet
the state's own minimum accreditation requirements in areas such as
teacher-student ratio, infrastructure, and special programs. Local sup-
plementation of state monies, therefore, was an absolute necessity.3 Be-
fore Edgewood, the state provided less than a bare minimum, explicitly
expecting school districts to supplement state funds from local taxes.
Although "in the last century and a half, public education in Texas
has been governed in just about every way imaginable,"' the political
battleground has consistently involved the Foundation Program in its
various incarnations and monikers .39 The basic structural components
that made up the Foundation Program-state funding subsidized by local
taxes and an emphasis on local control-have consistently defined educa-
tion-finance reform in Texas. Just as a number of other states have prop-
erty-tax-based school funding (if not a foundation program similar to
Texas's4), the policy considerations that underlie Texas's education liti-
gation appear in other states' litigation as well.
33. See Joe Ball, Efficient and Suitable Provision for the Texas Public School Finance Sys-
tem: An Impossible Dream, 46 SMU L. REV. 763, 769 n.40 (1992). The ranges of tax-rates for
which districts receive state aid for certain purposes are commonly known as "tiers"-a concept
that will be more fully developed below. See infra notes 111, 400-419 and accompanying text.
34. See Edgewood 1, 777 S.W.2d at 392.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. This conundrum portends the inextricable interdependence of the ideals of equity and
adequacy that will haunt decisionmakers throughout the Edgewood drama.
38. William P. Hobby, Texas Public Schools: Who Runs Them? Who Pays for Them? Does
it Matter?, 40 COMMENT: LYNDON B. JOHNSON SCH. OF PUB. AFF. 2 (1994) ("In this period,
public education in Texas has sometimes been governed by rigid systems of state control and at
other times by rather decentralized systems.").
39. See Mark G. Yudof, School Finance Reform in Texas: The Edgewood Saga, 28 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 499,499 (1991).
40. For example, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, and Louisiana, to name a few,
have (or had, prior to education equity litigation) similar foundation programs. See Mark
Diefenderfer, Riding the School Finance Litigation Wave: Alabama's Remedy May Not Be
Enough, 104 EDUC. L. REP. 961, 963 (1996); Andrew C. Forsaith, Achieving Equity and Excel-
lence in Kentucky Education, 28 U. MicH. J.L. REFORM 599, 601-02 (1995); Molly Townes
O'Brien, Private School Tuition Vouchers and the Realities of Racial Politics, 64 TENN. L. REV.
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The ultimate result of a property-tax-based funding scheme is that, to
raise the same sum of money, school districts with high-value property
can tax at a correspondingly lower rate than districts that happen to con-
tain low-value property. Thus, "[t]he lower expenditures in the property-
poor districts are not the result of lack of tax effort. Generally, the prop-
erty-rich districts can tax low and spend high while the property-poor dis-
tricts must tax high merely to spend low. ' 41 Although most states, in-
cluding Texas, have used some formula of adjustment to try to account
for poor-property districts, the end result is the disparity illustrated so
vividly by Edgewood and Alamo Heights.
For example, in 1985-1986, Edgewood I.S.D. drew taxes from $38,854
in property wealth per student; at the same time, Alamo Heights I.S.D.
enjoyed $570,109 in property wealth per student.42 Thus, Alamo Heights
theoretically could tax at a significantly lower rate than Edgewood in or-
der to collect the same dollar supplement to its basic allocation of money
from the state. Alternatively, Alamo Heights could tax at a moderately
lower rate than Edgewood and come away with many times the dollars-
per-pupil to fund its schools.
These disparities were even more dramatic on a statewide scale. The
state's wealthiest district enjoyed $14,000,000 of property wealth per stu-
dent from which to draw education funding. The poorest district made do
with $20,000 per student, creating an astounding 700-to-1 ratio of avail-
able taxable funds between the wealthiest and poorest school districts."
The 300,000 students in the poorest schools had less than 3% of the
state's property wealth while the 300,000 students in the highest-wealth
schools drew funds from over 25% of the state's property wealth.4 The
wealthiest district, taxing at a small fraction of the rate of poorer districts,
could spend $19,333 on each student while the poorest could spend only
$2,112.
359, 382-83 (1997); Barbara J. Staros, School Finance Litigation in Florida: A Historical Analy-
sis, 23 STETSON L. REv. 497,505 (1994).
41. Edgewood 1, 777 S.W.2d at 393.
42. See id. at 392.
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See id. The Texas Supreme Court gave other specific and revealing examples to show
precisely how this taxing process works:
In 1985-86, local tax rates ranged from $.09 to $1.55 per $100 valuation. The 100 poor-
est districts had an average tax rate of 74.5 cents and spent an average of $2,978 per
student. The 100 wealthiest districts had an average tax rate of 47 cents and spent an
average of $7,233 per student. In Dallas County, Highland Park I.S.D. taxed at 35.16
cents and spent $4,836 per student while Wilmer-Hutchins I.S.D. taxed at $1.05 and
spent $3,513 per student. In Harris County, Deer Park I.S.D. taxed at 64.37 cents and
spent $4,846 per student while its neighbor North Forest I.S.D. taxed at $1.05 and yet
spent only $3,182 per student. A person owning an $80,000 home with no homestead
exemption would pay $1,206 in taxes in the east Texas low-wealth district of Leveretts
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Analogous disparities have plagued education systems across the
country for decades. How can a state honor a tradition of local control
and local supplementation of state education funding while at the same
time ensuring equal distribution of funds?
B. Texas: "A Whole Other Country"?
4 6
Having to this point emphasized some of the common ingredients in
education equity struggles across the country, we must also acknowledge
a skeptical reader's assumption that unique aspects of the Texas litigation
distinguish it from other states' situations. Like every other state, unique
aspects of Texas's historical, constitutional, and political background
have indelibly framed its quest for education equity.
While we maintain that fundamental institutional issues4e make the
Edgewood drama an invaluable resource for those contemplating educa-
tion-equity reform elsewhere, we also believe that the Texas litigation
must be viewed in light of several circumstances that we believe may be
unique, if only in degree, to the state of Texas. First, Texans take the no-
tion of local control seriously. Second, all issues of property-based fund-
ing eventually encounter the uneven distribution of oil and gas across the
state. Third, the Texas Constitution significantly constrains the Legisla-
ture's ability to tax. Fourth, education may be the most political issue in a
state with colorful political traditions. The influence of these four factors
played critical roles in shaping the Edgewood drama.
As a general proposition, Texans take their independence extremely
seriously. What may be a humorous stereotype for the rest of the country
is for many Texans a historical, heart-felt ideal.4 In terms of school fi-
nance, this stereotype arguably surfaces in the form of an unqualified
dedication to the notion of "local control." School reformers must ac-
knowledge that local control is not negotiable. The most tangible indica-
Chapel, but would pay only $59 in the west Texas high-wealth district of Iraan-
Sheffield.
Id. at 393.
46. With the promise that Texas is "Like a Whole Other Country," the State Tourism
Board lures 169 million visitors a year. See 1998-1999 TEXAS ALMANAC 136 (1997) [hereinafter
ALMANAC].
47. Such universally encountered issues include the selection of local versus state control,
equity- versus adequacy-based funding, and judicial versus legislative oversight.
48. The evidence of this phenomenon is largely anecdotal. For example, many Texans still
celebrate every March 2 as "Texas Independence Day." The anti-litter campaign "Don't Mess
with Texas" has grown into a state motto. When the state legislature tried to put "The Friend-
ship State" on Texas license plates, a petition to recall state politicians was started. Today, the
license plates still proclaim Texas "The Lone Star State." For a more serious example of this
phenomenon, see Michele Kay, The Republic of Texas Wants You, AUSTIN AM.-STATEsMAN,
July 7, 1996, at Al ("Initially dismissed by many as a fringe political group that law officers said
might have ties to militias, the Republic of Texas has continued to attract new members.").
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tion of this phenomenon may be the large number of small, local school
districts in the state. Small school districts, with as few as two students,
have refused to be incorporated into their neighbors,49 an antiquated
side-effect of Texans' ideal of independence and "local control." While
there may be educational and organizational benefits to smaller school
districts, these micro-districts' costs are inordinately high on a per-pupil
basis, and taxable-wealth-per-pupil calculations are therefore skewed."
A 1931 Texas Supreme Court decision arguably codified this dedica-
tion to local control of school districts. In Love v. City of Dallas,5 the
court held that a school district could not be compelled to use its re-
sources to educate students who resided outside its boundaries. Because
of the Love court's determination that, under the Texas Constitution,
"districts shall be organized and taxes levied for the education of scholas-
tics within the districts,"' 2 subsequent courts have questioned whether a
school-finance system that involved statewide collection and redistribu-
tion of district money could pass constitutional muster." The ramifica-
tions of the Love decision form a recurring subplot of the Edgewood
drama.
The state's dependence on oil also shapes any attempt at education-
finance reform. Since the 1860s, wells have drawn crude oil from Texas
oil fields. The early 1900s saw the oil boom expand across Texas, from
East to West. The combination of the state economy's dependence on
oil and gas and the education system's dependence on local control and
property taxes creates several unique dilemmas. First, oil and gas wells
are not spread evenly but instead are sporadically concentrated in pock-
ets around the state. The rich reserves of oil in west Texas happen to co-
49. In fact, a "persistent problem throughout the history of Texas education had been the
existence of a large number of small, inefficient school districts. As late as 1936 there were 6953
districts in the state, including 5938 common (fiscally dependent) districts enrolling an average
of sixty-five students." Hobby & Walker, supra note 29, at 381. While the smallest districts have
been gradually consolidated (often in the name of transportation efficiency), many rural areas
continue to defend their small independent school districts. In 1991, Texas had over 1,000
school districts with an average of 3,000 students. Two-thirds of those districts, however, had
student populations under 1,000. See BILLY D. WALKER & DANIEL T. CASEY, THE BASICS OF
TExAs PUBLIC SCHOOL FiNANCE 87 (5th ed. 1992). In fact, in 1991, two Texas school districts
(Allamoore C.S.D. and Juno C.S.D.) had only two students each. See Edgewood Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Kirby, 804 S.W.2d 491, 497 (Tex. 1991) [hereinafter Edgewood II].
50. See WALKER & CASEY, supra note 49, at 87 ("Many states do not encourage small dis-
tricts by granting extra state dollars to them, as is done in Texas, unless the districts can meet
some formula of necessity (e.g., sparse population, distance to a neighboring community, and so
on).").
51. 40 S.W.2d 20 (Tex. 1931).
52. lId at 27.
53. See infra text accompanying notes 250-252,261,513-515.
54. See ALMANAC, supra note 46, at 561-62.
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incide with Texas's most sparsely populated school districts. Second, the
value of that oil and gas can vary dramatically over time. As a result,
property taxes that derive from oil and gas have been unpredictable.
The third factor unique to Texas that has shaped the state's educa-
tional-equity litigation is its institutionalized aversion to taxes. The Texas
Constitution contains a number of provisions that restrict the state gov-
ernment's ability to raise funds. For example, as a result of political
wrangling in the wake of the 1876 adoption of the Constitution's educa-
tion provision, ad valorem taxes-those imposed as a percentage of
property value--can, in some circumstances, be imposed in a school dis-
trict only by referendum.5  Local districts still struggle with this constitu-
tional requirement. 6 The Texas Constitution also explicitly prohibits the
state government from imposing any statewide ad valorem property tax.
As of 1951, "no State ad valorem tax shall be levied upon any property
within [Texas]." Although the interactions between the several tax pro-
visions of the Texas Constitution are complex, if not hopelessly unclear,"
state officials are constitutionally required to resist the otherwise politi-
cally-unsound temptation to interfere with local districts' property taxes.
Furthermore, the Texas Constitution requires voter approval to enact an
income tax. 9 While the issue occasionally surfaces in response to budget
shortfalls, Texans have historically been adamant about avoiding a state
income tax. "It's against the grain of the conventional political wisdom in
Texas. Many consider it political suicide." 6 While other specific provi-
sions of the Texas Constitution will take center stage in the Edgewood
cases,61 these underlying structural parameters define the arena of the
55. See TEx. CONsT. art. VII, § 3.
56. See infra text accompanying notes 303-307, 319.
57. TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1-e.
58. An ad valorem tax is a state tax when it is imposed directly by the State or when the
State so completely controls the levy, assessment, and disbursement of revenue, either directly
or indirectly, that the authority employed is without meaningful discretion. How far the State
can go toward encouraging a local taxing authority to levy an ad valorem tax before the tax be-
comes a state tax is difficult to delineate. See CarroUton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 826 S.W.2d 489,503 (Tex. 1992).
59. The long-running historical aversion to an income tax was institutionalized in an
amendment to the constitution approved in 1993, which states:
A general law enacted by the legislature that imposes a tax on the net incomes of
natural persons, including a person's share of partnership and unincorporated associa-
tion income, must provide that the portion of the law imposing the tax not take effect
until approved by a majority of the registered voters voting in a statewide referendum
held on the question of imposing the tax. The referendum must specify the rate of the
tax that will apply to taxable income as defined by law.
TEX. CONsT. art. VIII, § 24.
60. Dave McNeely, What About an Income Tax?, AUSTIN-AM. STATESMAN, Nov. 25, 1992,
at 15A.
61. For example, the Texas Constitution's education clauses are key to the plaintiffs' case
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debate. Thus, as in every state, a Texas lawmaker's dilemma is not only
to create a politically acceptable system of funding, but also to create a
system within the confines of long-standing constitutional limitations.
Finally, a spectator of the Edgewood drama must take into account
Texas politics. Not only do Texas politics have a reputation for and long
history of volatility, but education finance, as a political issue, seems to
incite particular contentiousness. The volatile history of Texas education
reform actually predates even the state itself. Charging the Mexican gov-
ernment with, among other injustices, having "failed to establish any
public system of education, although possessed of almost boundless re-
sources," 62 Texas revolutionaries declared independence from Mexico
and established the sovereign Republic of Texas on March 2, 1836.3 Four
days later, 183 Texans died at the Alamo in defense of that Declaration.64
Admittedly, invoking the Alamo in the name of education reform is
over-dramatic, if not historically inaccurate. Yet few Texas citizens-be
they parents, students, teachers, or property owners-have managed to
avoid taking sides in the education-reform debate. Many Texans defend
their beliefs vehemently, if not venomously. When, on June 1, 1987 (a lit-
tle more than 150 years after the fall of the Alamo), Texas District Court
Judge Harley Clark opened the Edgewood drama by invalidating the
Texas education system,6 Texas Governor Bill Clements sounded the
alarm: "And what he is doing is taking local control and the independent
school districts and abolishing them so that local school districts will no
longer elect their school board members and will no longer control the
schools within their district.'' 6
Several years later, when Texas District Court Judge Scott McCown
struck down one of the Legislature's attempts to answer the supreme
court's demand for reform, his chambers were inundated with letters,
that the finance system is unconstitutional.
62. ALMANAC, supra note 46, at 381.
63. See id. at 382.
64. Of course, the Declaration's education grievance was probably not a major motivating
factor for James Bowie and Davy Crockett as they faced several thousand Mexican troops. Ac-
cording to Lt. Col. William Travis's February 24, 1836 "Letter To the People of Texas & all
Americans in the world," the Texans' chief concerns were " [1]iberty ... patriotism & everything
dear to the American character." Id. at 234. Letters from the revolutionaries trapped in the
Alamo describe their dedication to ideals of freedom and liberty, not education equity. The fact
that education finance has, however, always been a critical political issue for Texans helps ex-
plain the intensity of Texas's recent education equity battle.
65. See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, No. 362,516 (Travis County Dist. Ct., 250th
Jud. Dist. of Texas, June 1, 1987), rev'd, 761 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. App. 1988), rev'd, 777 S.W.2d
391 (Tex. 1989).
66. Wayne Slater, Texas Will Lose Appeal, Bullock Says, DALLAs MORNING NEWS, Apr. 6,
1988, at 20A.
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"some angry, some exultant-but all full of passionate intensity."67 While
often less dramatic than "Remember the Alamo!", statements like "I
pray you stand firm" and "You have shit for brains ... You Mexi-
can/Catholic loving socialist"' leave little doubt as to the emotional divi-
siveness of this issue. One writer went so far as to explicitly blur the line
between the figurative and literal battlefield of education reform:
"Parents across the state will look for your resignation from the
bench.... Civil unrest will come squarely to your chambers."69
While it may be true that "[t]here is no better place than Texas to ex-
plore people's disenchantment with how politicians treat the public
schools,"70 one must admit, to be fair to lawmakers, that few political is-
sues are as difficult as education-finance reform. A legislator may be torn
between voting for the general welfare of the state and the more politi-
cally pressing welfare of his or her home district. Conventional wisdom is
that "[iln reviewing a public school finance bill, a legislator will vote for
the bill that will bring the most money to his home school districts. In
most cases, the state interest becomes secondary to the interest of the
legislator's home district.,
71
This dilemma is further complicated by the fact that school districts
and voting districts rarely, if ever, coincide geographically. Most voting
districts are in fact packed with a large number of school districts. Texas
Legislator Henry Cuellar called this problem "the dilemma of the com-
puter printout."72 In evaluating each new reform proposal, each legislator
must consider its effect on not only the entire state and his electoral dis-
trict but also the individual school districts within that district. Legislators
receive computer printouts detailing each proposal's effect on each
school district in their voting districts. Legislators are thereby often
forced to choose among groups of constituents. How does a legislator de-
termine which school districts' interests to advocate?73




71. Henry Cuellar, Considerations in Drafting a Constitutional School Finance Plan: A
Legislator's Prospective, 19 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 83, 88 (Fall 1993).
72. Id.
73. As Director of the Equity Center in Austin, Texas, Craig Foster is in charge of produc-
ing those perplexing computer printouts. Working at the Capitol on a daily basis, he has seen
first-hand the tendency for legislators to answer to the wealthy and more politically influential
segment of their constituency. The fact that affluent school districts claim more clout in the
Legislature is hardly surprising. Politicians, facing difficult decisions, must answer to money and
votes in hopes of reelection.
Foster does not believe, however, that the "computer printout dilemma" presents nearly the
obstacle to school-finance reform that the "good-old-fashioned" politics of the state house does.
If each legislator wrestled with these issues individually, the political puzzle would be relatively
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Presumably, these four factors-Texans' adherence to local control,
Texas's oil-based economy, the Texas Constitution's prohibitions on cer-
tain forms of taxation, and the intense political nature of the process and
its players-have analogous, if not identical, counterparts in other states'
struggles for education equity. We have presented these influences not
because they somehow predict or explain how and why the Texas educa-
tion litigation plays out, but because these background factors create the
social and political context in which the Edgewood drama is set.
III. THE EDGEWOOD DRAMA
A. The Opening Act
1. The Rodriguez Case
If these historical, constitutional, and political parameters set the
stage for the Edgewood drama, the Rodriguez case and House Bill 72
were the drama's opening acts. Of all the influential factors involved in
shaping the legal setting of the state litigation, none was as crucial as a
federal class-action suit called Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent
School District.74
Demetrio Rodriguez, whose children were in the Edgewood school
system, marched in that original protest in 1968.75 Rodriguez refused to
stop there. With the help of the Mexican American Legal Defense and
Education Foundation ("MALDEF") and the Intercultural Develop-
ment Research Association ("IDRA"), Rodriguez filed a class-action suit
on behalf of poor and minority Texas schoolchildren that same summer.76
simple. In Texas (as in all other states), however, politicians are constantly bartering for and
returning political favors. Legislators make decisions regarding a financing scheme not accord-
ing to its merits or its effects on constituents, but according to who wrote the bill. "You say 'But
my district will be hurt by this,' and the Speaker says 'Well, do you want to be on the team or
not?' Foster explains. "Ninety percent of the time they choose to be on the team and get their
committee appointments and so forth." Interview with Craig Foster, Director of the Equity
Center, in Austin, Tex. (Mar. 18, 1996).
Foster seems to believe that the nature of politics precludes straightforward answers to
problems as complicated as school-finance reform. He views even well-meaning politicians as
victims of their positions. "The human animal is just not well-prepared to have hundreds of
people coming around every day kissing their asses, telling them they are the most wonderful,
most brilliant, most affecting, having the greatest promise," Foster explains. Id.
74. 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1971), rev'd, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
75. See Siegel, supra note 2.
76. See William E. Sparkman & Michael P. Stevens, Texas School Finance System Uncon-
stitutional, 57 EDuc. L. REP. 333, 333 (1990). The defendants in the suit became the Commis-
sioner of Education, the State Attorney General, and the San Antonio Board of Trustees. See
Rodriguez, 337 F. Supp. at 280.
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Three years later, in the early winter of 1971, a United States District
Court stunned Texas citizens by declaring that Texas's school financing
scheme violated the United States Constitution.n Many Texans realized
for the first time that years of discussion and proposals had actually done
little to affect the inequity of the state's system. Texas politicians were
finally forced to acknowledge the pleas and warnings of the parents,
teachers, and students of the state's poorest school districts-messages
they had largely ignored for years.
The plaintiffs modeled their challenge on race-based equal protection
claims, arguing that the property-tax-based system of education finance
in Texas discriminated on the basis of wealth. Under this equal protec-
tion model, a federal court would strictly scrutinize (and thereby likely
declare unconstitutional) the finance system only (1) if it operated to the
disadvantage of a suspect class, or (2) it interfered with the exercise of
fundamental rights and liberties explicitly or implicitly protected by the
Constitution.' s Thus, plaintiffs had two angles of attack. They either had
to convince the federal court to apply "strict scrutiny" to the finance sys-
tem by convincing the court to label wealth a suspect classification," or
the plaintiffs could convince the court that education is a fundamental
interest and that this discrimination impinged on the poor children's ex-
ercise of their fundamental right to education. For the plaintiffs, these le-
gal arguments were simply meant to show the court that "the significant
disparities in educational expenditures caused by the disparate property
tax bases of the school districts, poor school children living in low prop-
erty value districts received a poorer quality education than the wealthy
school children living in high property value districts.""
The three-judge panel of the district court endorsed the plaintiffs'
contentions. Relying on decisions dealing with indigents' rights to equal
treatment in criminal trials and on cases discontinuing wealth-based re-
strictions on the right to vote, the district court concluded that wealth
was, in fact, a suspect classification.81 Given the Supreme Court's affirma-
tion of the undeniable importance of education, the district court decided
that education was, in fact, a fundamental right.8 Therefore, unless the
state could show a compelling interest in discriminating against poor
77. See WALKER & CASEY, supra note 27, at 10 ("In late 1971, Texans were stunned into a
realization of the ramifications of years of neglecting the problems of equity in school finance
when a U.S. District Court declared the state's financing scheme unconstitutional.").
78. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,19 (1973).
79. See Bernard Lau, Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby: A Political Ques-
tion?, 43 BAYLOR L. REv. 187,192 (1991).
80. Id.
81. See Rodriguez, 337 F. Supp. at 282-83.
82. See id. at 283.
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children, the system had to be rejected. The district court could find no
such compelling interest." Finding that the Texas education-finance sys-
tem-the Minimum Foundation Program-violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the judges gave the state two
years to start anew."' Demetrio Rodriguez's long march had paid off-
temporarily.
The plaintiffs' victory was short-lived. In March 1973, in a 5-4 deci-
sion, the United States Supreme Court reversed the district court's deci-
sion.8 While that year-long window of clear-cut victory for the plaintiffs
would have far-reaching political consequences, the plaintiffs' previously
successful legal arguments were systematically rejected by the High
Court.
Writing for the majority, Justice Powell first dismantled the plaintiffs'
assertion that classifications by wealth are constitutionally suspect.
Pointing out that "there is reason to believe that the poorest families are
not necessarily clustered in the poorest property districts,"8 the Court
based much of its argument on the difficulty of defining a category of
poor people that suffer at the hands of the Texas system. Noting some
form of "absolute deprivation" in its own precedents involving wealth-
based discrimination, the Court also stated that the absence of any abso-
lute deprivation of education in any definable class of individuals under-
mined the plaintiffs' suspect-class argument. "For these two reasons-the
absence of any evidence that the financing system discriminates against
any definable category of 'poor' people or that it results in the absolute
deprivation of education-the disadvantaged class is not susceptible of
identification in traditional terms." 87 Powell went on to explain that
[t]he system of alleged discrimination and the class it defines has none of the
traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is not saddled with such disabili-
ties, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or rele-
gated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordi-
nary protection from the majoritarian political process.88
Next the High Court rejected the plaintiffs' other angle of attack-
characterizing education as a fundamental right. While acknowledging
that it had labeled education "perhaps the most important function of
state and local governments," 9 the Court stopped short of granting edu-
83. See id. at 283-84.
84. See id. at 286.
85. The Supreme Court preempted any Fifth Circuit consideration of the issue based on its
"far-reaching constitutional questions." Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 6.
86. Id. at 23.
87. Id. at 25.
88. Id. at 28.
89. Id. at 29 (quoting Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
Yale Law & Policy Review
cation "fundamental right" status on the grounds that "[e]ducation... is
not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Con-
stitution."' Furthermore, in a vivid illustration of equity litigation's ten-
dency to draw in extraneous "adequacy" language, the Court determined
that, even if education were such a right, the plaintiffs' equity-centered
argument failed to demonstrate that the present levels of education ex-
penditures in Texas failed to meet some standard level of adequacy.9
Having denied the need for strict scrutiny of the Texas system, the
Court needed only to indicate some rational basis with which to justify
the inequities found among Texas schools. To that end, the Court found
that "[t]he Texas system of school finance... [w]hile assuring a basic
education for every child in the State ... permits and encourages a large
measure of participation in and control of each district's schools at the
local level... ."92 According to the majority, "the freedom to devote
more money to the education of one's children," at the local level, served
as a rational basis for Texas's system.93 Hence, the High Court accepted
Texas's claim "that it was reasonable for the Legislature to use local
property taxes to further the goal of local control over schools."94 The
Texas school-finance system was upheld and the district court decision
was reversed.
Undoubtedly, the Supreme Court's decision dealt a serious blow to
the plaintiffs' hopes for immediate reform of the school-finance system.
At the same time, however, the process of the Rodriguez case served as a
catalyst for reform in the long run.
Although it was fleeting, the plaintiffs did enjoy a dramatic victory for
a short period of time-a victory not without consequences. For over a
year, Texas citizens lived with the burdensome knowledge that their edu-
cation system was unconstitutional. "Throughout 1972, a great many
studies relating to school finance options were carried out, and many di-
verse recommendations were made in regard to both revenue and alloca-
tion plans." 95 Education became the state's overriding political issue-
and would remain so for over two decades.
The district court's decision in Rodriguez, along with the accompa-
nying public relations work of MALDEF and IDRA, helped to trans-
form the central issue of education from whether the education-finance
system should be changed to how it was to be changed. And this trans-
formation continued despite the Supreme Court's reversal of the lower
90. Id. at 35.
91. See id. at 36-37.
92. Id. at 49.
93. Id.
94. Sparkman & Stevens, supra note 76, at 333.
95. WALKER & CASEY, supra note 27, at 10.
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court's decision. "[T]he publicity surrounding the case raised the con-
sciousness of state leaders, legislators, and residents of Texas concerning
the inequities of the Texas public school finance system."96
Equally important, in reversing the trial court's decision, the Supreme
Court made clear that the Texas education-finance system needed repair.
While stopping short of Justice Stewart's concurring contention that the
Texas system was "chaotic and unjust," 7 the majority decision began
with a stark picture of the severity of education inequity in Texas;98 the
majority opinion also stressed that "this Court's action today is not to be
viewed as placing its judicial imprimatur on the status quo."99 The Court
went on to implore explicitly elected officials to find a solution to the
school-finance problem. Having had their dirty laundry aired nationally,
Texas politicians jockeyed for position in the reformation movement.
2. Introducing the Players
Not only did Rodriguez foreshadow and define the issues that would
take center stage in the late 1980s, the federal case also introduced the
players who would star in the Edgewood production.
As mentioned earlier, San Antonio's chapters of both MALDEF and
IDRA worked on the earliest Rodriguez litigation. The relationship de-
veloped during the federal equity case would serve as a convenient basis
for their collaboration in the state equity cases.
In those cases, the two organizations played different, but for the
most part complementary, roles. MALDEF,'0° a legal advocacy group,
provided much of the legal strategy and personnel. Albert Kauffman, still
a MALDEF lawyer in San Antonio, wrote the original petition in the
first Edgewood case and has been involved with the case through its sev-
eral incarnations. 1 IDRA,'02 a grant-funding organization founded by
96. Hobby & Walker, supra note 29, at 384.
97. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 59 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("The method of financing public
schools in Texas, as in almost every other state, has resulted in a system of public education that
can fairly be described as chaotic and unjust.").
98. See id at 23.
99. Id. at 58.
100. MALDEF is a national non-profit organization dedicated to legal advocacy for Mexi-
can-Americans' rights.
101. Interview with Albert Kauffman, Attorney for Mexican American Legal Defense and
Education Foundation, in San Antonio, Tex. (Mar. 20,1996).
102. According to Albert Cortez, IDRA was originally formed with "Texas Educational
Excellence" funds as an advocacy group that would provide research and technical assistance to
groups interested in reforms. Recently, its funding sources have shifted from private grants to a
number of federal and state grants and contracts. IDRA currently has forty employees working
on a whole range of advocacy projects. Telephone Interview with Albert Cortez, Researcher at
the Intercultural Development and Research Association (Apr. 3, 1996).
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Edgewood Superintendent Dr. Jose Cardenas, provided technical assis-
tance in the form of research and number-crunching. Both MALDEF
and IDRA, however, shared a heightened interest in advocating issues
important to Mexican-Americans. In fact, these organizations took on
the Edgewood case in hopes of protecting the rights of the primarily
Mexican-American community served by the Edgewood School Dis-
trict'03 MALDEF and IDRA's dedication to Mexican-Americans' con-
cerns would have a clear impact on the early rounds of the Edgewood
litigation.
At the same time, one of the lessons of the Rodriguez reversal was on
the need for thorough factual data to back up any claim that Texas's fi-
nance system was discriminatory. In Rodriguez, the majority chastised
the district court for passing over key factual threshold issues.'O The
Court pointed to the "absence of any evidence that the financing system
discriminates against any definable category of 'poor' people or that it
results in the absolute deprivation of education."'0' Many observers
would agree that, "in fact, the original Rodriguez lawsuit ... was lost be-
cause of the total absence of the factual basis."' 6 Heeding this warning,
Dr. Cardenas of the IDRA helped form a spin-off organization to con-
centrate on the constant number-crunching necessary for careful consid-
eration of school-finance reform. This IDRA spin-off, the Equity Center,
was a crucial factor in the plaintiffs' eventual success in the Edgewood
cases.
Directed by former IDRA employee Craig Foster, the Equity Center
accepts membership dues from low wealth school districts in exchange
for its advocacy services. Representing 380 of the 750 school districts with
property-tax bases poorer than that of the median Texan school district,
the Equity Center serves as a permanent advocacy organization for
poorer school districts around the state.10 Having taken over IDRA's
role (and become independent of IDRA), the Equity Center created the
constant stream of computer printouts that illustrate the distributional
effects of each reform proposal. Foster thereby hoped to remind legisla-
tors of the poorer and less influential school districts in their electoral dis-
tricts and to assure lawmakers of education equity's political viability.
Perhaps more importantly, Foster cultured a familiarity with Texas
politicians and learned to navigate the Capitol, periodically reminding
politicians of his member-districts' interests. While a number of other
states have developed ad hoe lobbying groups to promote court-induced
103. Id.
104. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 25.
105. Id. at 25.




finance reform, Foster believes that Texas is unique in having a perma-
nent political voice for poorer districts.'O'
While an evaluation of the impact of Foster's organization will come
later, the Equity Center was unquestionably a critical factor in the attack
on the Texas school-finance system. The Equity Center, throughout the
Edgewood drama, served as a strategic foil to MALDEF's emphasis on
judicial remediation. While Foster and his staff were actively involved in
the litigation, the Equity Center's primary role was to keep pressure on
the Legislature. "We knew when we formed that litigation was going to
be the major part of our program," he said, "but we adopted the policy
that we would always go first to the Legislature."' 9 Foster, using state-of-
the-art computers, supplied legislators with maps showing the funding
patterns of their constituents' school districts under various remedial
schemes, and, using his hard-earned understanding of Texas's good-ol'-
boy politics, Foster orchestrated a constantly changing coalition of sym-
pathetic legislators.
As the Edgewood cases evolved, a number of other interest groups
came and went. Groups of high-wealth districts coalesced to fight
MALDEF, IDRA, and the Equity Center's efforts. The ideals and con-
stituents of those three organizations changed over time as well.
MALDEF, IDRA, and the Equity Center, however, served as the main
characters of the Edgewood drama until the final curtain.
3. A Nation at Risk and House Bill 72
In the wake of Rodriguez came one legislative change after another.
The Minimum Foundation Program was renamed the Foundation School
Program ("FSP"). In 1975, the Texas Legislature adopted House Bill
1126, which added a second "tier" of equalization aid that was "grafted
onto the foundation program and targeted to property-poor districts."'1 °
House Bill 1126 marked the beginnings of the two-tiered state aid pro-
gram still in place today."' However, momentum for equity reforms
108. Id. ("We are the largest association of poor school districts in the world.").
109. Id.
110. Hobby & Walker, supra note 29, at 391. At the time of this implementation, the aid
provided in the second tier was quite sparse. The Legislature simply created a $50 million fund
to distribute to districts that were well below average in property wealth per child. See id. at 391
n.61.
111. The Foundation School Program has comprised two tiers since 1975. Local districts
have often raised unequalized funds at tax rates beyond the second tier, tapping into what has
been often called the "third tier."
In 1989, the Legislature expanded the second-tier equalization program by guaranteeing a
certain revenue yield for every penny of local tax effort, regardless of the property wealth of the
local district. See infra notes 206, 411-415 and accompanying text. For an in-depth discussion of
how these tiers function today, see infra Subsection III.D.4.b.
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quickly evaporated, and only minimal positive equity effects were
achieved as a result of this legislation. Other "reforms" were limited to
piecemeal tweaking of different aspects of the foundation program.
While Texans wrangled over the details of their Foundation School
Program, Americans critically evaluated their education system as a
whole. They were disappointed, if not horrified, by what they found.
Spurred by the growing importance of the worldwide market, Americans
compared themselves with their economic competitors around the world.
In 1983, the National Commission on Excellence in Education galvanized
Americans' greatest self-doubts in its report, titled A Nation at Risk: The
Imperative for Educational Reform. In the report, which has since be-
come a part of the education reform canon, the Commission invoked the
strongest of all metaphors, reporting that, "[i]f an unfriendly foreign
power had attempted to impose on America the mediocre educational
performance that exists today, we might well have viewed it as an act of
war. As it stands, we have allowed this to happen to ourselves."
11 2
Apparently, the national focus on education, immortalized in the
strong language of A Nation at Risk, helped spur the Texas Legislature to
take a more drastic approach to education reform. According to William
P. Hobby, Lieutenant Governor at the time, "House Bill 72 was Texas
government's response 11 3 to A Nation at Risk.
In 1983, faced with the combined pressures of the specter of
Rodriguez, A Nation at Risk, and static state revenues, Governor Mark
White appointed billionaire H. Ross Perot to chair a Select Committee
on Public Education.11 4 After a year-long investigation by this Commit-
tee, a whole range of education reforms were proposed. The proposals
covered everything from the structure of the school-finance system to the
length of the school day."'
Although House Bill 72 was considered a sweeping package of re-
forms, it made only minor changes to the structure of the education-
112. NAT'L COMM'N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., A NATION AT RISK: THE IMPERATIVE
FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM 5 (1983). The Commission warned:
Our Nation is at risk. Our once unchallenged preeminence in commerce, industry, sci-
ence, and technological innovation is being overtaken by competitors throughout the
world .... We report to the American people that while we can take justifiable pride
in what our schools and colleges have historically accomplished and contributed to
the United States and the well-being of its people, the educational foundations of our
society are presently being eroded by a rising tide of mediocrity that threatens our
very future as a Nation and a people.
Id.
113. Hobby, supra note 38, at 2.
114. See Bill McMurray, Governor Wants No Nonsense with the No-pass, No-play Rule,
Hous. CHRON., Sept. 5, 1985, at 10.
115. See, e.g., Paul Taylor, Texas Governor To Present Education Package in Special Ses-
sion, WASH. POST, May 12, 1984, at A3.
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finance system. House Bill 72's finance system became the baseline from
which Edgewood plaintiffs would fight for reform. The sum result of all
of these changes was that aid to poorer school districts increased by sev-
eral hundred million dollars a year-at least on paper.
In terms of the Edgewood cases, perhaps one of the most important
provisions of House Bill 72 was the refinement of the Foundation School
Program. 6 The state and the local school districts shared education ex-
penses. The cost of facilities, however, were borne entirely by the dis-
tricts.117 "Under the [House Bill 72's version of the Foundation School
Program], the amount of state aid received by any given district [was]
'equalized' according to a complex formula, so that low property wealth
districts generally receive substantially more state aid than do the high
property wealth districts."""8
While many of House Bill 72's education reforms remain (often con-
troversial) staples of the Texas education system, the school-finance
components of Perot's plan soon faced two insurmountable challenges.
First, as the boom of the early 1980s began to wane, the Texas economy
fell into recession. Oil prices plummeted. Suddenly, rather than increas-
ing school funding, politicians were scrambling to maintain the status
quo; the money was simply unavailable. 9 In the end, funding for educa-
tion escaped relatively untouched, suffering only minor cutsY °
While House Bill 72 may have been able to survive the recession,
Perot's proposals faced a second, more formidable challenge. The Edge-
wood plaintiffs had been waiting in the wings. They were poised to sue if
House Bill 72 did not remedy the inequities in the state funding system.
121
Unsatisfied, they filed suit. In January 1987, Edgewood v. Kirby went to
trial.
116. See WALKER & CASEY, supra note 27, at 12-13.
117. See Lau, supra note 79, at 188.
118. Kirby v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 761 S.W.2d 859,861 (Tex. App. 1988).
119. Interview with J. David Thompson III, Bracewell & Patterson, L.L.P. and Former
General Counsel for the Texas Education Agency, in Houston, Tex. (Mar. 14,1996).
120. See WALKER & CASEY, supra note 27, at 13. Taxpayers, however, were hit with in-
creases in sales and gasoline taxes. Politically, House Bill 72 suffered. So, despite House Bill
72's potential for salient reforms, it was dramatically weakened by "a decline in the state econ-
omy, an accompanying decrease in state revenues, failure to overhaul the antiquated Texas
state tax system, and the dissolution of legislative agreement on basic school finance values."
WALKER & CASEY, supra note 49, at 95.
121. See Lawrence 0. Picus & Linda Hertert, Three Strikes You're Out: Texas School Fi-
nance After Edgewood III, 18 J. EDUC. FIN. 366,368 (1993).
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B. Edgewood I
1. The District Victory
From the perspective of the legal strategist, the Rodriguez reversal
was not so much a rejection of the plaintiffs' argument as a rejection of
the plaintiffs' choice of venue. In denying the plaintiffs' federal equal
protection claims, "[t]he Rodriguez decision implie[d] that public school
finance systems may be successfully challenged only at the state level on
state constitutional grounds. This implication has been referred to as the
'Rodriguez loophole."" The so-called "Rodriguez loophole" would
frame the Edgewood cases.
The Edgewood drama's first scene opened in the court room of Texas
District Court Judge Harley Clark in Travis County. During the early
months of 1987, Judge Clark listened carefully as MALDEF's Albert
Kauffman led an ever-growing group of school districts's in a two-
flanked attack on Texas's school-finance system under the Texas Consti-
tution. 24 The plaintiffs argued that the school-finance system was uncon-
stitutional under two provisions of the Texas Constitution. The first pro-
vision, article I, section 3, mandates that "All free men, when they form a
social compact, have equal rights . .. ." ' From the plaintiffs' perspective,
this provision begged for a Rodriguez-style equal protection claim. Sec-
ond, the plaintiffs seized on the Texas Constitution's "efficient system"
provision in article VII, section 1, which requires that the state legislature
"establish and make suitable provision for the support and maintenance
of an efficient system of public free schools. '1 26 The plaintiffs hoped to
incorporate notions of "equity" into the Constitution's mandate of
"efficiency."
The plaintiffs' two-pronged strategy cannot be disentangled from the
bifurcated political dynamics that created it. That is, the fact that the case
122. Lau, supra note 79, at 195 ("The 'Rodriguez loophole' has proved to be effective for
plaintiffs challenging public school finance systems in states such as Arkansas, California, Con-
necticut, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.").
123. Kauffman's original plaintiffs numbered thirteen disgruntled school districts. Soon,
fifty-five other poor districts, organized by Craig Foster and the Equity Center, entered the suit
as plaintiff-intervenors. The plaintiff-intervenor districts brought several well-known and politi-
cally powerful private attorneys to the plaintiff team. According to Kauffman, "[t]he plaintiff-
intervenors brought in excellent lawyers," including David Richards of Richards, Wiseman &
Durst and Rick Gray of Gray & Becker. Mr. Richards, well-known in Texas political circles, is
the ex-husband of ex-Governor Ann Richards. Interview with Albert Kauffman, supra note 101.
124. The plaintiffs also made a short-lived "due course of law guarantee" claim under arti-
cle I, section 19, of the Texas Constitution. See Picus & Hertert, supra note 121, at 368.
125. TEx. CONST. art. 1, § 3.
126. Edgewood 1,761 S.W.2d 859, 867 (Tex. App. 1988).
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had two distinct groups of plaintiffs betrayed an underlying ideological
division over what legal route would best produce equitable funding for
Texas schools. Generally speaking, Kauffnan of MALDEF and his
original plaintiff group hoped to pursue an "equal protection" attack on
the funding system. MALDEF, as an advocacy group for Mexican-
Americans, favored the "equal protection" analysis because it was more
conducive to an ethnic-discrimination argument.'27
For political reasons, meanwhile, Foster of the Equity Center and his
plaintiff-intervenors preferred to concentrate on the "efficient system"
provision of the Texas Constitution and to use the equal-protection ar-
gument in the context of wealth instead of race.ln He hoped to attack the
system for its inherent weaknesses rather than its disparate effects. Nei-
ther of these two strategies became the exclusive domain of either group.
Both groups made both arguments, although each group seemed to favor
one strategy over the other. 29
While the plaintiffs' complaint alleged that the finance system vio-
lated both the "equal protection" (article I, section 3) and "efficient sys-
tem" (article VII, section 1) provisions of the Texas Constitution, in the
initial pleadings Foster's plan to use a wealth-based rather than race-
based equal protection claim was emphasized. The plaintiffs, as a cohe-
sive front, concentrated on the state's disparate treatment of poor and
wealthy students. This "equal protection" strategy maintained that the
education-finance system valued the rights of wealthy-district students
over the rights of poor-district students. Of course, this argument closely
mirrors the Rodriguez plaintiffs' unsuccessful arguments from fifteen
years before. This time, however, the arguments arose out of the Texas
Constitution, and this time the outcome was different.
Based on the ideas that (1) education is vitally important and (2) edu-
cation is specifically mentioned in article VII of the Texas Constitution,
Kauffman first argued that education is a fundamental right (and thereby
required the equivalent of "strict scrutiny") for the purposes of equal
protection analysis. (The Supreme Court had relied on education's ab-
sence from the United States Constitution for its decision in
Rodriguez.13 ) Given education's status as a fundamental state right, the
plaintiffs argued, the state could not provide unequal protection or
treatment of that right without some compelling interest. Hence, through
its education funding system, the state of Texas unjustly treated groups of
students differently solely on the basis of the property wealth of their
127. See id.
128. Interview with Albert Kauffman, supra note 101.
129. The distinct implications and success of these different strategies will be discussed in
more detail. See infra Part IV.
130. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35.
Yale Law & Policy Review
school district. True to his core MALDEF constituency, however,
Kauffman also presented an alternative race-based argument. Because
the poorest school districts generally had the highest concentrations of
Mexican-American students, Kauffman made a disparate impact argu-
ment. Maintaining that education is a "fundamental right" under the
state constitution and that wealth and race are suspect classifications,
Kauffman's team demanded that Judge Clark strictly scrutinize the
school-funding system and declare it unconstitutional. 3 '
The "efficiency" strategy was more straightforward. The plaintiff
team, still relying heavily on testimony and research from Foster,"2 main-
tained that such an inequitable finance system was "inefficient" in viola-
tion of article VII, section 1, of the Texas Constitution. That section, as
mentioned above, required that the state legislature "establish and make
suitable provision for the support and maintenance of an efficient system
of public free schools." '133 Plaintiffs made the case that "efficiency" de-
notes "fiscal neutrality" in public school funding and mandates that the
level of expenditures per pupil in a district should not vary in accordance
with the property wealth of that district' 34
In response to this two-pronged attack, the defendants, who were
rapidly growing in number, 35 argued that education was not a
"fundamental right" and that "equal protection" analysis thus did not
apply. According to these wealthier districts, whatever disparities arose
out of the Texas education system were necessary side-effects of the
cherished, if not constitutionally mandated, notion of local control. Some
defendant-intervenor school districts, ignoring the apparent irony of the
argument, also pushed a "money doesn't matter" argument, citing aca-
demic studies disputing the link between financial inputs and test scores
or student achievement.
1 36
Despite the State's best efforts, in June of 1987, the district court re-
jected the State's and the wealthy districts' contentions. Judge Clark
ruled that Texas's school-finance system was inequitable and therefore
131. See Edgewood 1, 761 S.W.2d at 860.
132. Interview with Albert Kauffman, supra note 101.
133. Edgewood 1, 761 S.W.2d at 867.
134. See id. at 861.
135. The state was not left to defend the system by itself. Spurred by fear that Democratic
Attorney General Jim Mattox would not adequately defend the status quo, two separate groups
of wealthy school districts joined in the suit, bringing with them private attorneys to protect
their interests. Attorney Earl Luna led one group, while Attorney Jim Turner represented an-
other group. Interview with J. David Thompson III, supra note 119. By the time the trial began,
the state of Texas was joined in its defense by no fewer than forty-nine defendant-intervenor
districts. See WALKER & CASEY, supra note 27, at 13.
136. Interview with Kevin O'Hanlon, Former Assistant Attorney General of Texas and
Former General Counsel for the Texas Education Agency, in Austin, Tex. (Mar. 20,1996).
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unconstitutional under both the "equal protection" and "efficient sys-
tem" provisions of the Texas Constitution.'3 7 Rejecting the defendants'
Rodriguez-style defense and accepting the plaintiffs' call for strict-
scrutiny, Judge Clark concluded that education is a "fundamental right"
and that wealth is a "suspect classification" in the school-finance con-
text."8 The school-finance system was therefore in violation of the equal-
rights provision of article I, section 3, of the state constitution. Further-
more, the court declared that the current system was "inefficient' '139 and
would have to be overhauled in order to provide each school district with
"the same ability as every other district to obtain (by state funds or local
taxes or both) funds for education, including the costs of facilities and
equipment.'
140
The State's only victory came at the expense of Kauffman's race-
based equal protection claim. On every other point, the plaintiffs were
victorious. The state district court gave the Texas Legislature two years-
until September 1, 1989-to create a constitutional school-finance sys-
tem. The equitable and efficient system would have to be ready for im-
plementation by September 1, 1990.
4'
2. An Appellate Defeat
For the second time, the Texas education-finance system had failed
constitutional scrutiny.142 Yet, once again, the plaintiffs' sweeping victory
proved short-lived. Just eighteen months later, the Court of Appeals of
Texas in Austin voted 2-1 to overrule Judge Clark and re-
constitutionalize the old Texas education-finance system.143
If the state district court decision reads like an appeal of Rodriguez,
the court of appeals decision reads like Rodriguez itself. The court of ap-
peals returned to Rodriguez's reading of the United States Constitution
to undercut the plaintiffs' argument that wealth is a suspect classifica-
tion, 44 declaring that "[o]ur analysis under the Texas Constitution
137. See Edgewood 1, 777 S.W.2d 391, 391 (Tex. 1989).
138. Edgewood 1, 761 S.W.2d at 860.
139. Id.
140. WALKER & CASEY, supra note 49, at 96.
141. See Julie Blase, Texas Lawmakers Hope Third Try Will Bring Fair School Financing,
CHRIsTiAN Sci. MoNrrOR, May 8, 1990, at 7.
142. The first failure came in the federal district court's decision in Rodriguez v. San Anto-
nio Independent School District, 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1971). See supra Subsection
III.A.1.
143. See EdgewoodI,761 S.W.2d at 860.
144. Based on the following excerpt from Rodriguez, the court of appeals refused to strictly
scrutinize a wealth-based classification:
[Aippellees' suit asks this Court to extend its most exacting scrutiny to review a system
that allegedly discriminates against a large, diverse, and amorphous class, unified only
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reaches no different result. 1 4 Frequently citing Rodriguez, the court de-
clared that Judge Clark was mistaken to qualify education as a
"fundamental right." While acknowledging the importance and long his-
tory of public education, the court stated that "importance" and
"fundamental right" are not synonymous concepts.'4 The notion of a
"fundamental right," the court emphasized, refers to a limitation on state
power, not "an affirmative obligation upon government to insure that all
persons have the financial resources available to exercise their liberty or
fundamental rights."' 47 The court apparently found a rational basis for
the wealth-based classification in the state's interest in maintaining "local
control" of school districts. While the court's reliance on local control
seems tentative at best, it does maintain that "[t]he scheme of local fi-
nancing that [has] evolved is not wholly irrelevant to the goal of local
control. ,,148
The court of appeals also quietly and in short order disposed of the
second, "efficiency" prong of the plaintiffs' strategy. According to the
court, because article VII, section 1, of the Texas Constitution gives no
guidance as to what "efficiency" means, the question of efficiency is
"essentially a political question not suitable for judicial review. 149 Here
the court foreshadowed one of the most divisive issues of the Edgewood
drama.5
3. A Supreme Court Victory
Not surprisingly, the plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenors challenged the
court of appeals decision. During 1989, all eyes turned to the Supreme
by the common factor of residence in districts that happen to have less taxable wealth
than other districts. The system of alleged discrimination and the class it defines have
none of the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is not saddled with such disabili-
ties, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to
such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection
from the majoritarian political process. We thus conclude that the Texas system does
not operate to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class.
Id. at 864 (quoting Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 862.
147. Id. at 863. The court found that "the district court erroneously elevated the important
state interest of financing educational opportunity into a protected right on the same level with
ancient liberties long recognized by the courts as fundamental, such recognized rights which do
not depend upon public financial support." Id.
148. Id. at 867.
149. Id. at 863.
150. Judge Shannon concluded for the court: "The opinion and judgment of this Court
should not be viewed as an affirmation that the present school financing system is desirable or
that it should continue without change; rather, our conclusion is solely that the system is not in
violation of the Constitution of Texas." Id at 867.
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Court of Texas. Kauffman's team of poor districts... faced off in court
against a collection of the state's wealthiest neighborhoods.52 The court
of appeals had relieved the Texas Legislature of Judge Clark's deadline,
but political pressure to reform the finance system had only intensified.
Politicians anxiously awaited the high court's decision to see just what
their role in the reform process would be.
On October 2, 1989, the Supreme Court of Texas finally decided
Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby. 53 In a unanimous deci-
sion, the court reversed the appellate court and once again declared the
Texas school financing system unconstitutional. Focusing on the plain-
tiffs' "efficiency" provision, the high court affirmed, but modified, the
district court's decision.
Poor districts across the state rejoiced, with perhaps the greatest cele-
bration occurring back in Edgewood. That long march of protest, begun
in 1968, had reached its greatest milestone. "This is vindication of 20
years of struggle," said James Vasquez, superintendent of the Edgewood
school district. "We poor school districts have been carrying a tremen-
dous burden for a long, long time, with the most kids, the most pressing
needs and the poorest tax bases.... A fairer system cannot come too
soon. ' m Vasquez and the other plaintiffs celebrated not only the victory
but also what they believed was the struggle's end.
The supreme court began its indictment of the Texas school-finance
system by echoing the angry and incredulous sentiments of the original
Edgewood protesters. After rehashing the contrasts in property wealth
between Alamo Heights and Edgewood, 55 the court explained exactly
how Texas's education-finance system perpetuates such disparity. Under
the Foundation School Program, the state distributed aid to districts un-
der a complex formula that gave poorer districts more money than
wealthier districts.' 56 As the court emphasized, however, that program did
not "cover even the cost of meeting the state-mandated minimum re-
151. By now, the plaintiff team had grown to include 67 districts and a number of individu-
als. See Edgewood 1, 777 S.W.2d 391, 391-92 (Tex. 1989).
152. Kauffman was joined as counsel by David Hall of Texas Rural Legal Aid in Weslaco,
Texas. Richards and Gray continued to represent the plaintiff-intervenors. The attorneys for
the defendant/respondents included Earl Luna from the office of Robert E. Luna in Dallas,
James Deatherage from the office of Power, Deatherage, Tharp & Blankenship in Irving, Kevin
O'Hanlon and Jim Mattox from the Office of the Attorney General, Timothy Hall from Hughes
& Luce in Austin, and Jerry Hoodenpyle from Rohne, Hoodenpyle, Lobert & Myers in Arling-
ton. See id. at 391.
153. See id.
154. David Maraniss, Texas Schools' Financing Ruled Unconstitutional; Court Orders
Lawmakers to Find Alternative, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 1989, at A14.
155. See Edgewood 1, 777 S.W.2d at 392.
156. See id.
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quirements. '' 15 7 Such dramatic disparities arose out of the system's reli-
ance on local property taxes for enrichment of education funds. Poorer
districts had to tax at a much higher rate than wealthy districts and still
could not raise equal funding.158 The supreme court expressed grave con-
cern about the fact that poorer districts were becoming mired in a self-
perpetuating cycle of poverty, without any opportunity for escape.
"Because of their inadequate tax base, they must tax at significantly
higher rates in order to meet minimum requirements for accreditation;
yet their educational programs are typically inferior." '159 Of course, these
higher taxes frightened off tax-paying businesses, forcing poor districts to
raise property taxes further. "[T]he property-poor districts with their
high tax rates and inferior schools are unable to attract new industry or
development and so have little opportunity to improve their tax base."
' 6
Meanwhile, wealthy districts, with their relatively low tax rates, repre-
sented state-sanctioned tax-havens for savvy businesses.
Although it shared Kauffman's disgust with the finance system's dis-
parities, the supreme court was more selective than the district court in
its endorsement of the plaintiffs' reasoning. Modifying some of Judge
Clark's declarations, the high court did not reach the question of equal
protection at all.'61 The supreme court's decision centered exclusively on
the mandate in article VII, section 1, that the Legislature "establish and
make suitable provision for the support and maintenance of an efficient
system of public free schools."1 62 The court expounded on the require-
ment of "an efficient system" and determined that the Texas education
system fell well short of that constitutional mandate.""
The court first had to dispose of the lower court's holding that defin-
ing "efficiency" is an inherently political issue that cannot be determined
by the courts, which it did directly:
We disagree. This is not an area in which the Constitution vests exclusive dis-
cretion in the legislature; rather the language of Article VII, Section 1 im-
poses on the legislature an affirmative duty to establish and provide for the
public free schools. This duty is not committed unconditionally to the legisla-
ture's discretion, but instead is accompanied by standards. By express consti-
tutional mandate, the legislature must make "suitable" provision for an
"efficient" system for the "essential" purpose of a "general diffusion of
knowledge." While these are admittedly not precise terms, they do provide a
157. Id. at 392.
158. See id. at 392-93.
159. Id. at 393.
160. Id.
161. See id.
162. TEx. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
163. See Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d at 394-97.
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standard by which this court must, when called upon to do so, measure the
constitutionality of the legislature's actions.'
64
Having determined that the matter of "efficiency" is in fact a justici-
able question, the supreme court confronted the more difficult task of de-
fining "efficiency." Despite its disclaimer that "because of the difficulties
inherent in determining the intent of voters over a century ago, we rely
heavily on the literal text,"' ' the supreme court delved into the records
of the Texas Constitutional Convention of 1875.'6 The court sought to
determine what the framers did not mean by "efficiency." The court em-
phasized that the ratifiers carefully chose the word "efficient," as op-
posed to "economical," "inexpensive" or "cheap,"1 67 and that "in man-
dating 'efficiency,' the constitutional framers and ratifiers did not intend
a system with such vast disparities as now exist. ' '
Based on this understanding of the original meaning of "efficient" in
the Texas Constitution, the court concluded that "the state's financing
system is neither financially efficient nor efficient in the sense of provid-
ing for a 'general diffusion of knowledge' statewide., 169 As such, the fi-
nancing system violated article VII, section 1, of the Texas Constitution.
With the violation established, the court then described what would be
expected of a constitutional financing system:
Efficiency does not require a per capita distribution, but it also does not al-
low concentrations of resources in property-rich school districts that are tax-
ing low when property-poor districts that are taxing high cannot generate
sufficient revenues to meet even minimum standards. There must be a direct
and close correlation between a district's tax effort and the educational re-
sources available to it; in other words, districts must have substantially equal
access to similar revenues per pupil at similar levels of tax effort.
170
In the final analysis, the court's mandate was a relatively simple one.
It did not, on its face, require a new source of funding. Nor did it require
a large-scale redistribution of funds or limit local enrichment of state-
provided funds. The supreme court's decision simply interpreted the effi-
ciency clause of the Texas Constitution as requiring fiscal neutrality.1
7
1
164. Id at 394.
165. Id.
166. See id. at 395.
167. Id-
168. Id. at 396.
169. Id. at397.
170. Id.
171. To a large degree, the true motivations of the justices remain unknown, particularly in
relationship to the ever-present dual concerns of equity and adequacy in education. By basing
their decision on "efficiency," the justices of the Texas Supreme Court held their cards close to
their vests. Both the inequitable and the inadequate aspects of the Texas school finance system
seemed to concern the court. Just which failures of the system most inspired each justice is a
sub-plot that develops throughout the remainder of the Edgewood drama.
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According to the court, "a penny of property tax effort in a poor district
must yield the same amount of educational dollars as a penny of tax ef-
fort in a rich district.' ' 2 Quite simply, two districts with similar tax rates
should have similar funds. Rather than mandate absolute fiscal neutral-
ity, however, the court allowed for some level of imprecision by calling
for "substantially equal access" and a "close relation."'73
The simple mandate of Edgewood I ignored the political morass it
would undoubtedly create. How similar tax efforts could yield similar
funds in a state with vast disparities in school districts' property wealth
remained unanswered. Without expressly stating it, the Texas Supreme
Court was indicting the school-finance system's dependence on local
property taxes as the culprit in Texas's inequitable schools. The under-
lying message of Edgewood I was that a district's resources should reflect
that district's tax effort, not that district's property wealth. Perhaps for
political reasons, these nine elected justices couched their decision in
terms of rewarding local effort, rather than condemning local, property-
based funding. One of the primary conflicts of the Edgewood drama is
the justices' vain attempt to walk this political tightrope.
This first supreme court decision, perhaps unavoidably, planted the
seeds of another future conflict: a power struggle between the legislative
and judicial branches of government. Clearly, the court's definition of
"efficiency" was intended to provide parameters for the Legislature to
use in redesigning the school-finance system. Nonetheless, these skeletal
guidelines would later produce criticism from legislators despairing over
the lack of guidance from the court. The Edgewood I decision may cer-
tainly be read as somewhat contradictory. While the court ordered the
Legislature to "take immediate action" 74 to create an "efficient" system
of school finance, the court also acknowledged limits to its demands sys-
tem:
Although we have ruled the school financing system to be unconstitutional,
we do not now instruct the legislature as to the specifics of the legislation it
should enact; nor do we order it to raise taxes. The legislature has primary
responsibility to decide how best to achieve an efficient system ...."'
The Texas Supreme Court gave the Legislature until May 1, 1990, to
repair its unconstitutional education-finance system. 76 The Governor
called a special session of the Legislature in the fall of 1989 to do just
that.
172. Mark Yudof, Court Limited Legislature's Options on School Funding, DALLAS
MORNING NEws, May 9,1993, at 5J.
173. Edgewood 1, 777 S.W.2d at 397.





Despite some legislators' cynicism and the court's self-imposed limita-
tions, the Edgewood I decision did provide a number of standards for the
Legislature to follow. Hoping to assist legislators in their formidable task,
the Texas Association of School Boards extrapolated nine guidelines
from the decision:
1) Under the Texas Constitution, the state has an affirmative obliga-
tion "to make suitable provision for an efficient system" and must
therefore give education funding priority.
2) The finance system must create a direct and close correlation be-
tween a district's tax effort and the educational resources available
to it.
3) School districts must have substantially equal access to similar lev-
els of revenue per pupil at similar levels of tax effort.
4) In ensuring similar levels of revenue per pupil at similar levels of
tax effort, the state may consider differential pupil costs and other
cost differentials.
5) The state's support must not underfund requirements and must
include funding for all costs, including facilities, equipment, and
debt service.
6) The Legislature must ensure horizontal tax equity (equal tax inci-
dence) by either eliminating "tax haven" districts or greatly re-
ducing reliance upon local property taxes.
7) The state must ensure an "efficient system" that produces a
"general diffusion of knowledge," is productive of results, and
maximizes the use of state resources.
8) Unequalized local enrichment is allowed, but such enrichment
must not result from necessity and must be supplemental to the
"efficient" state system.
9) Simply allocating more money into the current finance system is
unacceptable. The "system" itself must change.'n
Faced with the court's mandates, and constrained by the myriad of
political, constitutional, and historical factors mentioned earlier, the
Legislature began work on its first response to the first Edgewood deci-
sion-Senate Bill 1.
a. Recurring Themes: Efficiency, Justiciability, and Politics
At this point, it will be helpful to turn briefly from the litigation nar-
rative in order to introduce formally some of the underlying policy con-
siderations and tensions that will resonate throughout the rest of the
Edgewood litigation. Of the numerous subplots in the Edgewood drama,
177. These nine points are adapted from WALKER & CASEY, supra note 49, at 96-97.
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the evolving influence of three oft-hidden but ever-present specters-
efficiency, justiciability, and politics-repeatedly present formidable legal
questions. Perhaps more important to non-Texan readers, these issues
represent the universal and unifying dilemmas of education-equity litiga-
tion in states across the nation.
First, the notion of "efficiency," in various forms, recurs in each epi-
sode of the Edgewood drama. In Edgewood 1, the court found that the
constitutional concept of "efficiency" calls for "a direct and close correla-
tion between a district's tax effort and the educational resources avail-
able to it; in other words, districts must have substantially equal access to
similar revenues per pupil at similar levels of tax effort."178 One of the re-
vealing and fascinating aspects of this series of cases is how the court's
concept of "efficiency" changes over time. Each new decision reveals a
creative and novel approach to this term.
Another recurring theme of the Edgewood drama is the concept of
"justiciability." As Edgewood I illustrates, at one level the Edgewood
cases represent an ongoing exchange between the judicial and legislative
branches of Texas's government. This interaction takes the form of a
complicated dance, as the two institutions continually redefine their re-
sponsibility for overhauling the school-finance system. At times, the
court and the Legislature bicker over the lead; at others, they struggle to
foist it on one another. Occasionally, the court and Legislature try to
deny their interdependency altogether.
This tense dance begins early in, if not well before, Edgewood L Ac-
cording to Foster, the Legislature and the court were preemptively pass-
ing the buck to each other even before the case was filed. Having
"adopted the policy that we would always go first to the Legislature," '179
Foster discussed the reform process with many politicians. During his
very first attempts to lobby the Legislature, Foster found that legislators
expected the mandate for change to come from the court. Two of the
most powerful men in the Legislature, the Chair of the Ways and Means
Committee and the Chair of the Senate Finance Committee, told Foster
that "[if] you want real equity in the system, you are going to have to go
to the courthouse."'' 0 Libby Linebarger, former Chairperson of the
House Committee on Public Education, echoed that sentiment. Accord-
ing to Linebarger, "the Legislature wouldn't have acted without the liti-
gation because they only act when there is a smoking gun pointed to their
178. Edgewood 1, 777 S.W.2d at 397.




heads.''. For many, only a mandate from the court could provide politi-
cal cover for the difficult decisions to come.
The judicial-legislative tension that incessantly plagued the Edge-
wood drama thus began even before the case was filed. Thereafter, the to
and fro between the judicial and legislative branches only intensified. Af-
ter the court of appeals deferred to the Legislature altogether, the su-
preme court took back the lead, giving the Legislature a deadline for ac-
tion. At the same time, however, the court was careful to acknowledge
the Legislature's "primary responsibility to decide how best to achieve an
efficient system.""' While maintaining the right to approve the final
product, the court seemed to recognize stringent limits on its power to
design the new school-finance system. Nevertheless, the supreme court
clearly included some instructions with its mandate that the Legislature
assemble a new school-finance system.
Predictably, politics was another recurring theme of the Edgewood
cases. On every front, political power-plays shaped the drama's action.
As the court, the Legislature, the plaintiffs, and the defendants jockeyed
against each other for position, various factions were inevitably jockeying
for position within those groups. Nowhere was the political animus more
evident than in the Legislature. As mentioned earlier, many legislators
found themselves pulled in several directions by angry groups of con-
stituents. The Legislature itself was made up of a Gordian knot of favors
and debts, all of which combined to obscure any straightforward attempt
to reform the school-finance system. Each legislator was continually con-
fronted with a "conflict between representing [his] constituencies and
being part of the club."'
Also, as the poor districts organized to trumpet their cause, the
wealthy districts organized to protect their resources from dreaded
"recapture"-a politician's term for the redistribution of locally raised
property taxes. The combined political clout of oil and gas interests (that
had been using wealthy school districts as tax havens) and wealthy resi-
dential areas created a potent lobby. As Kauffman realized early on,
"[t]he strongest constraints were political. And, of course, that was re-
lated to money."'' 4 Of course, the fact that Texans elect the justices of the
Texas Supreme Court added one more political dimension to the Edge-
wood drama-a factor that became more important as the Edgewood
drama unfolds. Edgewood I demonstrated that any reform can only be
181. Interview with Libby Linebarger, Former Chairperson of the House Committee on
Public Education, in Austin, Tex. (Mar. 20,1996).
182. Edgewood 1, 777 S.W.2d at 399.
183. Interview with Craig Foster, supra note 73.
184. Interview with Albert Kauffman, supra note 101.
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achieved within the context of the complicated give-and-take of Texan
politics.
b. Abandoned Arguments
Edgewood I introduces the themes of efficiency, justiciability, and
politics that recur in each of the subsequent cases. Edgewood I is perhaps
most noteworthy, however, for what it does not introduce. In the process
of assessing the "efficiency" of the school-finance system, the supreme
court left behind several well-developed arguments for reform.
First and most obviously absent from the decision is the plaintiffs'
equal protection claim. As discussed earlier,1'8 Kauffman and Foster util-
ized two parallel legal strategies in the original petition against the
State"l The first of these two strategies, the equal protection claim, was
denied by the court in two distinct phases. First, the district court denied
a race-based equal protection claim. Second, the supreme court ignored
the plaintiffs' wealth-based equal protection claim.
At the district court level, both the wealth-based equal protection
claim and the "efficiency" argument won. At the supreme court, how-
ever, the equal protection argument fell by the wayside altogether. While
the court never explicitly rejected that line of reasoning, it did avoid the
issue. "Because we have decided that the school financing system violates
the Texas Constitution's 'efficiency' provision," wrote the unanimous
majority, "we need not consider petitioners' other constitutional argu-
ments." 17 The plaintiffs' equal protection argument thus simply fell off
the table.
As both Kauffman and Foster acknowledge, any court would be re-
luctant to take on an "equal protection" claim. In contrast with the
"efficiency" argument, an equal protection claim is much less "crisp" and
clear-cut. That is, the fact that each school district serves both poor and
wealthy kids, or both white and brown kids, muddles the claim that the
discrimination is aimed at one identifiable group. An "equal protection"
strategy forces a court to make coarse generalizations, ignoring wealthy
kids in poorer districts and poor kids in wealthier districts. "We looked at
the data and we saw that the Mexican-American population around the
state was disproportionately concentrated in low-wealth schools sys-
tems," explained Albert Cortez, one of IDRA's strategists and number-
crunchers. "The difficulty was that there were also some in major urban
185. See supra Subsection III.A.2.
186. Kauffman, a MALDEF lawyer, had hoped to pursue a Fourteenth-Amendment-style
equal protection claim against the State for unjustly discriminating against Mexican-American
and poor students via the education finance system. Interview with Albert Kauffman, supra
note 101.
187. Edgewood 1, 777 S.W.2d at 398.
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areas and in above-average wealth districts. That kind of complicated the
situation. ' 'l 8
Of course, given his dedication to MALDEF's goals of racial equality,
Kauffman was disappointed that the supreme court completely ignored
the equal protection claim. Kauffman had envisioned using the equal
protection argument for Mexican-Americans as a group (much like fed-
eral voting rights arguments had been used in the past)." 9 Kauffman's
statistics make a compelling case. According to Kauffman, thirty percent
of students in Texas are Mexican-American. Of the bottom 5% of stu-
dents in terms of education funding, 95% of them are Mexican-
American. Of the bottom 25% in terms of education funding, 65% are
Mexican-American.' 9 Kauffman blames himself for not being able to
make that argument fly. "We did not put on as thorough a record as we
could have," he said. "We should have developed that better."'
191
While Kauffman regrets not pushing the ethnic component before the
court more forcefully, he does acknowledge the political risks of such an
argument. "There's no doubt that having the Mexican-American issue in
there would have made it tough to deal with the Legislature," he admit-
ted. Stopping short of accusing the Legislature of racism, Kauffman ad-
mitted a court mandate to increase spending on Mexican-American chil-
dren's education "raises hackles more" than a mandate to educate "poor
kids everywhere."' 92 Nevertheless, Kauffman, perhaps more for reasons
of principle than pragmatism, still wishes he could have another shot at
the equal protection claim. "To this day, I still feel there was discrimina-
tion," he said. "The main reason this was allowed to go on was discrimi-
nation against Mexican-Americans." ' '93
For Foster, whose constituents included a number of poor, primarily
Anglo school districts, the political risk of such a race-based strategy
outweighed its potential gain. Foster felt that if school-finance reform
was defined as a Mexican-American issue, he would never be able to get
the Legislature on board. The resistance would be too strong. In fact,
Foster's fear was the impetus for organizing the plaintiff-intervenors in
the first place. "The reason for [bringing in the plaintiff-intervenors] was
that MALDEF was unwilling to give up the ethnic component even
though David Long from California [attorney in Serrano v. Priest?94] and
188. Telephone Interview with Albert Cortez, supra note 102; Interview with Kevin
O'Hanlon, supra note 136.





194. 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1977).
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everybody that had ever done a school-finance lawsuit said that you
don't really get anything out of that if you have an inequitable system,"
Foster explained. "It is best to just go with inequity for everybody and
not try to make it an ethnic or racial thing. That was the mood in 1986-
87."' 9 According to Foster, many poor school districts did not want to be
represented by MALDEF, so he organized the plaintiff-intervenors and
hired a separate set of attorneys.196
While he was sympathetic to Kauffman's perspective, Foster felt that
pragmatism demanded a straight-forward, non-ethnically-based constitu-
tional attack. "Judges don't want to deal with [the equal protection is-
sue]," said Foster. "If they have another basis that is effective, they will
choose that rather than the racial issue."197 The court did precisely that,
leaving Kauffman's equal protection theory behind in favor of a more
straightforward attack on the system's "efficiency."
The second most important concept not explicitly present in the
Edgewood I decision was "adequacy." Unlike the equal protection issue,
however, the adequacy issue never found its way into court-at least not
initially. In the litigation's earliest planning stages, the plaintiffs had re-
jected an argument based on adequacy in favor equity.
At the time Kauffman filed the first petition, an equity-based lawsuit
seemed the obvious choice. The first reason was precedent. The immedi-
ate precedent for the Edgewood case was Serrano v. Priest, a successful
challenge to California's school-finance model that sounded in equity.9 '
The second reason to avoid the adequacy issue is that an equity ar-
gument is generally much simpler and more straightforward. Kauffman
and Foster agreed that they would rather present numbers than curricu-
lum to the court.1'9 With an equity suit, all the pertinent information can
be presented as monetary figures. The basic argument is that one school
has more money than another school. An adequacy suit, on the other
hand, requires establishing some minimum standard of education by
which to judge all schools. The plaintiffs doubted that a court would be
willing to take on that task.
Perhaps most important in the decision to stay with the equity argu-
ment, the facts of the Texas financing scheme lent themselves to an eq-
uity suit. The plaintiffs' dramatic 700-to-1 ratio of property wealth be-
tween the richest and poorest districts was ripe for use in an equity-based
195. Interview with Craig Foster, supra note 73.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Unlike the Edgewood cases, however, Serrano was based in part on an equal protec-
tion claim. See Serrano, 557 P.2d at 929.
199. Interview with Craig Foster, supra note 73; Interview with Albert Kauffman, supra
note 101.
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attack on the system. Even though "[t]here is an adequacy case out
there," the Edgewood plaintiffs chose to pursue an equity suit.
"We made a strategic decision not to [use an adequacy argument],"
explained Kauffman. "We had a much cleaner and clearer case under
equity."2 1
Foster agreed. "All of the advice was to deal with the equity issue be-
cause that was so bad," he said. "That was an obvious one. If we can win
on anything, we can win on this."
According to Albert Cortez of IDRA, an equity approach immedi-
ately put the wealthier districts on the defensive, forcing them into self-
contradiction. "We wanted to make them justify the level of disparity
that existed," said Cortez. "It gave us the advantage. They tried to argue
that money did not make a difference while at the same time maintaining
their position. It made it easier."2' By contrast, an adequacy approach
would put the onus on the plaintiffs to determine an acceptable standard.
The division between issues of equity and adequacy, however, ulti-
mately becomes artificial. Neither concept can stand entirely alone. The
reason so many people were concerned with the inequities perpetuated
by the Texas school-finance system was that schoolchildren in the poorer
districts received a substandard education. Conversely, an argument that
all schools should provide some minimally adequate standard of educa-
tion inherently depends on underlying notions of equity.
So, while Edgewood I dealt primarily with the equity issue, concerns
with "adequacy" filtered through the court's language. The court la-
mented that "[b]ecause of their inadequate tax base, [property-poor dis-
tricts] must tax at significantly higher rates in order to meet minimum re-
quirements for accreditation; yet their educational programs are typically
inferior."204 Fiscal equity is important precisely because "[t]he amount of
money spent on a student's education has real and meaningful impact on
the educational opportunity offered that student."20' With such language,
the court acknowledged its concerns with the adequacy of the state's
public education system. Nonetheless, adequacy, at least in the first
scenes of this drama, was upstaged by concerns for equity.
200. Interview with Albert Kauffman, supra note 101.
201. IdM
202. Interview with Craig Foster, supra note 73.
203. Telephone Interview with Albert Cortez, supra note 102.
204. Edgewood 1, 777 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1989).
205. Id.
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4. Senate Bill 1: The Legislative Response to Edgewood I
While the notions of "equal protection" and adequacy were largely
absent from the opinion, Edgewood I did present the Legislature with a
strong mandate. Shaped by underlying themes of efficiency, justiciability,
and politics, Edgewood I forced the Legislature to reinvent the Texas
school-finance system. Offering only minimal guidance, the supreme
court had demanded a fiscally neutral reform package.6
a. A Surprise Reprieve
Facing the supreme court's threat to shut down the schools on May 1,
1990, the Texas Legislature set up camp in Austin. It met in four con-
secutive special sessions to hammer out a new education-finance sys-
temm However, corrective legislation eluded the Legislature. The politi-
cally charged nature of the education issue stymied progress. "Early
passage of a reform bill was impaired by the variety of proposals, the lack
of prospects for immediate revenues, and legislative disagreement over
'accountability' and 'efficiency' issues."
The Legislature's fourth straight special session ended on May 1,
1990-as did the supreme court's grace period. No remedy had passed. In
accordance with Edgewood I, public schools would have to shut down.
The ongoing struggle between the Legislature and the court had finally
come to an impasse. An injunction closing Texas schools took effect at
midnight .2  Just before school doors slammed shut, however, a new
Texas District Court Judge named F. Scott McCown stepped in with a
reprieve. In a surprisingly bold move, Judge McCown stayed the su-
preme court's injunction an additional month.2 0 He also appointed a
committee of three "masters" to draw up a financing plan that would
automatically go into effect on June 1 if the Legislature could not come
up with a plan of its own. In the final hour, Judge McCown had granted
206. Significantly, while the Edgewood I case was on appeal to the Texas Supreme Court in
1989, the Legislature expanded the second tier of the Foundation School Program by passing
Senate Bill 1019. See Act Relating to the Funding of Elementary and Secondary Education, ch.
816, 1989 Tex. Sess. Law. Serv. 816 (West). The "new" second tier was called the "Guaranteed
Yield Program," because the state promised to guarantee a school district a certain revenue
yield for every penny of tax effort in a designated tax range, above the first tier, regardless of
the district's property wealth. See Hobby & Walker, supra note 29, at 392; infra notes 411-412
and accompanying text.
207. The first session to deal with the education issue began on February 27, 1990. The se-
ries of special sessions continued into June of that year. See Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d 491, 493
n.3 (Tex. 1991).
208. WALKER & CASEY, supra note 49, at 97.
209. See Bob Burns et al., Texas School Finance Reform Hits Deadline, AUSTIN AM.-
STATESMAN, May 1, 1990, at Al.
210. See id. at 98.
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the Legislature an extension on its deadline and the public schools a lease
on life.
The Legislature, feeling the pressure, continued its difficult negotia-
tions. During the fifth special session, which began on May 2, 1990, a
school-finance bill finally passed both houses of the Legislature. This
time, however, the plan suffered a fatal flank attack. Republican Gover-
nor Bill Clements vetoed the Legislature's hard-won compromise. 1 As
one more volley in his long-running political struggle with the Democrat-
controlled Senate, Clements refused to go along with the proposed half-
cent sales tax increase.r With his veto, Governor Clements sent both
Houses scrambling back to work with only one week before their dead-
line.
By June 1, the Legislature still had not managed to put together an-
other corrective plan. This time, Judge McCown made good on the threat
to close the schools (more easily done in June, given the fact that stu-
dents were off for summer). That very day, McCown's committee of mas-
ters made public their preliminary plan. They proposed a pure guaran-
teed yield program that would, in theory, fill the gap between what a rich
district raised at a given tax rate and what a poorer district could raise at
the same rate. Such a program would be constrained only by available
appropriated moneys. To balance the books, however, their plan also
called for a radical (and politically unpopular) redistribution of state
aid. 3 The name "Robin Hood" echoed throughout the state. As news of
this plan spread, the pressure on the Legislature increased astronomi-
cally. Rapidly, the political pressure outside the Capitol overcame the
political quagmire on the inside. Four days after the masters announced
their redistribution plan, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill 1.
b. Political Impressions
The intense political pressure left its impression on the Legislature's
handiwork. Wealthy school districts had leaned heavily on legislators,
who in turn "avoided placing caps on local revenue-raising and did not
attempt to redistribute locally raised revenue from rich to poor school
districts. ,2 14 Rather, retaining the two-tiered foundation program imple-
mented by Senate Bill 1019 in 1989,215 the politicians pledged to raise the
level of per-pupil expenditure for which the state would equalize funding.
211. See Edgewvood II, 804 S.W.2d at 493 n.3.
212. See Terrence Stutz & Anne Marie Kilday, Clements Vetoes School Finance Bilk Senate
Fails To Override; Court Action Predicted, DALLAS MORNING NEvS, May 23, 1990, at IA.
213. See Debbie Graves & Bruce Hight, Court, Statehouse Face Off with Two Schoof Fund
Plans, AuSTIN AM.-STATEsNiAN, June 2,1990, at Al.
214. Ball, supra note 33, at 769.
215. See supra note 206.
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This increase in funding would be financed by a combination of sales
taxes, cigarette and liquor taxes, budget cuts, and Texas Stabilization
Fund money.216 Based on an increase in the state general sales tax rate,
Senate Bill 1 promised an immediate increase in education funding and
further increases in the future
2 1 7
Although the Legislature rightfully trumpeted its "new" plan as a
thorough renovation of the school-finance system,218 much of the reforms
of Senate Bill 1 actually entailed a careful retooling of the traditional
Foundation Program. The legislation added facilities and equipment to
the foundation program definition and increased the funds provided by
the basic foundation program.21 9 The plan also provided for a "wide array
of biennial studies to detect deviations from fiscal neutrality and inform
senior policy makers when increased state funding is required."' ° The re-
forms would take place over a five year period2'
The most central component of the reform law involved the Legisla-
ture's attempts to address the supreme court's mandate of "fiscal neu-
trality." In Edgewood I, the court had demanded that a district's tax ef-
fort be directly and closely correlated with the educational resources
available to it. Districts had to have "substantially equal access" to simi-
lar revenues.m In hopes of meeting this mandate, the Legislature
amended section 16.001(c)(1) of the Education Code to read: "the yield
of state and local educational program revenue per pupil per cent of ef-
fective tax effort shall not be statistically significantly related to local tax-
able wealth per student for at least those districts in which 95 percent of
students attend school." m
c. The Ninety-Five Percent Compromise
The Legislature had accepted the court's mandate, at least for ninety-
five percent of the districts in the state. By the year 1995, a penny of tax
effort in even the poorest district was to yield about the same per student
as it would in a district at the ninety-fifth percentile in wealth."4 To
216. See Ball, supra note 33, at 769 n.41.
217. See WALKER & CASEY, supra note 49, at 98.
218. Senate Bill 1 consisted of five major pillars: (1) finance, (2) accountability through
site-based management and annual district report cards, (3) efficiency through increased local
management, (4) performance incentives, and (5) year-round school options. See Act Relating
to Public Education, ch. 1, 1990 Tex. Sess. Law Sere. 1 (West).
219. See id.
220. Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d 491, 495 (Tex. 1991).
221. See WALKER & CASEY, supra note 49, at 98.
222. Edgewood 1, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989).
223. Edgewood 11, 804 S.W.2d at 495 n.7.
224. See William P. Hobby & Mark G. Yudof, Texas Got Itself into This School-Finance
Mess, How's It Going to Get Out?, HOUS. CHRON., Dec. 15, 1991, at 5.
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achieve this, Senate Bill 1 "guarante[ed] the yield," promising that the
state would make up the shortfall between what a poorer district can
raise on its own and the specified guarantee at the ninety-fifth percen-
tile." Thus, the Texas Supreme Court's phrase "substantially related ac-
cess" was "interpreted by policy-makers, lawyers and indeed the parties
themselves to mean that a school finance plan would be constitutional
even if it left a relatively small number of students and school districts
out of the equalized system." '
For both pragmatic and political reasons, the Legislature had taken
the court's qualifiers-"close" and "substantially"--and had quantified
them into "95% fiscal neutrality." 7 Most important, the politicians real-
ized that funding all districts at the level of the 100th percentile districts
was impossible. "[T]he annual cost of equalizing all districts to the reve-
nue levels attainable by the richest districts would be approximately four
times the annual cost of operating the entire state government." Al-
lowing every child in Texas to attend a school like Alamo Heights was
not a viable option. Furthermore, the "ninety-five percent" plan offered
much greater political stability than an absolute equalization approach.
By ensuring up front that the wealthiest districts' resources would not be
tapped by Senate Bill 1, a huge political burden was lifted from the Capi-
tol. Needless to say, the 132 richest school districts in Texas (which would
constitute the immunized top five percent) carried formidable political
clout.2
9
Thus, in early June of 1990, the Legislature had finally answered the
supreme court's mandate. With Senate Bill 1, it had created a reform
package that would achieve "substantial" fiscal neutrality in just a few
years. The Legislature had nobly performed its duty to create a constitu-
tional school-finance system-or so it would have loved to have Texans
believe.
225. See id.
226. Yudof, supra note 172.
227. The "95 in '95" Plan was engineered by University of Texas Law School Dean and
education specialist Mark Yudof as part of a committee formed after Edgewood I for the pur-
pose of addressing the education finance crisis. Interview with J. David Thompson III, supra
note 119. Yudof felt that optimal reform could be reached by "essentially exempt[ing] the
wealthiest districts from the plan and us[ing] state funds to guarantee tax yields in the other dis-
tricts." Yudof, supra note 39, at 501. In his own words, "[t]he ninety-five percent solution was
not cheap, but it was economically and politically feasible." Id.
228. Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d at 495-96.
229. The 95th percentile equalization would leave out 132 districts with about 170,000 of
the state's 3.3 million students. See Yudof, supra note 39, at 501.
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C. Edgewood II
It took less than a year-and-a-half for the Edgewood drama to return
to the Texas Supreme Court. The basic controversies that framed Edge-
wood I reappeared in Edgewood I with new-found intensity. In Edge-
wood's next act, the tension between the court and Legislature and the
perpetual political strife continued to fester. Meanwhile, the supreme
court continued to pressure the Legislature to create a constitutional
school-finance system while simultaneously whittling away the Legisla-
ture's options for reform.
1. Another District Win
The Edgewood plaintiffs immediately challenged Senate Bill 1. Be-
lieving that the Legislature had simply put more money into the old sys-
tem instead of overhauling the system itself, the frustrated plaintiffs
charged that Senate Bill 1 "failed to provide substantially equal access to
funds of all the state's students, failed to create a priority allocation of
state funds to education and failed to curb 'unequalized enrichment' of
educational funding by local districts."'
In response to these charges, the Attorney General presented a two-
pronged defense. First, the state maintained that "absolute equality"
would be "prohibitively expensive," 231 given the high-level of spending in
wealthy districts. As already mentioned, equalization at the level of the
wealthiest districts would cost four times the operating costs of the entire
state government. 232 Second, the Attorney General argued that any chal-
lenge to Senate Bill 1 was premature, because the equalizing effects of
Senate Bill 1 would take some time to kick in.2 3
Judge McCown's district court once again dismissed the Attorney
General's arguments. Senate Bill 1, said the court in 1990, failed to give
each school district "substantially equal access to similar revenue per pu-
pil at similar levels of tax effort" and was therefore "inefficient." Senate
Bill 1 simply looked too much like House Bill 72 and was rejected as un-
constitutional.
As the first judicial authority to interpret the supreme court's man-
date of fiscal neutrality, the district court read between the lines. Ac-
cording to the district court, Edgewood I required dramatic structural re-
form, not a refurbished version of the old system. The district court
outlined the bill's flaws: (1) exclusion of the top five percent of wealthy
230. Ball, supra note 33, at 4 n.42.
231. Id. at 4.
232. See Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d at 495-96.
233. See id. at 495.
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districts from the equalization process, (2) reliance on statistical tests of
fiscal neutrality, (3) exclusion of certain revenues in financing calcula-
tions, (4) continued potential discrepancy in local enrichment between
rich and poor districts, (5) time lags in the Bill's self-monitoring studies
and funding, (6) emphasis on "adequacy" as an equity goal, and (7) fail-
ure to fund facilities at a "substantially equal" level.2m
While perhaps nothing could top the audacity of Judge McCown's
staying of the supreme court's injunction,2 5 the district court decision was
again surprisingly proactive. The district court explicitly listed some of
the state's options for creating a constitutional finance system. While
recognizing that some or all of these options might be "undesirable, po-
litically unacceptable, or themselves unconstitutional," the district court
outlined four possibilities: (1) full state funding, (2) district consolidation,
(3) tax base consolidation,26 and (4) revenue caps as possible solutions to
the school funding crisis.27 The court went on to suggest that a better
version of the non-capped equalization approach that was in Senate Bill
1 might suffice.m By offering this unsolicited advice, the district court
made the most intrusive encroachment yet on the role of the Legislature.
As it turns out, this encroachment was just a harbinger of conflicts to
come.
2. A Supreme Court Endorsement... and Denouncement
Perhaps in acknowledgment of the firestorm it had created, the su-
preme court took direct appeal of the district court's decision in the fall
of 1990.2" Once again, it was the plaintiffs that refused to let the litigation
end. Despite their victory against Senate Bill 1, the plaintiffs were in-
censed that the district court would free the state from the supreme
court's deadline. Kauffman and his troops marched on the supreme court
in hopes of keeping the pressure on the Legislature to reform the system
quickly and dramatically. The Texas Supreme Court heard its second
round of arguments in the Edgewood litigation in November of that year.
In January of 1991, the supreme court handed the plaintiffs a second vic-
tory.
The supreme court began by lambasting the district court for tam-
pering with the high court's order. The justices unanimously scolded the
234. See WALKER & CASEY, supra note 49, at 98.
235. See supra text accompanying note 210.
236. By "tax base consolidation," the court meant that wealth-generating taxable property
could be consolidated for revenue purposes even if actual district lines did not change.
237. SeeVALKER & CASEY, supra note 49, at 99.
238. See id
239. See id Direct appeals are permitted to the Texas Supreme Court in certain circum-
stances. See TEX. R. App. P. 57; infra note 467.
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district court for "clearly abus[ing] its discretion in refusing to enforce the
mandate of this court issued in Edgewood L, 240 The Texas Supreme
Court pointedly outlined the Legislature's failure to act and reinstituted
the original injunction against the distribution of state aid with a new
deadline: April 1, 1991. The high court warned the district court against
extending this new deadline.24'
Having denounced the district court's actions, the Texas Supreme
Court endorsed much of its reasoning. The court agreed with the district
court that Senate Bill 1, with its "95% compromise," failed to meet the
mandate of Edgewood L Echoing the lower court's decision, the court
stated that "Senate Bill 1 does make certain improvements in public
school finances .... However, Senate Bill 1 leaves essentially intact the
same funding system with the same deficiencies we reviewed in Edge-
wood L ' '242 Among these "deficiencies," was a continued reliance on an
underfunded two-tiered Foundation School Program.24' Like the district
court, the Texas Supreme Court ignored the state's pessimistic outlook
on equalization. "Even if the approach of Senate Bill 1 produces a more
equitable utilization of state educational dollars, it does not remedy the
major causes of the wide opportunity gaps between rich and poor dis-
tricts,"244 announced the court. Under Senate Bill 1, the same "tax ha-
vens" that plagued the old system remained.245 Savvy businesses would be
lured into low tax-rate areas and wealthy districts could thus lower their
tax rates still further.
The high court particularly disapproved of the ninety-five-percent-
compliance plan:
By limiting the funding formula to districts in which 95% of the students at-
tend school, the Legislature excluded 132 districts which educate approxi-
mately 170,000 students and harbor about 15% of the property wealth in the
state .... Consequently, after Senate Bill 1, the 170,000 students in the
wealthiest districts are still supported by local revenues drawn from the same
[amount of available] tax base as the 1,000,000 students in the poorest dis-
tricts.246
Hence, the Texas Supreme Court found that Senate Bill 1 failed to
provide "a direct and close correlation between a district's tax effort and
the educational resource available to it.,
247
240. Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d 491,498 (Tex. 1991).
241. See id.
242. Id. at 494-95.
243. The two-tier system continued to allow some districts to raise locally much more
money than could other districts.
244. Id. at 496.
245. See id.; supra text accompanying note 160.




Like the district court, the Texas Supreme Court did not end its
opinion with this declaration of unconstitutionality. Instead, the court
went on to hint at what types of reforms might in fact survive constitu-
tional scrutiny. In retrospect, one of the most critical components of the
court's decision in Edgewood II has proven to be its not-so-subtle sugges-
tion that "[a]nother approach to efficiency is tax base consolidation." 248
The court seemed to hint that, even if lawmakers leave school district
boundaries as they are, legislators should consider redrawing the prop-
erty-tax boundaries so that the resulting tax revenues turn out equally for
the school districts. In anticipation of the difficult legal questions sur-
rounding such consolidation, the supreme court revisited its earlier inter-
pretation of the Texas Constitution's mandate on local control.249
In Love v. City of Dallas,20 the high court had determined that article
VII, section 3, of the Texas Constitution means that "the Legislature
cannot compel one district to construct buildings and levy taxes for the
education of nonresident pupils. '' 51 Apparently attempting to ease the
Legislature's burden, the Texas Supreme Court preemptively denied that
the Love decision stood in the way of tax-base consolidation. According
to the court, "[t]he Constitution does not present a barrier to the general
concept of tax base consolidation, and nothing in Love prevents creation
of school districts along county or other lines for the purpose of collect-
ing tax revenue and distributing it to other school districts within their
boundaries." 2 By providing a specific example of such an arrangement
in a footnote, the court seemed to endorse the creation of school districts
on some form of county-wide basis for the purpose of limited consolida-
tion of poor and wealthy districts. As will quickly become apparent, some
legislators believed they were being handed a prescription for reform.
3. The Legislative Response to Edgewood II
The supreme court announced its decision on January 22, 1991, and
the Texas Legislature immediately jumped into action. Both wings of the
state capitol bustled with activity as dramatic and draconian reforms
were drafted and redrafted. While both chambers turned to the politi-
cally dangerous "revenue caps" that would put limits on the amounts of
money school districts could raise locally for their schools, the Senate
concentrated its reform efforts on the "recapture" of local tax dollars on
a regional basis and the House of Representatives concentrated on "tax
248. Id. at 497.
249. See TEx. CONsT. art. VII, § 3.
250. 40 S.W.2d. 20 (Tex. 1937).
251. Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d at 497.
252. Id.
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consolidation" plans.23 Recapture would involve pooling all the tax dol-
lars of districts in a carefully selected region and then redistributing the
money equitably among districts. Tax consolidation, again, would involve
redrawing property-tax boundaries to redirect tax receipts.
The storm of activity in Austin spread across the state. Educational
experts, teachers, and parents flooded the Legislature with conflicting in-
terpretations of the Edgewood II decision. Some believed that Edgewood
II had mandated a state-funded school system. At the same time, others
maintained that Love v. City of Dallas prohibited such a "recapture" sys-
tem. Debate over whether or not the court had mandated absolute
equality also continued. Meanwhile, some court watchers believed that
the Texas Supreme Court had actually prescribed voter-approved
county-equalization-fund taxes, by which county lines would be used as
property-tax boundaries and the money would be redistributed to dis-
tricts within the county.2 4
Many Texans were just as critical as they were confused. A popular
backlash against the court swept the state. The media and many politi-
cians denounced what they interpreted as an absolute rejection of any lo-
cal enrichment at all.2 A guest column by former Republican gubernato-
rial candidate Thomas W. Luce suggested allowing unequalized local
enrichment after the major disparities in wealth had been eliminated.26
Luce predicted a "loss of public support for the system" in response to
the court's apparent call for absolute neutrality257 Meanwhile, Lieutenant
Governor Bill Hobby vented his disgust with the court's rejection of Sen-




Once again, the volatile political issue of local control had polarized the
state.
Underlying this bitter strife was, once again, the notion of
"efficiency." Edgewood I had required "substantially equal" access to
education funds at the same level of taxation, but the court had rejected
the Legislature's ninety-five-percent plan in Edgewood I. Either the
court believed that 95% was not "substantial," or it had changed its mind
at the expense of the Legislature's compromise. The state was once again
left without a school-finance system. What did the phrase "substantially
equal access to resources" mean? If exact equity at the level of the
wealthiest schools was financially impossible and leaving out the top five
253. See WALKER & CASEY, supra note 49, at 100.
254. See id.
255. See Janet Elliot, Edgewood III Foes Blame Ruling on Public Pressure, TEX. LAW.,






percent of schools is unconstitutional, what solution remained? The an-
swer to that question terrified many politicians.
It seemed clear that the court was steering the Legislature toward a
massive redistribution of wealth. For many parents, teachers, and politi-
cians-especially those in the wealthier districts-a redistribution of
funds amounted to state-sponsored theft. "By God, if we decide we want
a gym, hey, I live here, I paid for it. It's my kid," exclaimed David Longo-
ria, an exasperated San Antonio resident in a relatively well-off district.
"If you like it, move into this district. If you don't, stay away. Don't take
from me. Don't deny my child and give elsewhere. I am willing to pay
more. That's why I moved here. That's why I chose this district."' 9 The
editor of Texas Monthly captured the feelings of many of these Texans
when he wrote that "[t]he courts have ruled it unconstitutional to be
best."26
4. Edgewood IIa: If You Can't Stand the Heat, Write a New Opinion
This swirling political storm, first unleashed by the court's own deci-
sion in Edgewood II, returned to the supreme court itself just one month
later. Shortly after Edgewood 1H came down, the plaintiff-intervenors
filed a motion for rehearing asking the justices to approve recapture, at
least in principle, by explicitly overruling Love v. City of Dallas."" Not-
so-affectionately known as Edgewood Ha, the court's denial of the plain-
tiffs motion took on a life of its own.
After consecutive unanimous decisions in Edgewood I and 1H, the jus-
tices' united demand for reform crumbled into disarray on the motion for
rehearing. Rather than simply deny the motion-an issue on which all
nine justices agreed, a number of the justices used this opportunity to re-
fine their own ideas for reforms. The court voted 5-4 that Love did, in
fact, rule out "recapture." More critically, in an astonishing about-face,
the majority seemed to amend its decision to allow some local unequal-
ized enrichment revenues. According to Justice Phillips's majority opin-
ion, "[o]ur Constitution clearly recognizes the distinction between state
and local taxes, and the latter are not mere creatures of the former."
2 62
Therefore, according to the court, the Legislature could not characterize
local property taxes as a "state tax., 263 The court thus held that the Leg-
islature could not toy with local tax decisions. The court also seemed to
259. Siegel, supra note 2.
260. Elliot, supra note 255, at 15.
261. See Edgewood Indep. Sch. District v. Kirby, 1991 Tex. LEXIS 21, at *2 (Tex. Feb. 25,
1991) [hereinafter Edgewood Ha].
262. Id. at *4-*5.
263. See id. at *5.
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be backing off its implied advocacy of absolute fiscal neutrality Edge-
wood II.
With Edgewood Ila, the court blatantly used the denial of the motion
for rehearing as an opportunity to fend off the brutal political attacks it
had suffered. The majority deflected those attacks with straightforward
acquiescence. In language remarkably similar to that of Thomas Luce's
newspaper column, the majority wrote that once the Legislature created
a constitutionally efficient system, "it may, so long as efficiency is main-
tained, authorize local school districts to supplement their educational
resources if local property owners approve an additional local property
tax."2 4 The "majority" here consisted of all four Republicans on the
court. Democrat Jack Hightower provided the swing vote.
Although technically concurrences, the three other opinions regis-
tered in Edgewood Ha read like caustic dissents. The justiciability issue-
lurking in the background in Edgewood I and Il-burst onto center stage
in Edgewood Ila. Justices Gonzalez, Gammage, and Doggett decried the
court's unsolicited "advisory opinion." Justice Gonzalez reminded the
court that "judicial power does not embrace the giving of advisory opin-
ions." 26 Justice Gammage announced that "[tlhe majority's gratuitous
action in addressing matters not raised in the motion for rehearing is
both unnecessary and inappropriate, amounts to an advisory opinion,
and is calculated to further confound and confuse the public and the leg-
islative process.
' 266
Justice Doggett was perhaps the most distraught by the majority's de-
cision to use the denial of a rehearing to advise the Legislature. As evi-
dence that the majority had folded under political pressure, Justice Dog-
gett included two newspaper articles with his opinion-one of which was
Luce's column. In his lengthy, often poetic concurrence, Doggett la-
mented the court's loss of unity and lambasted the court's legislative
meddling. "Tragically," he wrote, "today this unity has been abruptly
abandoned, shattering the good faith upon which it was founded. 267
"Determined to react to extrajudicial developments, the court exceeds its
jurisdiction, contravenes its rules, and ignores limitations imposed on it
by tradition and the Constitution." Before picking apart the majority's
opinion as unnecessary and damaging, Doggett rued the further delay
this opinion would mean for school reform. As he points out, a child en-
tering the first grade when the Edgewood litigation began was now en-
264. Id. at *6 (footnote omitted).
265. Id. at *9 (Gonzalez, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
266. Id. at *10 (Gammage, J., concurring). These statements will ring ironic when Justice
Gammage returns to center stage in Edgewood III. See infra notes 314,322.
267. Id. at *11 (Doggett, J., concurring).
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tering the eighth.2 s Before concluding, Doggett had recruited Felix
Frankfurter,269 Thomas Jefferson,' ° and George Washington 27' to support
his cause.
Over Doggett's vehement and dramatic objections, however, the
court's opinion became another addendum to the court's mandate for re-
form. Together, Edgewood II and Ha added three standards to the
guidelines developed in Edgewood L First, "recapture" was not an op-
tion for reform under the Texas Constitution. Second, local tax-base con-
solidation was possibly an option. Third, tax-base consolidation alone
does not guarantee a reform package's constitutionality.
5. Underlying Tensions... Revisited
Doggett's acidic dissent unearths and encapsulates all of the most dif-
ficult dilemmas of the Edgewood drama. The same underlying themes
and controversies that framed Edgewood I reappear in Edgewood II and
Ha. Once again, the all-important notion of "efficiency" eluded the
court's grasp. After Edgewood I, the notion of "substantially equal access
to resources ' ' 7 was interpreted to mean that a reform system would sur-
vive judicial scrutiny "even if it left a relatively small number of students
and school districts out of the equalized system." 273 In Edgewood II, how-
ever, many felt the court tightened the word "substantially" to mean
"absolutely." According to the lawmakers, Edgewood II essentially re-
jected the court's previous definition of "substantially equal." By criti-
cizing the Legislature for having "excluded 132 districts which educate
approximately 170,000 students and harbor 15 percent of the property
wealth in the state," 4 the court not only surprised and angered the po-
litical branch of government but revealed its own uncertainty as to what
"efficiency" meant.
Of course, a justice's definition of "efficiency" can apparently trans-
form under political pressure. Doggett was clearly correct in his assertion
that Edgewood Ila was a response to politics. Rather than following
precedent and the Texas Constitution, the five justices in the majority
seem to have followed their constituency. "That is always a danger on
any court, especially an elected one," explained University of Texas Law
School Dean and education expert Mark Yudof. "Certainly there was an
268. See id. at *11 n.1.
269. See id- at *22.
270. See id. at *19 n.7.
271. See id.
272. Edgeivood 1, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989).
273. Yudof, supra note 172.
274. Edgewood 11, 804 S.W.2d 491, 496 (Tex. 1991).
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outcry after Edgewood I.''25 As Justice Doggett alleged, "extrajudicial
developments"' 276 seem to have shaped the law. The same politics, he
noted with relief, will eventually cleanse the system: "Thankfully, Texas





Meanwhile, the tension between the legislative and judicial branches
of government had obviously intensified in Edgewood II and Ila. Once
again, the court at least superficially deferred to the legislators' law-
making role, announcing, "[w]e do not undertake lightly to strike down
an act of the Legislature. '27s The court, however, not only struck down
Senate Bill 1, but it further narrowed the parameters of an acceptable
solution to the school-finance crisis.
As mentioned above, the court's confusing, if not shifting, mandates
also did little to endear it to the scrambling politicians. Many legislators
resented the court's involvement. "Once the Court demonstrates its
willingness to advise the legislature on the details of public school finance
legislation, the questions will not end," wrote one politician.2 9
Justice Gonzalez acknowledged this tension in his concurrence in
Edgewood Ila: "We should not speculate or interfere with the ongoing
legislative debate as to how to meet the mandates of Edgewood I or
Edgewood II; nor should we get into the business of giving the legislature
pre-clearance on proposed legislation." Doggett went even further, as-
serting that the judiciary's unwarranted interference with the Legisla-
ture's responsibilities would set back the quest for reform. "Advice not
properly sought is offered anyway," wrote Doggett, "despite the warning
of the Chairman of the Senate Education Committee that further judicial
interference will be disruptive and his indication that the Legislature al-
ready has all the judicial advice necessary 'to remedy the constitutionally
flawed system of public education.. . 2,
In the next election, the political tensions on the bench underscored
the constant struggle to define the judiciary's proper role. When Justice
Mauzy, the liberal leader who wrote Edgewood I, challenged the conser-
275. Elliot, supra note 255.
276. Edgewood la, 1991 Tex. LEXIS 21, at *11 (Doggett, J., concurring).
277. Id. at *27 (Doggett, J., concurring).
278. Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d at 498.
279. Edgewood Ha, 1991 Tex. LEXIS 21, at *21 n.9 (Doggett, J., concurring) (quoting
Amicus Brief on Motion for Rehearing, Sen. Carl Parker, at 2).
280. Id. at *9-*10.
281. Id at *11 (Doggett, J., concurring) (quoting Amicus Brief on Motion for Rehearing,
Sen. Carl Parker, at 2).
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vative Chief Justice Phillips for his post, the chief justice repeatedly and
publicly criticized Justice Mauzy for legislating from the bench.2
The controversy over the court's rejection of the ninety-five-percent
plan also revealed one more divergence between the two plaintiff camps.
From the beginning, MALDEF and IDRA had been committed to ab-
solute equality. When Albert Cortez of IDRA was asked on the stand
about the level of precision required in ensuring substantially equal
funding, he answered: "You know, Judge, it's either equal or it's not."
' ,3
Cortez and Kauffman acknowledge that such a hard line was not al-
ways popular, but they "felt that when you start saying that something
else is close enough, you get on a slippery slope."2' By contrast, Foster
and the Equity Center felt that absolute equality was politically impracti-
cal. In fact, Foster may have preferred some level of inequality to use as
leverage in his constant quest to increase education funding.25
6. The Legislature's Challenge
After Edgewood II and Ha, the Legislature's challenge was more
formidable than ever. The Texas Supreme Court had not only thrown
out the Legislature's best effort but had dramatically limited the options
for reform before sending the politicians back to the drawing board. By
refusing to allow even a five-percent inequity, the court had denied the
Legislature the most politically viable options for reform.
Before Edgewood II, the reform effort had concentrated on bringing
up the bottom. The Legislature had focused its attention on "mak[ing]
the poor rich enough." ' And yet, to bring all districts up to the levels of
the richest districts was impossible. At that point, even after Edgewood
Ila's concession that some degree of inequality was acceptable, the poli-
ticians were going to have to take money away from the state's wealthi-
est, most politically powerful districts. The reform effort shifted to
bringing the top down.
Billionaire H. Ross Perot became the metaphor of choice to describe
the Legislature's dilemma.27 David Anderson, general counsel of Texas
282. See George Kuempel, Chief Justice Race Is Study in Contrasts: Candidates Argue
Court's Direction, DALLAS MORNING NENWs, Oct. 14, 1990, at 41A.
283. Telephone Interview with Albert Cortez, supra note 102.
284. Id.
285. Interview with Kevin O'Hanlon, supra note 136. This ideological division will be dis-
cussed in more detail infra Sections II.A-B.
286. Interview with David Anderson, General Counsel for the Texas Education Agency, in
Austin, Tex. (Mar. 21, 1996).
287. "By requiring equalization at the tail end of the distribution-the equivalent of using
H. Ross Perot's income as the standard for wealth redistribution, the sums required become
gargantuan unless serious structural reforms are undertaken." Hobby & Yudof, supra note 224.
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Education Agency and former aide to Lieutenant Governor Bob Bul-
lock, described the Legislature's limited options after Edgewood II and
Ha:
You can make everyone as rich as H. Ross Perot, but God doesn't have that
much money. You can take money away from H. Ross Perot until his money
comes down to an appropriate level. Or, you can kill H. Ross Perot-which
in school finance terms is consolidating the districts.28
Anderson, like so many others, believed that the Texas Supreme
Court did not fully understand the practical realities of the dilemma. 29
Standing in the smoldering ruins of Senate Bill 1, the Legislature
found little with which to rebuild. After Edgewood II and h1a, the politi-
cians had, at best, four distasteful options. They could enact an entirely
new tax system, consolidate school districts, design a constitutional
scheme to recapture local tax revenue, or cap spending by wealthy dis-
tricts. "All of these alternatives had as much popular and political appeal
as a statewide election in Texas in which only Saddam Hussein, Idi
Amin, Charles Manson and David Koresh were on the ballot. ''2,0
Given the constitutional prohibitions against "recapture" and given
the political nightmare of straightforward caps on education spending,
the list of viable alternatives for the Texas Legislature was pared down to
two possibilities. It could somehow abolish the local property tax, or it
could consolidate school districts. "The Legislature responded with a
clever if somewhat jerry-built plan in Senate Bill 351." '' 1
7. Senate Bill 351: The Legislature Answers Edgewood II and Ha
The Legislature began its second attempt by rejecting the Senate's
"recapture" approach in favor of the House's "tax-base consolidation"
strategy. Both houses focused almost immediately on a reform plan cen-
tered around newly defined, tax-empowered school districts. Several
constitutional hurdles, however, stood in the way.
29
Given these constitutional obstacles, it is not surprising that the
court's April 1 deadline passed without a new reform proposal from the
Texas Legislature. Given the events surrounding the last missed dead-
line, it is also not surprising that this time the district court enforced the
supreme court's injunction. On April 1, 1991, an injunction barred the
288. Interview with David Anderson, supra note 286.
289. See id.
290. Yudof, supra note 172.
291. Id.
292. See infra notes 303-307 and accompanying text.
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state from funding public education.2 3 By April 12, the Texas Legislature
passed Senate Bill 351.24
Senate Bill 351 represented a major overhaul of the public education
system's structure. The reform package centered around the creation of
new taxing authorities called County Education Districts ("CEDs"). The
state was divided into 188 CEDs, drawn roughly along the lines of the
254 counties, with 31 multi-county CEDs.2 All of the school districts in
each CED fell under the same taxing authority. Taxes would be collected
and redistributed from the CED level. In effect, each CED was a group
of consolidated school districts, at least for funding and taxing pur-
poses.2 6 The CEDs were designed so that no CED could exceed $280,000
in taxable value per weighted student in "average daily attendance."
' 7
This effectively spread the richest districts' wealth among their neigh-
bors. 93
The state funding scheme for the new CEDs retained the two-tiered
system.29 The first tier was made up of "basic allotment" money. CEDs
were required to tax at a rate of $0.72 per $100 of taxable property to re-
ceive the state's basic allotment of $2200 per weighted student. At tier
two's guaranteed yield, CEDs could tax up to an additional $0.45 per
$100 to enrich instructional and facilities funds. Local districts that
wanted to raise additional, unequalized funds for local enrichment pur-
poses could do so at what was called a "third tier.' '310 In summary, "[a]s to
the equity or fiscal neutrality of the system, tier one provides full equali-
zation, tier two offers only partial equalization due to wealthy districts'
ability to exceed the state guaranteed yield, and tier three provides no
equalization at all." 31
293. See Cindy Rugeley, School Law Still Faces Fund Hurdle, HOUS. CHRON., Apr. 16,
1991, at 1.
294. See id.
295. See Act Relating to Public Schools, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 20 (West).
296. Each district is an independent school district established by consolidation of local
school districts within its boundaries for the limited purpose of exercising a portion of the taxing
power previously authorized by the voters in those school districts and for the purpose of dis-
tributing CED revenues to the component school districts. See id. § 1.
297. See id.; see also infra notes 402-406 and accompanying text (explaining this concept).
298. While some would argue the distinction is little more than semantics, the CED system
would stop short of a statewide system of recapture. That is, money would be kept within a
given "neighborhood" of districts as opposed to being deposited in a statewide pool of funds.
299. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
300. See 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 20 (West). This "third tier" is not part of the state's
Foundation School Program.
301. Ball, supra note 33, at 772. A simple example using the funding figures for the 1991-
1992 school year will help to illustrate the mechanics of the plan. At tier one, the newly created
CEDs composed of member school districts must tax at an effective rate of $0.72 per $100 of
taxable property to receive the State's unadjusted basic allotment of $2200 per weighted stu-
dent. At tier two, individual school districts can tax up to $0.45 for enrichment of their instruc-
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While Senate Bill 351 featured a number of other complicated de-
tails,3° the CED scheme became its controversial centerpiece.
D. Edgewood III
1. Proceedings in the District Court
On June 17, 1991, little more than two months after Governor Ann
Richards signed Senate Bill 351 into law, three groups of rich school dis-
tricts challenged the new law on three grounds. First, they asserted that
the law constituted a state ad valorem tax in violation of article VIII, sec-
tion 1-e, of the Texas Constitution. 3 Although the state did not directly
collect or distribute the CED taxes, it mandated that the CEDs raise
their local fund assignment, set the tax rate at a predetermined level, and
prescribed the CED's distribution mechanism. These provisions, the rich
school districts claimed, amounted to a de facto state property tax.
A second alleged constitutional infirmity arose from the absence of
voter authorization for the infusion of tax authority into the new CEDs.
Article VII, section 3, of the constitution, a confusing provision com-
posed of a 393-word sentence, apparently prohibited the state legislature
from raising school district taxes without voter approval." In crafting
Senate Bill 351, the Legislature relied on article VII, section 3-b, which
tional and facilities expenses with the state guaranteeing $21.50 per weighted student for each
penny of tax effort above the $0.72 CED tax rate. At tier three, the state provides no supple-
mental funds for locally-raised revenue at tax rates higher than the combined tier one and tier
two tax rates ($0.72 + $0.45), and school property taxes are limited to a total tax rate of $1.50.
Such a limit translates to a maximum $0.33 tax rate for tier three unequalized local funding. See
id. at 771-72.
302. Other notable internal changes included:
... (4) increasing the Basic Allotment (the starting point in state aid formulations)
from $1,910 in 1990-91 to $2,200 in 1991-92, rising to $2,800 by 1994-95; ... (6) in-
creasing the local share of the foundation program from 54 cents per $100 in 1990-91
to 72 cents per $100 in 1991-92, rising to $1 per $100 by 1994-95, and making the local
share mandatory on CEDs; (7) increasing the yield in the second-tier guaranteed yield
program from $17.90 in 1990-91 to $21.50 in 1991-92, rising to $28 in 1994-95, while es-
tablishing the maximum second-tier tax rate to be matched by the state at 45 cents per
$100; (8) imposing revenue limits on school districts; [and] (9) imposing new tax rate
limits on districts, including rates for 'new debt' ....
WALKER & CASEY, supra note 27, at 18.
303. See supra text accompanying note 57.
304. See supra text accompanying note 55. The constitution provides:
[T]he Legislature shall be authorized to pass laws for the assessment and collection of
taxes in all said districts and for the management and control of the public school or
schools of such districts.., and the Legislature may authorize an additional ad valo-
rem tax to be levied and collected within all school districts.., provided that the ma-
jority of the qualified property taxpaying voters of the district voting at an election to
be held for that purpose, shall vote such tax ....
TEx. CONST. art. VII, § 3.
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permitted taxation without voter authorization when two or more whole
districts were consolidated.35 Of course, the CEDs were not exactly con-
solidated school districts-the school districts were joined only for the
purpose of creating a limited taxing authority. It was an undecided con-
stitutional question as to whether voter authorization already given to
school districts could be transferred to the CEDs without a renewed
mandate from the voters.
The final basis on which Senate Bill 351 was challenged was that it
allegedly constituted a local or special law in violation of article VII, sec-
tion 3, and article III, sections 56 and 64, of the constitution.3 A local or
special law is one that applies to a limited class of people distinguished by
some special characteristic, such as geography or wealth.3 The wealthy
districts argued that since they, as a class, were adversely affected by
Senate Bill 351, the law was unconstitutional.
The Edgewood litigation found its way back into the court of Judge
Scott McCown. McCown heard the rich school districts' arguments re-
lating to the constitutionality of CEDs and reserved for a future trial the
issue of whether the scheme satisfied the "efficient" and "suitable" re-
quirements of the educational clause of the constitution.m A number of
poorer districts backed by the Equity Center and MALDEF, along with
several CEDs and a few individual citizens, joined the state in defense of
the new law. Relying on language in Edgewood II and Edgewood Ha
suggesting that tax base consolidation was "preapproved," McCown
305. The constitution provides:
After any change in boundaries, the governing body of any such district, without the
necessity of an additional election, shall have the power to assess, levy and collect ad
valorem taxes on all taxable property within the boundaries of the district as changed,
for the purpose of the maintenance of public free schools... in the amount, at the
rate, or not to exceed the rate, in the manner authorized by the district prior to the
change in its boundaries .... In those instances where the boundaries of any such in-
dependent school district are changed by the annexation of, or consolidation with, one
or more whole school districts, the taxes to be levied for the purposes hereinabove
authorized may be in the amount, or not to exceed the rate theretofore voted in the
district having at the time of such change the greatest scholastic population according
to the last scholastic census ....
TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 3-b; see also WALKER & CASEY, supra note 27, at 17.
306. See Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 826
S.W.2d 489,507-11 (Tex. 1992) [hereinafter Edgewood 111].
307. See Clark v. Finley, 54 S.W. 343, 345 (Tex. 1899).
308. See Joe Culbrith, School Funding Upheld, County Districts Allowed, FORT WORTH
STAR-TELEGRAM, Aug. 8, 1991, at 1.
309. See Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d 491, 497-98 (Tex. 1991) ("Consolidation of school dis-
tricts is one avenue available toward greater efficiency in our school finance system. Another
approach to efficiency is tax base consolidation.... The Constitution does not present a barrier
to the general concept of tax base consolidation, and nothing in Love prevents creation of
school districts along county or other lines for the purpose of collecting tax revenue and distrib-
uting it to schools within their boundaries.") (footnote omitted); Edgewood Ila, 1991 Tex.
LEXIS 21, *3 (Tex. Feb. 25, 1991) ("[T]ax base consolidation could be achieved through the
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upheld the constitutionality of Senate Bill 351 on all counts on August 7,
1991.310
2. The Supreme Court Decision
McCown's decision was quickly appealed, and the battle again shifted
to the Texas Supreme Court. On January 30, 1992, two-and-a-half
months after it began hearing arguments, the court overruled Judge
McCown's decision and struck down Senate Bill 351.311 As a result, the
Legislature found itself with one less option and several more restric-
tions. The decision was another crucial turning point in the Edgewood
litigation.
The court's ruling infuriated many legislators, who thought that the
language in the prior opinions had endorsed the course that they fol-
lowed. The ruling rekindled the bitterness and antagonism left over from
the Edgewood II decision and led many to question again the court's role
in this difficult issue. The heated feelings were not confined to the Leg-
islature as blatant hostility surfaced among the justices. Justice Doggett,
joined by Justice Mauzy, turned in a stinging dissent.312
The decision was also noteworthy for a concurrence by Justice
Cornyn, who would later write the majority opinion in Edgewood IV.
The concurring opinion injected language and ideas into the debate that
had been largely hidden in the shadows of the prior supreme court opin-
ions. Some of Cornyn's ideas, which included a significant redefinition of
"efficiency" and a rejection of the importance of equity, would prove to
have important consequences for Texas's schoolchildren.
One final source of controversy in the supreme court's decision was
its issuance of a stay until June 1, 1993, delaying any remedy for two tax
cycles instead of one. This decision, supported by only a 5-4 margin (two
of the justices who found Senate Bill 351 to be unconstitutional dissented
on this question), spawned an unsuccessful federal lawsuit by a group of
taxpayers from Travis County.313 Despite being harshly criticized for al-
creation of new school districts. We said these school districts could be organized along county
or other lines and could be given the authority to generate local property tax revenue for all of
the other school districts within their boundaries.").
310. See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, No. 362516A, (Travis County Dist. Ct.,
250th Jud. Dist. of Tex., Aug. 7, 1991), rev'd sub nom, Carrolton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 826 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1992).
311. See Edgewood III, 826 S.W.2d at 522.
312. Beginning his onslaught with the words "So many words - so little justice," Doggett
delivered a scathing thirty-nine page attack accusing the majority of entrapping the Legislature.
Edgewood 11I, 826 S.W.2d at 537 (Doggett, . dissenting).
313. See WALKER & CASEY, supra note 27, at 18, The initiators of the federal lawsuit de-
manded a retroactive, not a prospective remedy. They challenged the court's decision as a de-
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lowing an unconstitutional system to persist for two years,314 the majority
justified its decision as the only way to avoid "unduly disrupting the or-
derly functioning of the schools."""5 The court also noted that the Legisla-
ture was not due to meet in session until January 1993, and it wanted to
"provide the Legislature sufficient opportunity to consider comprehen-
sive reform to the public education system. 316 The Legislature had to
have an alternative financing scheme in place by the 1993-1994 school
year.
a. Infirmities in Senate Bill 351
The majority opinion, written by Justice Gonzalez, sustained two out
of the three constitutional objections raised by the appellants. The court
never even reached the question of whether Senate Bill 351 had created
an "efficient" or "suitable" system capable of providing the schoolchil-
dren of Texas a "general diffusion of knowledge." Nor did the court shed
any more light on what it meant by "substantially equal access to similar
revenues per pupil. 3 17 Instead, the court held that the law had trans-
gressed upon other provisions of the Texas Constitution-in particular,
the prohibition of a statewide property tax318 and the requirement of
nial of property without the due process of law guaranteed by the federal constitution. The fed-
eral district court refused to issue an injunction, citing the potential disruption of the educa-
tional system. See Smith v. Travis County Educ. Dist., 791 F. Supp. 1170 (W.D. Tex. 1992). On
appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the federal courts lacked jurisdiction
until all state-level appeals routes had been exhausted. See Smith v. Travis County Educ. Dist.,
968 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1992).
314. One justice implied that the majority was delaying the effects for an extra tax cycle
because of "election year political considerations." Edgewood 111, 826 S.W.2d at 537
(Gammage, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Another called it an act of "political
expediency" and wrote: "The court's disparate treatment of two different violations of the same
constitution is a starkly unacceptable abdication of its constitutional responsibility." Id. at 525
(Cornyn, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
315. Id. at 522.
316. Id.
317. See Edgewood1, 777 S.W.2d 391,397 (Tex. 1989) (emphasis added).
318. Although the taxes were raised and spent by the CEDs and not by the state, the ma-
jority found that the CED taxes were de facto state property taxes because of the myriad of re-
strictions and conditions placed on the CEDs by the state. The court noted:
Senate Bill 351 mandates the tax CEDs levy. No CED may decline to levy the tax. The
tax rate for all CEDs is predetermined by Senate Bill 351. No CED can tax at a higher
rate or a lower rate under any circumstances. Indeed, the very purpose of the CEDs is
to levy a uniform tax statewide. The distribution of the proceeds is set by Senate Bill
351. No CED has any discretion to distribute the tax proceeds in any manner except as
required by state statute.... If the State mandates that a tax be levied, sets the rate,
and prescribes the distribution of the proceeds, the tax is a state tax, regardless of the
instrumentality which the State may choose to use.
Edgewood II, 826 S.W.2d at 500. The court contrasted this approach with the prior methods of
encouraging school districts to contribute local tax revenue, where financial incentives were
provided to boost tax levels or state aid was conditioned on a certain tax rate. Pointing out that,
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voter authorization for the infusion of new taxing authority into the
CEDs.319
b. The Dissent: Alleged Judicial Entrapment of the Legislature
Justice Doggett launched a two-pronged attack on the court's hold-
ing. Aside from mounting a heated challenge to the majority's construc-
tion of the constitutional clauses at issue, Doggett also charged the court
with entrapping the Legislature with its prior opinions. Based on the
court's own pronouncements in Edgewood II and Edgewood Ha,20 Dog-
gett accused the majority of deception, elitism, entrapment, and a failure
to accept responsibility for its previous statements. The court, in Edge-
wood II and Edgewood Ha, had come dangerously close to treading on
the Legislature's ground by mentioning possible remedies for the school-
finance dilemma.321
The majority's response was defensive: "[We] mentioned two exam-
ples of the kind of systemic change necessary to correct the constitutional
defect.... We did not suggest that there were no other alternatives, or
that one of these two options was preferred." 32 Having previously stated
that tax base consolidation was constitutionally permissible, the majority
claimed that it "obviously contemplated that approval of the voters of
the county would be required," and asserted that the court's statement
affirming the constitutional permissibility of tax base consolidation "did
not exempt such action... from all other requirements of the Constitu-
tion.,3z
The defenses offered by the majority were considered inadequate by
the dissenters and by many legislators. Justice Doggett wrote:
for the first time, the state had mandated ad valorem local taxes at a set rate, the court wrote
that "Senate Bill 351 is thus all stick with no carrot attached." Id.
319. See id. at 493 ("[WMe hold that Senate Bill 351 levies a state ad valorem tax in violation
of article VIII, section 1-e; and second, we hold that the Bill levies an ad valorem tax without an
election in violation of article VII, section 3 of the Texas Constitution.").
320. For a discussion of these pronouncements, see supra note 309 and accompanying text.
321. See supra Subsections III.C.3-.5.
322. Edgewood 111, 826 S.W.2d at 511-12. Tax base consolidation and school district con-
solidation were the two suggestions previously offered by the court. See id. Justice Gammage,
who in a concurring opinion joined the majority in finding Senate Bill 351 unconstitutional,
blasted the court for trying to defend its previous advisory pronouncements:
The court imprudently tried to give advice, but once undertaking the task failed to
give complete advice. Legislatures enact statutes; courts decide cases. Even when this
court has before it an actual case involving a specific constitutional complaint, we have
no business speculating for the legislature, the executive department, or anyone else,
what may or may not be otherwise constitutionally done.
Id. at 537 (Gammage, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
323. Id. at 512.
Vol. 17:607,1999
Edgewood Drama
Although indicating that the Legislature was constitutionally empowered to
implement tax base consolidation, the majority did not indicate, in any way,
an election precondition. Rather it directly resolved this matter in the nega-
tive. Having charted the legislative course through the murky waters of
Texas constitutional law, it is no minor matter that the majority now claims
its map failed to detail the sharp rocks and swift current near the shore. The
essence of the peculiar position now adopted is that by formerly providing
guidelines for tax base consolidation without saying a vote was unnecessary,
the majority, upon further reflection, finds that it is necessary. Disavowing
paternity of the CED offspring of its prior writing, the majority tries vainly to
shift the blame to the Legislature. 24
These feelings of resentment were shared by many legislators. Repre-
sentative Libby Linebarger said: "They really did prescribe that [CED
plan] in Edgewood 1H. But what was interesting was they prescribed it, we
didn't, we sent it back to them, and then they said 'Oh, this is not what
we really meant.' So it was a very frustrating experience."'" Another
commentator, who was an aide to Lieutenant Governor Bob Bullock at
the time, noted the "tremendous anger in the Legislature after Edge-
wood III," and commented that this series of events is "exactly why
courts are not supposed to do advisory opinions." 326
Anticipating this criticism, the majority blamed the Legislature for
the constitutional infirmities of Senate Bill 351, asserting that the legisla-
tors "were not fooled into thinking that this Court had preapproved the
system. ',327 The majority pointed to testimony of expert witnesses as well
as to language from legislators themselves as evidence of constitutional
doubts about Senate Bill 351.
32
The heated debate about the propriety of the court's advisory state-
ments in Edgewood II and Edgewood Ha touches on much larger issues
that are addressed in greater detail in Section IV.C of this Article. There
is the constitutional concern that the court should abstain from offering
324. Id. at 544 (Doggett, J., dissenting). Doggett also poked holes in the court's contention
that it had "obviously" contemplated voter authorization when it previously had mentioned the
constitutional feasibility of tax base consolidation. See id. at 543-44.
325. Interview with Libby Linebarger, supra note 181.
326. Interview with David Anderson, supra note 286.
327. Edgewood 111, 826 S.W.2d at 513.
328. See id. The majority also insinuated that the Chairman of the Senate Committee on
Public Education, Carl Parker, was aware that either a vote or a constitutional revision would
be necessary to adopt a CED-type plan, see id. at 514, but the dissent claimed that the majority
was intentionally distorting Parker's testimony, see id. at 544-45 (Doggett, J., dissenting). Kevin
O'Hanlon, the general counsel for the Texas Education Agency ("TEA") at the time, sup-
ported the majority's account. O'Hanlon insisted that there was a great debate during the crea-
tion of Senate Bill 351 about whether there should be an election to authorize the CEDs. He
claimed that he recommended the election but Parker opted not to do it because he feared that
there would be no other options if the voters struck it down. See Interview with Kevin
O'Hanlon, supra note 136.
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remedial advice for fear of violating the separation of powers doctrine.
There is also the more pragmatic concern that the court may have some
inherent institutional deficiencies, hindering it from acting profitably in
an advisory capacity. The court itself quoted the following passage from
Rodriguez: "[U]ltimate solutions must come from the lawmakers and
from the democratic pressures of those who elect them."329 Elaborating
further on its institutional limitations, the court continued:
We are constrained by the arguments raised by the parties to address only is-
sues of school finance. We have not been called upon to consider, for exam-
ple, the improvements in education which could be realized by eliminating
gross wastes in the bureaucratic administration of the system. The Legisla-
ture is not so restricted.
3
3
Not heeding its own admonition, the majority continued in its advi-
sory capacity, making thirty separate statements on the topic of
"restructuring the tax system" and warning the Legislature of the dangers
of over-reliance on the local property tax as a source of funding.33'
c. The Cornyn Opinion: The Shield of Adequacy
Because CED taxes were indispensable to the school-finance system
under Senate Bill 351, the court, in declaring CEDs unconstitutional, had
necessarily jettisoned the entire proposed school-finance system. Ac-
cordingly, the court never reached the issue of whether Senate Bill 351
was in conformity with the education clauses of the constitution. Never-
theless, the majority insisted that it was not deviating from the interpreta-
tions of the education clauses adopted in the prior Edgewood cases,33 2
and reaffirmed the previous definitions of "efficiency. ' 33 The majority
329. Edgewood 111, 826 S.W.2d at 524 (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 58-59 (1973)).
330. Id. This claim is somewhat disingenuous, considering that the court offers no proof of
administrative waste-nor is it likely that, if such waste existed, the dollars squandered would
be sufficient to cover the costs of meeting the constitutional requirements for the finance system
set out by the court.
331. See WALKER & CASEY, supra note 49, at 105.
332. The court offered: "Our holding in this case does not conflict with our previous deci-
sions in Edgewood I and Edgewood II, and we in no way withdraw from those opinions." Edge-
wood Ii, 826 S.W.2d at 493.
333. The majority made the following comments on the court's previous interpretations of
"efficiency":
We did not hold that efficiency requires absolute equality in spending; rather we said
that citizens who were willing to shoulder similar tax burdens should have similar ac-
cess to revenues for education. Specifically, we said: 'There must be a direct and close
correlation between a district's tax effort and the educational resources available to it;
in other words, districts must have substantially equal access to similar revenues per
pupil at similar levels of tax effort.'
Id. at 497 (quoting Edgewood 1, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989)).
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did add the caveat that "money is not the only issue, nor is more money
the only solution. '
Though the majority held the line on the previous understandings of
efficiency, Justice Comyn, in a separate opinion, introduced new lan-
guage and ideas into the school-finance debate. Though Cornyn could
not persuade any other justices to sign on to his opinion in this case, he
later wrote the majority opinion in Edgewood IV. The significance of
Cornyn's Edgewood III opinion lies in the fact that he ends up swaying
the court to his point of view, resulting in a major shift in the constitu-
tional framework in Edgewood IV.
Cornyn, voted onto the court after the Edgewood 11 case was de-
cided, interpreted the word "efficiency" much differently than either
previous courts or the current majority, despite his protestations to the
contrary. Starting with the premise that "[e]fficient conveys the meaning
of effective or productive results and connotes the use of resources so as
to produce results with little waste,"3 5 Cornyn wrote:
An "efficient" education requires more than elimination of gross disparities
in funding; it requires the inculcation of an essential level of learning by
which each child in Texas is enabled to live a full and productive life in an in-
creasingly complex world....
... Edgewood I and Edgewood II... require... the legislature to articulate
the requirements of an efficient school system in terms of educational results,
not just in terns of funding.
336
Cornyn's move was subtle yet significant. Whereas previous defini-
tions of "efficiency" had focused almost entirely on financial disparities,
Cornyn concentrated on "results" and "outputs." Cornyn called on the




In addition to shifting the focus to adequacy, Cornyn advanced two
other controversial propositions: first, that the notion of equality had not
been and should not be incorporated into the definition of "efficiency,
' 33
334. Id. at 524.
335. 1d at 527 (Cornyn, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Edgewood I,
777 S.W.2d 391,395 (Tex. 1989)).
336. Id. at 525-27 (Comyn, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
337. Id. at 527 (Cornyn, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
338. See id. at 527-28 (Corayn, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Once a uni-
form, basic education is provided by the school system, equalization of funding is not neces-
sary.") Justice Cornyn even accused the trial court judge of misinterpreting the language of the
prior Edgewood cases by bringing equal rights terminology into the discussion. See id. at 528
(Comyn, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). As the dissent points out, however,
Cornyn is the one who departs from prior understandings. See id. at 570 (Doggett, J., dissent-
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and, second, that the link between money and educational results is at
best tenuous and at worst nonexistent.339 Despite Cornyn's claims, these
two contentions were radical departures from prior court pronounce-
ments. The court had frequently incorporated notions of equality into the
definition of efficiency,3 and its holdings were based on the assumption
that money is a major factor in the quality of education!"'
Justice Cornyn's opinion is a perfect example of how adequacy issues
can be used as a shield as well as a sword. Especially in the most recent
wave of school-finance litigation, adequacy arguments have been used by
plaintiffs as a sword, with the intention of boosting overall funding on
education and improving educational results. Plaintiffs in other states
have pointed to poor educational results to spur efforts for educational
reform. Justice Cornyn, however, used results-oriented language as a
shield, working against the expressed goals of the plaintiffs, in order to
thwart the move towards equalization of access to funding. In parroting
the "money doesn't matter" argument, made throughout the Edgewood
saga by the wealthy school districts,3 2 Comyn undermined the concep-
tual basis of the prior opinions. Those opinions sought to reduce the
gross disparities in access to funding among school districts, leaving only
disparities that stem from a district's tax effort rather than the size of its
tax base. As mentioned above, Cornyn's positions became increasingly
important in the next round of litigation.
ing).
339. See id. at 531 (Cornyn, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
340. The court in Edgewood I "recognized the implicit link that the Texas Constitution es-
tablishes between efficiency and equality." Edgewood 1, 777 S.W.2d 391,397 (Tex. 1989). It also
wrote: "An efficient system... requires only that the funds available for education be distrib-
uted equitably and evenly." Id. at 398. In the next round, the court again reaffirmed its com-
mitment to egalitarianism when it criticized Senate Bill 1 for making "no attempt to equalize
access to funds among all districts." Edgeivood 11, 804 S.W.2d 491, 496 (Tex. 1991). Even the
majority opinion in the present case recognized that the constitution, while not mandating
"absolute equality," did require that districts have "substantially equal access to similar reve-
nues per pupil at similar levels of tax effort." Edgewood I11, 826 S.W.2d at 497 (quoting Edge-
wood 1, 777 S.W.2d at 397) (emphasis added).
341. See Edgewood 1, 777 S.W.2d at 393 ("The amount of money spent on a student's edu-
cation has a real and meaningful impact on the educational opportunity offered that student.").
Justice Doggett, in response to Justice Comyn's assertion about the insignificance of financial
inputs, quoted Justice Thurgood Marshall:
[I]t is difficult to believe that if the children of Texas had a free choice, they would
choose to be educated in districts with fewer resources, and hence with more anti-
quated plants, less experienced teachers and a less diversified curriculum. In fact, if fi-
nancing variations are so insignificant to educational quality, it is difficult to under-
stand why a number of our country's wealthiest school districts, which have no legal
obligation to argue in support of the constitutionality of the Texas legislation, have
nevertheless zealously pursued its cause before this Court.
Edgewood 111, 826 S.W.2d at 572 (Doggett, J., dissenting) (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 83-85 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
342. See supra text accompanying note 136.
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d. Political Motivations
Of course, Texas politics again may have been behind these legal ma-
neuverings. In addition to providing the possible motivations of the jus-
tices in delaying the remedy, 3 political considerations may have
prompted the ruling striking down CEDs as well. Several of the attorneys
involved in the case insinuated that the ruling was a result of the mis-
taken reading of popular opinion.3" The initial reaction to the implemen-
tation of the CED scheme was negative, but, after school districts had
adjusted to the new system, it became increasingly popular. School dis-
tricts favored the scheme because of what was labeled a "park and ride"
provision, in which the Legislature mandated that the Tier One tax rate
be automatically raised from $0.72 to $1.00 over a period of four years.
Because local school districts had no authority to counter this rise in tax
rates, Senate Bill 351 allowed districts to shift blame for the tax increases
onto the Legislature while still being able to spend the extra revenue.
The attorneys allege, however, that news of the late-blooming popularity
of Senate Bill 351 never filtered its way up to the supreme court.31'
e. The Reaction
Many of the plaintiffs, having been content with the funding mecha-
nism of Senate Bill 351, were dismayed that the latest system was ruled
unconstitutional. But considering Justice Cornyn's opinion, the plaintiffs
and other supporters of school-finance reform were at least satisfied that
the court held the line on the previous constitutional standards.
MALDEF attorney Al Kauffman remarked: "We are disappointed that
they threw out the County Education Districts. We are glad they didn't
do anything to upset the earlier decisions."3" Frustrated with the inability
to establish a fair, constitutional finance plan, and aware of State District
Judge Scott McCown's threat to cut off state funding to schools if such a
plan was not devised by June 1993, Kauffman asked McCown to appoint
a special master to prepare a plan in the event of failure by the Legisla-
ture.3" After filing the motion on March 13, Kauffman said: "We would
want a plan so that we can tell the court, 'Your honor, we do not want to
343. See supra note 314.
344. Interview with David Anderson, supra note 286; Interview with Kevin O'Hanlon, su-
pra note 136.
345. See Interview with David Anderson, supra note 286; Interview with Kevin O'Hanlon,
supra note 136.
346. Cindy Rugeley et al., Court Kills School Plan a Third Time; Funding System Illegal,
Justices Tell Legislators, Hous. CHRON., Jan. 31, 1992, at Al.
347. See Cindy Rugeley, School Suit Plaintiffs Seek Another Master, Hous. CHRON., Mar.
14, 1992, at A25.
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stop funding... here is a plan that has been developed by the court."'"
He also argued that the threat of a more stringent court-imposed plan
would motivate legislators to move quickly in constructing a proposal.39
On July 7, 1992, McCown denied Kauffman's request for the appoint-
ment of a special master, arguing that such action would allow legislators
to abdicate their responsibility and take a "blame the court" attitude for
any plan.3 0 He also reiterated the threat to shut down the public school
system if the legislators did not devise a plan by June 1, 1993.
3. The Legislative Response, Part I
a. A Failed Special Session
The Legislature, stunned by the ruling in Edgewood III, now had to
navigate around several more constitutional barriers, including prohibi-
tions of mandatory local-share tax rates, new districts with taxing author-
ity granted without local authorization, and over-reliance on local prop-
erty taxes.35' With a tax base consolidation plan now off the table,
legislators mulled over the few remaining possibilities, all of which
seemed politically unpalatable.
In March, Speaker of the House Gib Lewis chose to pursue what was
perhaps the most politically imprudent route of all. He proposed a school
district consolidation plan (as opposed to a tax base consolidation) that
would have consolidated approximately 1,050 of the districts into 188,
largely along the boundaries of the now-unconstitutional CEDs"' Lewis
claimed that it would eliminate the need for a statewide property tax, re-
duce pressure for a state income tax, and avoid a massive redistribution
of funds from wealthy districts to poor ones.353 The spokesperson for the
Texas Association of School Boards called the proposal "ludicrous" and
"unsound," and the Equity Center director Craig Foster remarked that
voting for consolidation in Texas would be "political suicide."' ' 4 Lewis's
proposal failed to win any significant support.
When it became obvious that district consolidation was not a politi-
cally viable option, the state's three most powerful politicians-Speaker
348. Id.
349. See Cindy Rugeley, Judge Threatens Closing of State's Public Schools, Hous. CHRON.,
July 8, 1992, at Al.
350. See id.
351. See WALKER & CASEY, supra note 49, at 104-05.
352. See Clay Robison & Melanie Markley, Lewis Calls for Radical School Cure, Hous.
CHRON., Mar. 12, 1992, at Al. School district consolidation has never been constitutionally sus-
pect. In fact, the Texas Constitution explicitly authorizes school district consolidation without
electoral authorization. See TEx. CONST. art. VII, § 3-b.




Lewis, Governor Ann Richards, and Lieutenant Governor Bob Bul-
lock-crafted what they called the "Fair Share Plan," a plan based on
limited recapture. This proposal would have required Texas's 111 richest
school districts to surrender a portion of their local tax revenue to the
state, which would then funnel the money through the Teacher Retire-
ment System to aid poorer districts.355 Because the constitution had been
interpreted to prohibit tax money collected in one school district from
being spent in another, the plan was drafted in the form of a constitu-
tional amendment to circumvent this restriction.356 It would have abol-
ished CEDs, since recapture would have been implemented on a state-
wide basis, not by county. Bullock insisted that the recapture would have
touched only 10% of the districts with 6% of the students and affected
only 2.5% of the total school spending.3 7 The legislation also included a
proposed equity standard, which stated that 95% of the state and local
funds used to finance public schools had to be equalized.358
Governor Richards called legislators to Austin in November 1992 for
a post-election special session, in order to resolve the school-finance is-
sue. The "Fair Share Plan" supported by the Governor and the legisla-
tive leadership sailed through the Senate, 29-2, 3" but the plan fell victim
to partisan bickering and political gamesmanship in the House. The
House fell 10 votes short of the necessary 100 to approve the constitu-
tional amendment. The 90-57 margin was almost strictly on party lines,
with only two Republicans supporting passage of the plan and only four
Democrats defecting to the opposition.3
The "Fair Share Plan" sparked vociferous opposition for several rea-
sons. Many Republicans were ideologically opposed to the idea of recap-
ture, arguing that hurting wealthy districts by "leveling down" was not
the proper solution.36' Defenders of the plan responded that their real
complaint was with the supreme court, which had severely restricted the
available options, and that recapture was the best of the remaining
choices. 362 The opponents of the amendment also harped on the fact that
the Plan contained estimated local property tax increases of $2.8 billion
355. See Cindy Rugeley, School Plan Faces Lawmakers as Session Begins This Week,
Hous. CHRON., Nov. 8, 1992, at 1.
356. See WALKER & CASEY, supra note 27, at 19.
357. See Bob Bullock, School-Finance Opposition Is Thumbing Its Nose at Texas Supreme
Court, Hous. CHRON., Dec. 15, 1992, at Bll.
358. See WALKER & CASEY, supra note 27, at 19.




362. See Bullock, supra note 357.
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for the biennium' 3 The "Fair Share Plan" also ran into trouble because
the proposed equity standard of 95%, while high, appeared to dilute the
standard previously outlined in the Edgewood cases (similar revenue per
student for similar levels of tax effort) when the revenue effects on poor
districts were examined in the computer printouts that accompanied the
plan.3 6 The proposed 95% equity target was not chosen by accident-it
had been at the center of Senate Bill 1, and, as before, it was still consid-
ered to be a politically attractive figure.
Two other proposals were also rejected in the House. An alternative
amendment offered by some Democratic representatives, which would
have allowed voters to decide whether to keep the CED system, died on
a procedural motion without a full vote.36 With the frustration level ris-
ing with every passing day, some legislators sought to capitalize on the
legislative-judicial tension. A bloc of Republicans, led by Representative
John Culberson, attempted to pass a constitutional amendment which
would have strictly limited court intervention in matters of school fi-
nance. Democrats lambasted the idea as a breach of the separation of
powers doctrine and accused its proponents of running away from the
problem instead of trying to solve it' 66 The measure gathered 57 votes,
but eighty-nine representatives spurned it.367 The voting again was almost
exclusively along party lines. Despite the setback, Culberson and his sup-
porters would be heard from again.
b. Proposition One
After the failure to reach any sort of consensus, the special session
was disbanded and the political discourse descended into invectives and
attributions of blame. t When a new Legislature (still in Democratic
hands) convened in January 1993, tempers had cooled. The impending
June 1 deadline, a change in legislative leadership, and a willingness by
House Democrats to open up the legislative process to their Republican
counterparts helped break the legislative logjam.369
363. See WALKER & CASEY, supra note 27, at 19. One critic went so far as to argue that the
Democrats were intentionally increasing local property taxes and other state taxes to unbear-
able levels in order to stimulate demand for a state income tax. See William Murchison, Robin
Hood, in Reverse, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 7,1992, at 8 (Commentary section).
364. See WALKER & CASEY, supra note 27, at 19.
365. See Rugeley et al., supra note 359.
366. See Cindy Rugeley & Melanie Markley, Though Narrower, School Funding Gap Still
Chasm, HoUs. CHRON., Dec. 27, 1992, at 1.
367. See Rugeley et al., supra note 359.
368. Governor Richards rebuked the Republicans and partisan politics for the failure of the
session, but one prominent Republican fired back, saying, "From a political aspect, she
[Richards] is the one that played the school issue like a yo-yo." Id.
369. See House Approval of School Plan Unexpected, Welcome, HOUS. CHRON., Feb. 12,
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Legislators began discussing constitutional amendments as a means of
circumventing the constitutional defects of Senate Bill 351. For an
amendment to become enshrined in the constitution, it had to be ap-
proved by two-thirds of both houses of the Legislature and then ap-
proved by a majority of the voters of Texas. With adroit dealmaking and
offers of compromise, new House Speaker Laney and Public Education
Committee Chairperson Linebarger swayed 15 Republicans to their side
to get the two-thirds vote needed in the House.7 0 The proposed constitu-
tional amendment sailed through the Senate by a twenty-seven-to-four
margin a few days later.7
Three proposed constitutional amendments, called propositions, were
to be voted on by the citizens of Texas on the May 1 ballot. The first
proposition was the focus of most of the attention.3 Proposition One
would have constitutionalized the CED system struck down in Edge-
wood Ill. It would have allowed the state to take as much as 2.75% of
state and local school revenue from wealthy districts-approximately
$400 million-and redistribute the money to poorer ones.373 It would also
have allowed the state to establish county or multi-county education dis-
tricts as a mechanism for redistributing this revenue and to limit to one
dollar the tax rate that these districts could levy.374 Having never really
come close to finding another way out of the quagmire, the Legislature
had a lot riding on Proposition One.
The two-and-a-half month campaign for passage of Proposition One
was aggressively fought on both sides. Governor Richards was the plan's
most vociferous supporter, putting all the political capital she could mus-
ter into the fight. Also supporting the bill was the Democratic legislative
leadership and most major education and teacher groups.375 Proponents
of the plan were also helped by some of the state's business leaders, who
contributed more than $1.5 million in order to launch a television adver-
tising blitz.376
1993, at A32.
370. See Ross Ramsey et al., Arm-Twisting Helped Shove Issue over Top, Hous. CHRON.,
Feb. 12, 1993, at Al.
371. See Cindy Rugeley, Senate Approval Sends School-Finance Plan to Voters, Hous.
CHRON., Feb. 16, 1993, at Al.
372. Proposition Two would have allowed school districts to ignore state mandates when-
ever the state refused to provide the funding for the fulfillment of said mandates, and Proposi-
tion Three authorized the issuance of state bonds for the construction of school facilities. See
WALKER & CASEY, supra note 27, at 20.
373. See Rugeley, supra note 371.
374. See id.
375. See Cindy Rugeley, Voters Reject School Funding, Hous. CHRON., May 2,1993 at Al.
376. See id.
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Opponents of the bill were not to be outdone, making their presence
felt through talk radio and through meetings with newspaper and televi-
sion reporters across the state.3 They had the organized backing of the
Republican Party of Texas and an organization called Citizens to Stop
Robin Hood Taxes, which dubbed Proposition One the "Robin Hood
Amendment," and warned voters that it would lead to massive tax in-
creases.378 Even the National Republican Party chipped in for the anti-
amendment campaign with a donation of $400,000 from the Republican
National Committee. Some believe that the purpose of this contribu-
tion was to deliver a blow to the political fortunes of Governor Richards,
damaging her chances of reelection.38
Whether or not the Republicans were trying to deflate Governor
Richards, the voters of Texas surely did when they overwhelmingly de-
feated Proposition One.' Several of Proposition One's supporters at-
tribute their failure to a poorly managed campaign and light voter turn-
out.m The legislators did not have much time for recrimination. With
McCown's June 1 deadline approaching and the specter of a school shut-
down again looming large, legislators had only a matter of weeks to cob-
ble together a finance plan that could pass constitutional muster, and
many did not know where to start.
377. See id.
378. See Terrence Stutz, 'Robin Hood' Supporters Preparing To Woo Voters; School Fund-
ing Plan Will Be Tough Sale, They Say, DALLAS MORNING NEws, Feb.13, 1993, at 1A.
379. See Wayne Slater, U.S. GOP Cash Fought School Plan; Democratic Official Calls
Foes' Tactic Hypocritical, DALLAS MORNING NEwS, Jan. 12, 1994, at 1A.
380. See id. Their efforts may have been successful. Richards went on to lose the guberna-
torial race to George Bush, Jr., in November 1994.
381. Proposition One lost by a margin of 63% to 37%. See Rugeley, supra note 375.
382. One legislator, Scott Hochberg, a Democratic representative from Houston, argued
that the campaign was poorly managed and not broad-based, because many legislators were left
out of the loop. He contended that opposition to the amendment stemmed from misconceptions
surrounding the "Robin Hood" name, as many people mistakenly believed that their districts
were being affected. He also noted the opposition was bolstered by a light turnout, which mag-
nified the power of the conservative activists. See Interview with Scott Hochberg, Texas Repre-
sentative, in Houston, Tex. (Mar. 13, 1996). House Public Education Committee Chairperson
Libby Linebarger asserted that she and her Senate counterpart, Bill Ratliff, wanted to campaign
by telling voters how they would be affected in their pocketbooks. Richards instead tried to tug
at their heartstrings-to no avail. Linebarger also accused the opposition of putting out
"misinformation and outright lies" but attributed their victory to their focus on pocketbook is-
sues. Interview with Libby Linebarger, supra note 181.
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4. The Legislative Response, Part 11: Senate Bill 7
a. The Genesis of the Bill
With yet another plan going down to defeat, House members quickly
began stitching together a consolidation plan in order to avoid a school
shutdown, believing that district consolidation was the only "lead-pipe
cinch" to be constitutional. 3  The plan that emerged would have com-
bined 109 wealthy districts with 172 other districts in order to achieve a
greater degree of equity.3 The consolidation bill was able to muster
some support in the House, only because representatives feared that a
failure to meet the June 1 deadline would tarnish the Legislature as a
whole, that a school shutdown was something to be avoided at all costs,
and that the only other constitutional alternative would be to institute a
state income tax. Still, consolidation was not an attractive alternative for
the politicians. Linebarger explained that consolidation "is a nasty word
in Texas because people think they are going to have to give up their
Friday night football games., 38" The traditional importance of local con-
trol and independence in Texas education posed a major barrier to any
consolidation plan.
Consolidation was even less attractive for the senators. Because only
a small number of schools would be affected by the consolidation plan,
there were many House members whose districts were completely unaf-
fected. In contrast, senators represented much larger areas that were
more likely to contain wealthy school districts and thus were more likely
to have something to lose.36
While the consolidation bill was treading water in the House, the
Senate developed and passed its own plan, which was developed with the
assistance of the Equity Center. The plan called for detaching commer-
cial property from a wealthy district and annexing it to a poor district.
The annexed property and the district did not have to be contiguous.
One of the plan's architects, Craig Foster, contended that the scheme
could have easily been implemented: "It [the annexation plan] was an in-
genious thing. It was literally as simple as the legislature establishing
boundary lines. We already have in Texas school districts that are split
into parts for whatever reason. There was no difference except the pur-
pose for which it [the splitting] was being done. '' 87
383. Interview with Scott Hochberg, supra note 382; see also Terrence Stutz, New Option Is
Sought on Schools, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 3, 1993, at 1A.
384. See Terrence Stutz, Richards Tells Texans To Push Lawmakers on School Finance,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 14,1993, at IA.
385. Interview with Libby Linebarger, supra note 181.
386. Interview with Scott Hochberg, supra note 382.
387. Interview with Craig Foster, supra note 73.
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The General Counsel of the TEA, Kevin O'Hanlon, strongly disa-
greed with Foster's claim. The plan, which he labeled a "logistical night-
mare," would have required the TEA to keep track of millions of parcels
of commercial property in the state, a task for which O'Hanlon claims it
was ill suited: "We [the TEA] would lose control over it, and I didn't
have that much confidence in our ability, because we weren't in that
business. We were going to have to start this process from scratch and
keep up with it." Complicating matters was a constitutional provision
requiring appraisals to be done by county-based organizations, adding a
barrier between the base data and the administrative task that the TEA
would have been asked to fulfill7 9
The Senate bill also encountered some ideological opposition in the
House. Because the plan only allowed commercial property to be trans-
ferred, seven wealthy districts that were composed of primarily residen-
tial property would have remained untouched by the plan.390 Among
these districts were some of the defendant-intervenors in the original
Edgewood lawsuit, including the Alamo Heights and Highland Park
school districts, that were some of the most vigorous opponents of the
school-finance reform efforts 9.3 " The House leadership was not about to
let them off the hook, because they believed doing so violated the su-
preme court's constitutional interpretations, particularly the pronounce-
ments in Edgewood II regarding the need to bring all property into the
school financing system. Linebarger, for instance, remarked: "The su-
preme court said all property. They didn't say 99.6% of property. They
said all property had to be in the system.
' 3
12
In addition to worrying about the imposing time constraints and
horse-trading with the various constituencies, the legislative leadership
also had to deal with Representative John Culberson and his followers,
who were still clamoring for a constitutional amendment that would have
prohibited the courts from intervening in school-finance issues. Accord-
ing to Linebarger, Culberson's troops were unwilling to discuss any al-
ternative to their constitutional amendment9 Had the Legislature failed
to meet the June 1 deadline and an emergency special session was called,
Linebarger estimates that the Culberson amendment would have passed,
388. Interview with Kevin O'Hanlon, supra note 136.
389. Id.; see also TEX. CONsT. art. VIII, § 23(b).
390. See Stutz, supra note 384. These districts had a total of approximately 7,000 students,
less than one half of one percent of the state's total student population. See id.
391. Interview with Libby Linebarger, supra note 181.
392. Stutz, supra note 384.
393. Interview with Libby Linebarger, supra note 181.
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given the level of disgust that would have existed and the legislators' de-
sire to free themselves from this intractable conundrum
3
4
Fortunately, the Legislature was able to find its way out of the morass
in time to meet the deadline. Recognizing that none of the ideas that had
been circulating could gain a majority in both houses and running out of
time the House developed a multi-option "cafeteria-style" plan.
O'Hanlon summarized the thinking in the House: "[W]e c[ould] avoid
this fight by giving the locals a choice. They're not good choices for the
rich districts, but at least they get to participate. 3 5 Piecing together old
and new ideas, approximately 100 of the wealthiest school districts were
given five choices to reduce their tax base. They could:
1) consolidate with another district by agreement (the old House
plan);
2) detach commercial property to be annexed by another district (the
Senate plan);
3) purchase attendance credits (a form of recapture that entailed
sending funds to the state);
4) contract for the education of non-resident students; or
5) undertake tax base consolidation by setting up a mini-CED (the
approach in Senate Bill 351). 96
These choices formed the core of what became Senate Bill 7.3 If one
of the choices was deemed unconstitutional, the law allowed the districts
to choose another .3 " The bill sailed through the Senate on a vote of 25-6
and passed the House by a vote of 103-41 with only days to spare before
the court-imposed deadline.3 9 Almost seventeen months after the su-
preme court ruled the Legislature's last school-finance system unconsti-
tutional, Governor Richards signed the bill into law and Texas finally had
another system in place.
b. A Description and Analysis of Senate Bill 7
Because the finance system established in Senate Bill 7 is largely in
place today, the provisions of the law warrant close scrutiny. Senate Bill 7
394. See id.
395. Interview with Kevin O'Hanlon, supra note 136.
396. See WALKER & CASEY, supra note 27, at 20-21.
397. An Act Relating to Public School Education and Finance, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
Ch. 347 (West). The entire education code was recodified in 1995, meaning that technically the
provisions of Senate Bill 7 were repealed and replaced in different sections of the code. How-
ever, the financing provisions of Senate Bill 7 remain largely in effect. For the sake of clarity,
citations to Senate Bill 7 in the following discussion refer to the pre-1995 education code.
398. See id. § 1.01 (codified at TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 36.009 (West. 1994)); see also
WALKER & CASEY, supra note 27, at 21.
399. See Cindy Rugeley & Clay Robison, The 73rd Legislature; Challenges to School Fi-
nance Already Lurk, HOUS. CHRON., May 30, 1993, at Al.
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retained the two-tiered structure of the FSP, the system of formulas for
the distribution of state aid to qualifying school districts4 ° Within the
FSP, state aid is disbursed in three basic components: (1) Tier One, (2)
the Guaranteed Yield Program (Tier Two), and (3) the Available School
Fund.
About three-fourths of the state funds distributed to school districts
through the FSP are Tier One funds.4°' Tier One is supposed to cover the
cost of a basic education for each school district. In Senate Bill 7, the
state set this figure at $2300 for each student in "average daily atten-
dance" ("ADA"), $100 less than Senate Bill 351 had allotted for Tier
One.4°2 This basic allotment is subject to adjustments on the district level
(through a cost-of-education index, a small district adjustment, and a
sparsity adjustment)43 and adjustments based on different student
needs,44 as well as some other minor modifications.405 These adjustments,
or weights, are factored into the funding mechanism through a formula
called the "weighted students in average daily attendance"
("WADA").4 To qualify for the state guarantee of $2300 per student in
400. See supra notes 111, 206, 299-301 and accompanying text. See also TEXAS EDUC.
AGENCY, SNAPSHOT 94: 1993-94, at 23 (1995).
401. See LEGISLATIVE BUDGET BOARD, FINANCING PUBLIC EDUCATION IN TEXAS:
KINDERGARTEN THROUGH GRADE 12, at 14 (Feb. 1999), available at <www.lbb.state.tx.us>
(visited Feb. 16, 1999).
402. See id. at 23; 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 347, § 2.01 (codified at TEX. EDUC. CODE
ANN. § 16.101 (West 1994)).
403. The cost of education index adjusts the basic allotment for each district to reflect the
geographical variation in known resource costs and costs of education due to factors beyond the
district's control. See 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 347, § 2.0; LEGISLATIVE BUDGET BOARD,
supra note 401, at 14. Districts may qualify for the small district adjustment and the sparsity
adjustment depending on their student population, geographic expansiveness, and proximity to
a high school district. See 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 347, § 2.01; LEGISLATIVE BUDGET
BOARD, supra note 401, at 14.
404. Students with special educational needs are given different weights to recognize the
differing costs in educating the students. Students in the normal educational program are
counted as 1.00 for funding purposes, while weights for students in the special education pro-
gram range from 2.3 to 7.11. See BILLY D. WALKER & DANIEL T. CASEY, THE BASICS OF
TEXAS PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE : A NOVEMBER 1994 UPDATE 3-4 (5th ed. 1994). These
weights, used for the 1993-1994 school year, had been retained from the previous system. Sen-
ate Bill 7 called for modification of many aspects of the weighting system beginning in the 1994-
1995 school year. See 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 347, § 2.06. In addition to the special educa-
tion weights, there were also weighted programs for vocational education, compensatory educa-
tion, gifted and talented students, and bilingual education. See id.; LEGISLATIVE BUDGET
BOARD, supra note 401, at 15; see also Dan Casey & Frank Battle, Presentation for the 1994
TASA/TASB Joint Annual Convention (Oct. 3, 1994).
405. Districts were also eligible for a transportation allotment and a technology allotment.
See LEGISLATIVE BUDGET BOARD, supra note 401, at 15.
406. These weights, which reflect the varying cost of education by pupil characteristic or
instructional arrangement, enable the state to direct more aid to districts whose students are
more expensive to educate.
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ADA, or the approximately $2566 per student in WADA, the school dis-
tricts have to agree to tax their property at an effective rat of $0.86 per
$100 of assessed valuation,4 an increase of $0.04 over the mandatory
rate the CEDs were required to levy under Senate Bill 351. 4,9 Some
wealthy districts could meet this basic allotment through this tax rate
without any state aid, but most districts received some state money to
bridge the gap between what they reaped in local revenues from the
$0.86 tax and the basic allotment provided under Tier One.
410
The Guaranteed Yield Program, often called the second tier, was be-
gun in 1989-1990 to provide additional funds to enrich the basic Tier One
program. Its stated purpose is "to provide each school district with the
opportunity to supplement the basic program at a level of its own choice
and with access to additional funds for facilities., 411 It enables districts
with property wealth below $205,500 per student to earn additional state
aid by setting their tax rate anywhere between the $0.86 required for Tier
One financing and the $1.50 statutory maximum.4 2 For each penny of tax
effort past the first tier requirement up to an additional $0.64, the state
guarantees a yield of $20.55 per penny per WADA.43 Thus, a poor dis-
407. An effective rate differs from the actual rate in that it is a uniform statewide measure
that takes into account regional differences based on prices and differing appraisal techniques.
408. The phrase "per $100 of assessed valuation" is hereafter either omitted or referred to
numerically (e.g., $0.86/$100).
409. See TEXAS EDUC. AGENCY, supra note 400, at 25. The local district was responsible
for the product of the $0.86 effective tax rate per $100 of value and the taxable value of the dis-
trict's property for the prior tax year determined under TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 11.86 (West
1994). See 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 347, § 2.06 (West).
410. In fact, for the 1993-1994 school year, local property taxes accounted for $5.026 billion
of the Tier One funding, whereas the state contributed $5.973 billion. See Casey & Battle, supra
note 404.
411. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 16.301 (West 1994).
412 See id. § 16.302.
413. See id. School district property taxes have two functional components: a Maintenance
and Operations ("M&O") rate, for administrative and operational costs, and an Interest and
Sinking Fund rate ("I&S"), or "debt service" rate, for facilities construction and renovation. See
LEGISLATIVE BUDGET BOARD, supra note 401, at 10. Both M&O and I&S taxation qualify a
district for state aid under the Guaranteed Yield Program of Tier Two. See William Sparkman
& Fred Hartmeister, The Edgeiwood Saga Continues: The Texas School Finance System is Con-
stitutional-But Not out of the Woods, 101 ED. LAW. REP. 509 (1995), available in WESTLAW,
Education Library, WELR File. There is a statutory cap of $1.50/$100 for M&O taxation. Un-
der Senate Bill 7, the tax rate for servicing old debt remained unlimited, but the rate for the
issuance of new debt (after September 1, 1992) was limited to $0.50, required approval from the
Attorney General, and had to be within the overall $1.50 limit. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN.
§ 20.09(d) (West 1994), superseded by TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 45.003(e) (West 1996). The
$1.50 cap could be exceeded for I&S taxation, but only with local voter authorization; any taxa-
tion in excess of $1.50 did not qualify for state aid under Tier Two. See id. § 20.09(a); LEG-
ISLATIVE BUDGET BOARD, supra note 401, at 10. Because the state does not provide additional
money for districts taxing (for debt service) above the $1.50 rate, such taxation leads to une-
qualized local enrichment, thus creating a "third tier."
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trict taxing at the maximum rate allowed ($1.50) would qualify for a
guaranteed $1315 per weighted student (64 times $20.55), in addition to
the basic allotment provided in Tier One. This scaled system provides an
incentive for districts to tax at a greater rate.414 Districts with property
values per student exceeding $205,000 would not qualify for assistance,
because their local tax revenue would exceed the state's guaranteed
yield.415
The Available School Fund, which was constitutionally created in
1876, consists of the annual interest from the Permanent School Fund
416
as well as one-fourth of the revenues from the state motor fuel tax.17
Most of the money in this fund is disbursed to school districts based ex-
clusively on the number of students in ADA. In 1993-1994, the per capita
apportionment for school districts was $334 per student in ADA.41" The
Available School Fund disbursements are not provided in addition to
Tier One and Tier Two but rather in lieu of the state's contributions un-
der Tier One and Tier Two.
To look at the system from a broad perspective, the amount of FSP
state aid that a district is entitled to is the basic Tier One allotment (with
weights and adjustments) combined with the guaranteed yield from Tier
Two, minus the district's allocation from the Available School Fund and
the district's local share of Tier One and Tier TWO.
419
The essence of Senate Bill 7 is the multi-option formula designed to
"level down" the wealthiest districts. Under the new law, districts can no
longer exceed $280,000 in property value per student (which equals the
district property value as assigned by the comptroller's Property Tax di-
414. The state set its guaranteed yield to the tax rates levied by the districts in 1992-93, so
that any local tax effort in 1993-1994 above the previous year's rate was not recognized for
equalization purposes, creating what the plaintiffs called a "biennium lag." See infra text ac-
companying note 452.
415. Under Senate Bill 7, districts with property values of $205,000 per student or greater
did not receive any state aid under Tier Two, because they could generate more than the state's
guaranteed yield of $20.55 per penny of tax effort from their own tax base. For example, a dis-
trict with $210,000 of property wealth per student could raise $21 from its own tax base for
every additional penny of tax effort. A district with $280,000 of property wealth per student
could raise $28 of local funds for every additional penny of tax effort.
For the 1993-1994 school year, the state contributed $1.32 billion of the Tier Two money,
while the districts' share from local tax revenue accounted for $2.63 billion of the total. See Ca-
sey & Battle, supra note 404.
416. The Permanent School Fund is an endowment consisting of land and investment
holdings established by the state in the nineteenth century. See LEGISLATIVE BUDGET BOARD,
supra note 401, at 10. The Fund was valued at $18.4 billion in 1998. See hL
417. See TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 43.001 (West 1994); LEGISLATIvE BUDGET BOARD,
supra note 401, at 12. The revenues from the motor fuel tax are constitutionally allocated to the
Available School Fund. See TEx. CONST. art. VIII, § 7-a.
418. See TEXAS EDUC. AGENCY, supra note 400, at 23.
419. See WALKER & CASEY, supra note 404, at 6.
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vision studies divided by the WADA4 2°).421 Any district that exceeds the
allowable wealth per student has five options to reduce its wealth.
The first option is consolidation by agreement. The board of trustees
of two or more districts could voluntary consolidate so long as the com-
bined entity would have less than $280,000 in property value per stu-
dent.4= An election is not required, and districts need not be contigu-
ous.411 The second option is detachment of property and annexation by
agreement. The board of trustees of two districts may agree to detach
property from one district (which must bring it to below $280,000 of
property value per student) and annex it to the other (so long as the an-
nexation does not increase the wealth of the annexing district above
$205,000 per student).4 4 A third alternative for wealthy districts is the
purchase of attendance credits from the state. Money from the payment
of attendance credits is deposited for use in financing the Foundation
Program.4 s For each credit purchased, one student is added to a district's
WADA for calculation of property value per student.4 6 This mechanism,
which would require local voter approval, would allow wealthy districts
to dip below the $280,000 ceiling for property wealth per student.42 The
fourth possibility, also requiring local voter approval, would involve con-
tracting with other school districts to educate their students.4  Finally, the
last option would allow several districts to create a consolidated taxing
district, but it would require local voter approval in all affected districts. 9
This type of tax base consolidation would be much like a mini-CED, ex-
cept that all M&O taxing authority resides in the taxing district, whereas
under Senate Bill 351 the component districts would have retained some
of their M&O taxing authority.430
420. See 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 347, § 1.01 (codified at TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN.
§ 36 (West 1994)).
421. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 36.002(a) (West 1994)).
422. See id. § 36.031.
423. See id. § 36.032.
424. See id. § 36.061(a)(1)-(2). Such property need not be contiguous. See id. § 36.062.
425. See id. § 36.094.
426. See id. § 36.092. Each "credit" counts as an extra student solely for determining the
district's wealth per student wealth, and does not bring additional students into the district. See
id. Additionally, the price of each credit is either the district's total tax revenue per WADA or
the statewide average for the previous year, whichever is greater. See id. § 36.093.
427. See id. § 36.096. Because property value per student is calculated as district property
value divided by WADA, adding to the WADA through the purchase of attendance credits
would obviously lead to lower property value per student. An agreement to purchase atten-
dance credits would be valid for one year. See id. § 36.095.
428. See id. The districts giving away the students must not have their WADA decline to
such an extent that they would then exceed the $280,000 cap.
429. See id.
430. See WALKER & CASEY, supra note 404, at 14.
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If none of these options were selected, the Commissioner of Educa-
tion would be authorized, subject to certain restrictions, to detach com-
mercial property from the noncompliant district and annex it to another
district.43' For the rare wealthy district lacking a substantial amount of
commercial property, the Commissioner would be authorized to force
wholesale consolidation if the district were to fail to choose among the
five options.432
Senate Bill 7 also included a controversial provision that allowed
some of the state's wealthiest districts to retain some of their property
wealth in excess of the $280,000 cap for three years. 433 This "hold harm-
less" provision allowed wealthy districts to maintain their prior spending
levels and avoid the abrupt funding decreases that they would have oth-
erwise faced.434
For the 1993-1994 school year, ninety-eight districts exceeded the
$280,000 cap, and all made their decisions in a timely fashion, avoiding
detachment or forced consolidation by the Commissioner.4 35 Sixty-four
chose to purchase attendance credits. Thirty districts elected to contract
for the education of students from other districts. Four districts opted
both to purchase attendance credits and to educate students from other
districts. No district opted for detachment, and no district pursued con-
solidation of any sort.436 In its first year of existence, the finance plan in-
troduced by Senate Bill 7 raised $318 million in revenues "recaptured"
from wealthy districts by the state.437 By 1998-1999, recaptured revenues
are expected to exceed $716 million.438
431. See 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 347, § 1.01.
432. See id.
433. See id. This provision was one of the bases on which the poorer districts challenged
Senate Bill 7. See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717, 734 (Tex. 1995)
[hereinafter Edgewood IV].
434. Much to the chagrin of the poorer school districts, the hold harmless provision was
extended twice by the Legislature, in 1995 and in 1997, and it is now set to expire in 2000. The
provision is still the subject of fierce debate today.
435. See TEXAS EDUc. AGENCY, supra note 400, at 24.
436. See id. These numbers vary among several different sources. One source agreed that
98 districts were affected but claimed that one fewer district exercized option four, choosing
instead to detach property under option two. See WALKER & CASEY, supra note 404, at 19. An-
other source claimed that there were actually 99 districts touched by the law, one of which
chose the detachment option (option two), 52 of which chose to purchase attendance credits
(option three), eight of which opted to educate students from other districts (option four), and
38 of which combined options three and four. See Sparkman & Hartmeister, supra note 413, at
514-15. The Texas Supreme Court in Edgewood IV also claimed that there were 99 affected
districts. See Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 746.
437. See TEXAS EDuc. AGENCY, supra note 400, at 28. There was also disagreement on
this figure among the various sources. The Edgewood IV court, for example, claimed that the
plan raised $400 million in recaptured money. See Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 735.
438. See LEGISLATIVE BUDGET BOARD, supra note 401, at 18.
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In addition, as part of Senate Bill 7, the Legislature appropriated an
additional $1.1 billion to fund the state's contribution to the Foundation
School Program for the 1993-1995 biennium. The state delayed payment
of approximately $250 million of that amount to school districts in a bid
to shift twenty-five percent of the increase to the next biennium.43 9 The
additional funding was still not enough to keep pace with increasing en-
rollment, meaning that school districts lost an average of $94 per student
for the 1993-1994 school year. These funding concerns had a lot to do
with the reduction of the Tier One guarantee from $2400 in 1992-1993 to
$2300 for the 1993-1995 biennium, the decrease in the guaranteed yield
in Tier Two from $22.50 to $20.55 per weighted student for each penny
of tax effort, and the application of the guaranteed yield (in Tier Two) to
1992-1993 tax rates rather than the 1993-1994 tax rates.4' Given the
overall changes, including the different funding mechanisms and the in-
adequate funding, both rich and poor districts had to raise local taxes to
generate the same amount of revenue in 1993-1994 that they had re-
ceived in 1992-1993.
Senate Bill 7 was not dedicated exclusively to reforming the finance
system; it also sought to create an accountability regime for Texas stu-
dents. It made significant reforms in Chapter 35 of the Texas Education
Code that were aimed at establishing a system of assessment and accredi-
tation for school districts to measure their progress in reaching seven
educational goals44 The school accountability regime grades campuses as
439. See WALKER & CASEY, supra note 404, at 9.
440. See Terrence Stutz, Richards Signs School Funding Bill, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
June 1, 1993, at 10A.
441. See Sparkman & Hartmeister, supra note 413.
442 See 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 347, § 7.01 (West). The seven educational goals
mentioned were:
GOAL A: All students shall have access to an education of high quality that will pre-
pare them to participate fully now and in the future in the social, economic, and educa-
tional opportunities available to Texas.
GOAL B: The achievement gap between educationally disadvantaged students and
other populations will be closed. Through enhanced dropout prevention efforts, the
graduation rate will be raised to 95 percent of students who enter the seventh grade.
GOAL C: The state shall demonstrate exemplary performance in comparison to na-
tional and international standards for student performance.
GOAL D: A well-balanced and appropriate curriculum will be provided to all stu-
dents.
GOAL E: Qualified and effective personnel will be attracted and retained. Adequate
and competitive compensation commensurate with responsibilities will be ensured.
Qualified staff in critical storage areas will be recruited, trained, and retrained.
GOAL F: The organization and management of all levels of the educational system
will be productive, efficient, and accountable.
GOAL G: Instruction and administration will be improved through research that iden-
tifies creative and effective methods. Demonstration programs will be developed and
local initiatives encouraged for new instructional arrangements and management
techniques. Technology will be used to increase the equity, efficiency, and effective-
ness of student learning, instructional management, staff development, and admini-
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either exemplary, recognized, acceptable, or low-performing, based on
standardized test scores, attendance, and dropout rates."3 Low-
performing districts that consistently fail to meet accreditation standards
are subject to penalties, including dissolution of the offending school dis-
trict and consolidation with another district.44"
Six years after the first hearing in the Edgewood suit, legislators
crossed their fingers, hoping they had finally put together a plan that
could survive judicial scrutiny. It did not take long for challenges to
emerge and battle lines to be drawn.
E. Edgewood IV
1. A Host of Challengers and Challenges
Less than two weeks after Senate Bill 7 passed, MALDEF and the
Equity Center requested that Texas District Court Judge Scott McCown:
(1) overturn the law, (2) hold an immediate hearing, (3) give the Legisla-
ture an August 1 deadline to come up with a new finance system, and (4)
appoint a court master to devise a plan in the event of the Legislature's
failure to do so."5 MALDEF attorney Kauffman said that the law would
"have an immediate negative effect on the poorest school districts and
did not go far enough toward guaranteeing long-term equality for all
school children in Texas.""' 6 The executive director of the Equity Center,
Craig Foster, called the new system "a step backward in terms of the
equalization gains we've been making over the past four years in par-
ticular." 447 The original Edgewood plaintiffs (and plaintiff-intervenors)
objected to three elements of Senate Bill 7, in particular: inadequate
state funding, a $600 gap between rich and poor districts at the maximum
allowable rate of taxation, and the biennium lag in determining the
amount of state aid.
stration.
Id.
443. See A. Phillip Brooks, Record Number of Texas Schools Given Top Grade, AUSTIN
Am.-STATESMAN, Jan. 4,1998, at Al.
444. See 1993 Tex. Sess. Law. Serv. Ch. 347 (West).
445. See Terrence Stutz, School Finance Law Challenged in Court; Lawyers Warn of Irrepa-
rable Harms to Poor, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 12, 1993, at 30A.
446. Id.
447. Rugeley & Robison, supra note 399. Libby Linebarger, one of the key legislators in-
volved in the passage of Senate Bill 7, strongly disagreed with Foster, saying:
I can tell you [that] what the Equity Center is saying in my opinion is absolutely un-
true. What we are doing answers the court's concerns. This is the most equalizing bill
this Legislature has passed since the issue has been before us. It leads me to believe




Although the Legislature did appropriate an additional $1.1 billion
for public education in the biennium, the plaintiffs claimed that this
amount was not enough to keep pace with rising enrollment and would
force poor districts disproportionately to raise their tax rates and cut
back on their programs. For an example, Kauffman pointed to the poor
Brownsville district, which he argued would have to raise its taxes to $.50
per $100 valuation to offset its estimated $12 million loss in state aid,
"while wealthy districts of comparable size and tax rate can maintain
their level of per student revenues with no tax increases or with tax de-
creases." 4 ' In his court filing, Kauffman wrote: "The unconstitutional dis-
tribution of state school funds is manifested in the tremendous and im-
possible burdens put upon poor school districts to recoup the loss of state
funds by raising their local tax rates."49
As further evidence of the law's unfairness, plaintiffs pointed to a
permanent $600 gap in revenue per weighted student between rich and
poor school districts when taxing at the maximum $1.50/$100 rate. For a
poor district participating in the state's Guaranteed Yield Program of
Tier Two, the state guarantees a yield of $20.55 for each additional penny
of taxation above $0.86/$100. A poor district taxing at the maximum rate
will get the $2300 basic allotment for Tier One, plus approximately $1315
(64 times $20.55) for Tier Two, resulting in a total of $3615 per student.
A wealthy district at the $280,000-property-value-per-student cap, how-
ever, will be able to generate $28 from local funds for each additional
penny of tax effort. A wealthy district taxing at the maximum rate of
$1.50/$100 will be able to raise $4200 in revenues per student ((1.50/100)
times 280,000)-leaving a permanent gap in access to revenues of ap-
proximately $600 per student annually. This gap was unacceptable to the
plaintiffs. One lawyer for poor districts, Roger Moore, said: "We felt like
the $600 gap is significant. It certainly does make a difference in the
quality of education., 45" Kauffman, while recognizing that parts of the
plan do represent a step forward in equity, said that the law "still does
not guarantee to all Texas students the same access to revenues for their
education.
,451
Finally, the plaintiffs also protested vociferously about the "biennium
lag." Senate Bill 7 limits a district's state aid "to the amount to which the
448. Stutz, supra note 445. The loss in state aid reflects funding formula reductions from
Senate Bill 351 to Senate Bill 7.
449. Id. Governor Richards recognized the need for money in the system but claimed that
there was no public support for raising taxes: "The public wants to see a better educated child.
They want to see a better product before we talk to them about additional money." Stutz, supra
note 440.
450. Terrence Stutz, School Finance Law OK'd, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 10, 1993,
at IA.
451. Id.
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district would be entitled at the district's tax rate for the final year of the
preceding biennium. ,42 Though many poor districts raised their tax rates
in 1993-1994, they could not recognize the gains in state aid because the
state was using the 1992-1993 rates in calculating the amount of state aid.
At the same time, wealthier districts had immediate access to the in-
creased revenues from their 1993-94 tax rates, which are generated from
their own tax bases and not from state aid.
In other criticisms of the law, the plaintiffs complained that the state
did not provide enough money for construction and that the $1.50 cap on
tax rates could too easily be breached, leaving unequalized revenue in
the system. They also complained that the "hold harmless" provision let
the wealthy districts evade equalization for too long.
The poor districts were not the only ones unhappy with the new law.
Several different groups of wealthy districts challenged the law as well,
asserting that the financing system still constituted a statewide property
tax, that the methodology of recapture and recapture itself were uncon-
stitutional, and that the overemphasis on the local property taxes vio-
lated the "suitable" provision in the constitution's education clause.4m
Another group of plaintiffs, composed of parents and their children, al-
leged that the present system denied them their constitutional rights to a
suitable and efficient education and demanded a voucher system pro-
viding them with school choice and tuition reimbursement. 455 For the first
time in the Edgewood saga, the state stood alone in defending the consti-
tutionality of its school-finance system, deflecting attacks from all parts
of the political spectrum.
2. Proceedings in the District Court
State District Judge McCown, who had presided over the school-
finance litigation since Edgewood II, consolidated all the lawsuits into
one trial. He denied the Equity Center and MALDEF's request for an
immediate hearing, injunction, and appointment of special master, and
permitted Senate Bill 7 to go into effect for the 1993-1994 school year.
McCown proclaimed on December 9, 1993, that Senate Bill 7 had estab-
lished a constitutional mechanism for financing schools.456 He ruled, how-
ever, that the state had still failed to devise an equitable method of fi-
452. TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 16.254(e) (West 1994).
453. See supra text accompanying notes 433-434.
454. See Cindy Rugeley, Judge Upholds Texas' School Finance Plan, Hous. CHRON., Dec.
10, 1993, at Al; infra notes 506-509 and accompanying text.
455. See Edgevood IV, 917 S.W.2d 717,747 (Tex. 1995).
456. See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, No. 362,516 (Travis County Dist. Ct., 250th




nancing capital outlay, which the Edgewood I decision had required . 7
Accordingly, he ordered that no bonds for any school be approved, regis-
tered, or guaranteed after September 1, 1995, unless the Legislature had
corrected this problem by that time.
McCown responded to the alleged constitutional defects submitted by
the litigants. He asserted that the $600 gap was reasonable and noted that
it had narrowed considerably since 1989, when it had been $1700 per stu-
dent.4s He also wrote that "[t]he $600 advantage about which the plain-
tiffs complain is too small and enjoyed by too few to say that it was un-
reasonable for the Legislature to leave this gap., 459 He cautioned
legislators not to neglect their duty to fund schools properly and also
warned them not to further the gap between rich and poor districts. He
wrote of the law: "Perhaps it will not work. Perhaps it will not be funded.
But we cannot today say that it will not. Given the progress that has been
made in providing equity, further orders can await further develop-
ments."4'6
Responding to the wealthy districts' arguments, McCown argued that
the system did not utilize a state property tax (although many wealthy
districts will have property tax revenues going into the state treasury),
because local districts have been required to provide a certain level of
support to the educational system since 1949. In response to the assertion
that recapture itself was unconstitutional, McCown noted that there was
no way to have greater equity in spending without some form of recap-
ture.4 61
McCown reserved his harshest criticism for some of the districts that
picked up ideas from Justice Cornyn's concurrence in Edgewood 111.
462
These districts argued that equity was not necessary as long as the state
provided a minimum adequate education. They claimed that they were
being forced to "level down" programs, and called for the state to pro-
vide more "adequate" funding for all schools.46 McCown called their ar-
guments "delusional" and wrote: "One measure of just how much prog-
ress is made under S.B. 7 is the ferociousness of the fight of the property-
457. See id. The language McCown referred to in Edgewvood I reads:
[TIhere are no Foundation School Program allotments for school facilities or debt
service... . Low-wealth districts use a significantly greater proportion of their local
funds to pay the debt service on construction bonds while high-wealth districts are able
to use their funds to pay for a wide variety of enrichment funds.
Edgewood 1,777 S.W.2d 391, 392 (Tex. 1989).
458. See Edgewood IV, slip op. at 64; see also Rugeley, supra note 454.
459. Edgewood IV, slip op. at 64; see also Rugeley, supra note 454.
460. Edgevood IV, slip op. at 77; see also Rugeley, supra note 454.
461. See Edgewood IV, slip op. at 26-27; see also Rugeley, supra note 454.
462. See supra Subsection IlI.D.2.c.
463. Edgewood IV, slip op. at 64; see also Rugeley, supra note 454.
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rich districts against it.''464 McCown allowed some testimony regarding
"adequacy" issues related to this debate, but emphasized that he would
not get involved in defining an adequate education.465
The response to the opinion was muted, as all sides anticipated an
appeal to the supreme court.4" They did not have to wait long, as ten
separate groups of plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenors (including the State
of Texas protesting McCown's bond ruling) brought direct appeals to the
467supreme court. It would be the court's fourth encounter with the
school-finance issue. As Justice Cornyn had noted previously, the justices
must have begun "to wonder whether [they had] been assigned to some
judicial purgatory where [they] must hear the same case over and
over."
46
3. The Supreme Court Decision
After hearing arguments in May 1994, a bare majority of the Texas
Supreme Court ruled that the Legislature had finally established a consti-
tutional finance system on January 30, 1995. Justice Cornyn, author of
the significant concurring and dissenting opinion in Edgewood III, per-
suaded four other justices-one other Republican and three Demo-
crats-to join his majority opinion.469 While he conceded that the system
was finally constitutional, he emphasized that it was far from optimal:
464. Edgewood IV, slip op. at 64; see also Rugeley, supra note 454.
465. Craig Foster of the Equity Center commented on the manner in which "adequacy"
issues were treated in Judge McCown's courtroom:
The adequacy issue was there in the courtroom in a very strange way. One group of
districts represented by the school board association.., put together this group of
plaintiffs and they wanted to do an adequacy lawsuit. The judge said "I don't want to
sit here and listen for weeks and weeks and weeks to experts from all over the country.
I don't know how to figure adequacy anyway. But I'll let you guys come in and sit here
and from time to time you can comment." So it was sort of weird. The trial wasn't
about adequacy, but there was a lot of discussion of adequacy. And then, unfortu-
nately, the supreme court picked up on some of that and used it against poor school
districts in the decision that was written for Edgewood IV.
Interview with Craig Foster, supra note 73.
466. See Rugeley, supra note 454; Stutz, supra note 450.
467. Two groups of appellants, representing primarily poor districts, raised arguments
about the efficiency of Senate Bill 7. Five groups of appellants comprising primarily wealthier
districts complained about the revenue system of Senate Bill 7. One group of parents, calling for
a voucher system, complained about the district court's dismissal of its cause of action. Another
group brought a complaint about the distribution of excess CED funds left over from the Senate
Bill 351 mechanism. Finally, the State challenged the district court injunction against bond issu-
ances. See Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d 717,727 (Tex. 1995).
468. Edgewood 11I, 826 S.W.2d 489, 526 (Tex. 1992) (Cronyn, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (quoting Edgewood III, No. 632,516A, slip op. at 36 (Travis County Dist. Ct.,
250th Jud. Dist. of Tex., Aug. 9, 1991)).
469. See Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 717; see also Kathy Walt & Melanie Markley, Court
Upholds Texas School-Funding Law, HOUS. CHRON., Jan. 31, 1995, at Al.
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Yet sadly, the existence of more than 1000 independent school districts in
Texas, each with duplicative administrative bureaucracies, combined with
widely varying tax bases and an excessive reliance on local property taxes,
has resulted in a state of affairs that can only be charitably called a 'system.'
For too long, the Legislature's response to its constitutional duty to provide
for an efficient system has been little more than crisis management. The ra-
tionality behind such a complex and unwieldy system is not obvious. We con-
clude that the system becomes minimally acceptable only when viewed
through the prism of history. Surely Texas can and will do better.470
Despite the rebuke, state lawmakers were thrilled that they had fi-
nally devised a plan that withstood judicial scrutiny. They must have felt
like Atlas passing the weight of the world onto Hercules. While Senate
Bill 7 survived, however, the previous standards of constitutional inter-
pretation did not.
a. A Different Spin
Building upon his unique constitutional interpretations in his Edge-
wood III opinion, Cornyn dramatically altered the constitutional land-
scape in Edgewood IV. His views on adequacy and local enrichment
shaped a much different view of what constituted an "efficient system"
and colored his outlook on the arguments before the court. As men-
tioned above, the court had never before deviated from the Edgewood I
definition of efficiency, which required districts to have "substantially
equal access to similar revenues per pupil at similar levels of taxation."47'
Justice Cornyn, however, revived two dormant constitutional concerns
about adequacy and local enrichment and incorporated them into his
definition of efficiency. The new definition of efficiency now only re-
quired districts to have "substantially equal access to funding up to the
legislatively defined level that achieves the constitutional mandate of a
general diffusion of knowledge.",
4 2
Justice Cornyn justified this shift by pointing to language in the prior
supreme court opinions, never conceding that his opinion represented a
major change from the prior Edgewood cases. First, he argued that the
school-finance system was ruled unconstitutional in Edgewood I for both
financial and qualitative reasons4 73 but that the vast financial disparities at
470. Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 726.
471. Edgewood 1,777 S.W.2d 391,397 (Tex. 1989).
472. Edgewood V, 917 S.W.2d at 731.
473. Justice Cornyn writes:
In Edgewood I, this court held that the school finance system was unconstitutional be-
cause it was "neither financially efficient nor efficient in the sense of providing for a
'general diffusion of knowledge' statewide." While we considered the financial com-
ponent of efficiency to be implicit in the Constitution's mandate, the qualitative com-
ponent is explicit....
Id. at 729 (citation omitted) (quoting Edgewood 1, 777 S.W.2d at 397).
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the time attracted nearly all of the court's attention.4 4 Since the inception
of the litigation, the exclusive focus of the cases had been on the financial
disparities between districts; no court had attempted to elaborate on the
meaning of the constitutional requirement to provide a "general diffu-
sion of knowledge" statewide.475 Justice Cornyn, resuscitating some of the
language in Edgewood I, attempted to provide content to this dormant
constitutional standard. Responding to his own call (from his Edgewood
III opinion) to define the contours of a "minimally adequate educa-
tion,"47 Justice Cornyn linked the accountability regime enacted in Sen-
ate Bill 7 to the "general diffusion of knowledge" standard-in essence,
stating that an accredited education is the minimally adequate standard
by which this constitutional duty can be satisfied.4n
Justice Comyn coupled his new take on the "general diffusion of
knowledge" standard with some controversial views on the constitution-
ality of local enrichment to forge his new definition of "efficiency." The
debate over the extent to which local districts could supplement their
educational programs had always rested just beneath the surface of the
Edgewood cases. The court had previously hinted that unequalized local
enrichment was tolerable but that too much local enrichment facilitated
by disparate tax bases would violate the "substantially equal access to
similar revenues per pupil at similar levels of taxation" definition of effi-
ciency. 47s Previous cases, which required "substantial," but not "absolute"
474. See id. ("Because of the vast disparities in access to revenue at the time Edgewood I
was decided, we did not then decide whether the State had satisfied its constitutional duty to
suitably provide for a general diffusion of knowledge. We focused instead on the meaning of
financial efficiency .... ).
475. TEx. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
476. See supra notes 335-337 and accompanying text.
477. Justice Comyn wrote: "In Senate Bill 7, the Legislature equates the provision of a
'general diffusion of knowledge' with the provision of an accredited education. The account-
ability regime set forth in Chapter 35, we conclude, meets the Legislature's constitutional obli-
gation to provide for a general diffusion of knowledge statewide." Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d at
730.
Recognizing the danger of letting the Legislature set the bar for educational adequacy, how-
ever, Cornyn introduced a caveat:
This is not to say that the Legislature may define what constitutes a general diffusion
of knowledge so low as to avoid its obligation to make suitable provision imposed by
article VII, section 1. While the Legislature certainly has broad discretion to make the
myriad policy decisions concerning education, that discretion is not without bounds.
Id. at 730 n.8 (citations omitted).
478. In Edgewood I, the court did not rule on the constitutionality of unequalized local en-
richment but held that the definition of efficiency "does [not] mean that local communities
would be precluded from supplementing an efficient system established by the legislature; how-
ever any local enrichment must derive solely from local tax effort." Edgewood 1, 777 S.W. 2d at
398. In Edgewood Ha, the court did sanction some unequalized local enrichment. The court
held that "[o]nce the Legislature provides an efficient system... it may, so long as efficiency is
maintained, authorize local school districts to supplement their education resources if local
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equality,479 left some wiggle room for Justice Cornyn to maneuver. Com-
bining the long overlooked and underutilized court pronouncements on
the "general diffusion of knowledge" requirement and tolerance for
some unequalized local supplementation, Justice Cornyn crafted a new
definition of efficiency whereunder school districts must have substan-
tially equal access to funds only up to the "legislatively defined level that
achieves the constitutional mandate of a general diffusion of knowledge,"
or in other words, substantially equal access to funds necessary to pro-
vide an accredited education.4 After a district fulfills its duty to provide
an accredited education, unequalized local supplementation is perfectly
acceptable. Beyond that point, there is no need for equality in access to
revenues, or, as Justice Cornyn wrote: "[A]n efficient system does not
require equality of access to revenues at all levels." ''
Although Justice Cornyn claimed to be following the rulings of ear-
lier courts, Justice Spector, a newly elected justice writing alone in dis-
sent, took him to task for abandoning prior interpretations. She dispar-
aged the majority for abandoning the court's stance against unequalized
local enrichment, writing: "At no point have we ever indicated that the
basic mandate of Edgewood I-similar yield for similar effort-only ap-
plies to a particular range of tax rates."4' Tracing the conceptual basis of
property owners approve an additional local property tax." Edgewood Ha, 804 S.W.2d 491, 500
(Tex. 1991) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
As Justice Doggett pointed out in Edgewood III, however, allowing too much unequalized
local supplementation beyond the funds required for a "minimally adequate education" would
create the same disparities that were problematic in the first place. He explained that "districts
with ample wealth and unlimited enrichment capability have no incentive to encourage the
State to fully fund a realistically adequate level of educational services. That is why we insisted
that enrichment derive solely from local tax effort" and not from the happenstance of a superior
tax base.
Edgewood 11, 826 S.W.2d 489, 573 (Tex. 1992) (Doggett, J., dissenting) (citation omitted)
(quoting Edgewvood 1, 777 S.W.2d at 398).
479. See supra text accompanying note 170.
480. Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 730.
481. Id. at 729. Justice Comyn argued that the court obviously did not contemplate equality
at all levels if they sanctioned unequalized local enrichment, but this argument ignores the fact
that the court called only for substantially equal access, a standard that could tolerate minor
variations in access to revenue but not the wholesale alteration Justice Cornyn had in mind. See
id.
482. Id. at 767 (Spector, J., dissenting). Justice Spector gave this interpretation of the case
law with regard to local supplementation:
The standard adopted in Edgewood I, and applied in Edgewood H1, does not require
equal spending in every district. Rather, the standard recognized the importance of lo-
cal control: some districts may choose to tax and spend at higher levels than others.
Thus, in both opinions, we noted that a local community could choose to supplement
its financing of education. We emphasized, however, that all districts must have the
opportunity to provide such supplementation on a similar basis.
Id. at 766 (Spector, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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the majority opinion back to Justice Comyn's concurrence in Edgewood
III, Spector lambasted Cornyn for incorporating adequacy questions
into the established constitutional standards, stressing at one point that
"[t]he 'general diffusion of knowledge' has never been a part of this de-
bate."48 She also attempted to shatter the link between a "minimally
adequate education" and the accreditation requirements, writing: "The
little evidence that did come in [before the district court] indicates that
Senate Bill 7's accreditation requirements do not even satisfy any previ-
ously-articulated concept of a 'minimally acceptable education. ' '4 5 She
quoted the Texas Commissioner of Education, who said that "our pres-
ent accreditation criteria at the acceptable level.., does not match up
with what the real world requirements are." 46
Finally, Justice Spector criticized the court for the way it allowed the
adequacy issues into the debate. Spector noted that because the district
court had applied the original Edgewood I standard of efficiency, setting
aside adequacy issues, "there [was] virtually no evidence on this issue in
the record." Justice Spector also observed that, "in all of the volumi-
nous briefing before this court, no party makes any argument based on a
'general diffusion of knowledge' requirement. On its own initiative, the
majority simply seizes upon these four words, equates them with accredi-
tation requirements and decides that our constitution requires no
more."4 ' Foster, echoing Justice Spector, went so far as to call Justice
Cornyn's introduction of this adequacy language "intellectually dishon-
est."48
483. Of Justice Comyn's opinion, Justice Spector wrote:
The last time this case was before this Court, one justice authored an opinion criticiz-
ing the Edgewood I standard. The opinion urged this Court to decide "the substantive
level of education our constitution requires"; and it repeatedly referred to this level as
"a minimally adequate education."... The position taken in this one-justice opinion,
which advocated a standard very different from the one set out in Edgewood L has
now been adopted by a majority of this Court.
Id. at 767 (Spector, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
484. Id. at 768 (Spector, J., dissenting).
485. I& (Spector, J., dissenting). The previously articulated concept of a "minimally ade-
quate education" to which Spector referred was the one Justice Cornyn had defined in Edge-
wood I as "an essential level of learning by which each child in Texas is enabled to live a full
and productive life in an increasingly complex world." Edgewood 11I, 826 S.W.2d 489, 525-26
(Tex. 1992) (Cornyn, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
486. Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 768 (Spector, J., dissenting).
487. Id. (Spector, J., dissenting).
488. Id. (Spector, J., dissenting).
489. Interview with Craig Foster, supra note 73. Adequacy issues had seeped into the trial
court hearing despite Judge McCown's aversion to dealing with the issue. See supra notes 462-
465 and accompanying text. Foster felt that the adequacy testimony in the district court was
misused by Justice Cornyn because it was unanticipated and not subject to cross-examination:
"[Nobody] anticipated it would be used this way. They didn't anticipate the extent to which
[McCown] would let things in. Then Comyn said, 'Ha, I'll use some of this right now' because it
Vol. 17:607, 1999
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Nevertheless, the constitutional landscape had been convincingly al-
tered. Not only had Justice Cornyn persuaded four other justices to
adopt his new definition of efficiency, three of the dissenters also em-
braced Cornyn's new standards while finding other constitutional infirmi-
ties with Senate Bill 7. Only Justice Spector reiterated the previous un-
derstandings of what constituted "efficiency." Having steered Texas into
new constitutional waters, Justice Cornyn could deal with the arguments
of the plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenors on his own terms.
b. Deflecting Objections from All Sides
The court found that the qualitative and financial components of the
new definition of efficiency had been met by the provisions in Senate Bill
7. The State, by adequately funding Tier One and Tier Two, had fulfilled
its obligation to provide a "general diffusion of knowledge" statewide.4'9
Noting that the disparity of access to funds within the two tiers had fallen
to 1.36-to-1, the court concluded that "[c]hildren who live in property-
poor districts and children who live in property-rich districts now have
substantially equal access to the funds necessary for a general diffusion of
knowledge," and found Senate Bill 7 to be thus constitutionally
"efficient. , 491
Having made this determination, the court proceeded to deflect the
challenges presented by the poor school districts. Justice Comyn first
dismissed the contention that the $600 gap between rich and poor dis-
tricts at the maximum rate of taxation rendered Senate Bill 7 unconstitu-
tional. The poor districts argued that this gap would leave them with a
"permanent educational disadvantage," but Justice Cornyn indicated
that their viewpoint was based on an incorrect understanding of effi-
ciency.4' The proper focus was not on the gap at the maximum rate of
taxation but on the tax rate differentials necessary for funding a basic (or
minimally adequate) education at Tier One and Tier Two. Justice
Cornyn found that the poor and wealthy districts could meet this obliga-
tion (by spending $3,500 per weighted student) at tax rates of $1.31/$100
fit in nicely with what he wanted to say." Interview with Craig Foster, supra note 73.
490. See Edgeivood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 731. Interestingly, the court blurred the distinction
between Tier One and Tier Two in making this determination. Previously, Tier One was sup-
posed to supply all necessary funds for a "basic" education. Tier Two was supposed to "provide
each school district with the opportunity to supplement the basic program at a level of its own
choice and with access to additional funds for facilities." See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 16.301
(West 1994). The district court determined that $3,500 per weighted student was needed to
meet accreditation standards, but Tier One provided an average of only $2,537 per weighted
student. See Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 731 n.10.
491. Id. at 731.
492. For an explanation of how the $600 gap arises, see supra Subsection III.E.1.
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and $1.22/$100 respectively. The court recognized that a disparity still
existed but found it to be "not so great that it renders Senate Bill 7 un-
constitutional. 494 Justice Cornyn's argument in this instance is consistent
with his definition of efficiency, which allows for unequalized local en-
richment once the state meets its obligation to provide an accredited
education.
The court also dismissed the poor districts' contention that the $1.50
cap on tax rates could too be easily breached, creating a "third tier" of
unequalized supplementation and thereby making the system
"inefficient." The poor districts had interpreted a provision of Senate Bill
7 to mean that a district could exceed the $1.50 cap for any purpose so
long as the tax rate was approved by the local voters in an election.49 Jus-
tice Cornyn disputed this interpretation, claiming that a district could
breach the $1.50 cap only for old or new long-term debt service and only
if the increase was approved in an election called for that purpose.4"' He
also asserted that, even if the poor school districts were correct, and
wealthy districts could exceed the cap with only approval in a local elec-
tion, the law would still not be deemed "inefficient" so long as the poor
districts could provide a basic education through Tier One and Tier Two
financing.4  The court reiterated its conclusion that "[a]s long as effi-
ciency is maintained, it is not unconstitutional for districts to supplement
their programs with local funds, even if such funds are unmatched by
493. See Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 731. As legislator Scott Hochberg later noted, there
is a dangerous implication hidden in the court's point. Because any extra funding beyond what
is required to provide a "general diffusion of knowledge" is just "gravy," the court would have
likely approved the use of state equalization aid only to the tax rate of $1.31 rather than the
$1.50 provided for in Senate Bill 7. The realization of this logic would lead to much greater in-
equities in the system and would be a "disaster" for schoolchildren. Interview with Scott
Hochberg, supra note 382.
494. Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 732.
495. The relevant statutory language is: "Except as provided by subsections (c) and (d),
and unless specifically approved in an election for that purpose, a school district may not im-
pose a total tax rate on the $100 valuation of taxable property that exceeds $1.50." TEX. EDUC.
CODE ANN. § 20.09(a) (West 1994). Justice Cornyn explained that "[s]ubsection (c) of section
20.09 allows a district to exceed the $1.50 limit for the purposes of collecting taxes pledged and
levied to pay the principal of and interest on old debt.... Subsection (d) created a similar ex-
ception for new debt subject to some restrictions." Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 732.
496. See Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 732.
497. See id. at 733 ("Once all districts are provided with sufficient revenue to satisfy the
requirement of a general diffusion of knowledge, allowing districts to tax at a rate in excess of
$1.50 creates no constitutional issue."). For the same reason, certain special laws that allow
some 63 districts with 37% of the total weighted student population in the state to tax at a rate




state dollars and even if such funds are not subject to statewide recap-
ture."498
Next, the court responded to the poor districts' complaints about the
"biennium lag" in calculation of state aid.4" The court found that while,
the plaintiffs' concern was a valid one, there were enough public policy
considerations on the other side of the debate to justify the Legislature's
decision: ° The court also brushed off complaints about changes to the
tax rollback election proce51 and the "hold harmless" provision, which
allowed certain wealthy districts to keep money in excess of the $280,000-
per-student cap for three years following the implementation of Senate
Bill 7. The court found that these provisions did not seriously impair the
implementation or equalizing effects of Senate Bill 7 and were thus not
constitutionally problematic.:°
Finally, Justice Cornyn's opinion dismissed the allegations of the poor
school districts that Senate Bill 7 had been inadequately funded. Though
498. Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 732. The court warned, however, that "the amount of
'supplementation' in the system cannot become so great that it, in effect, destroys the efficiency
of the entire system. The danger is that what the Legislature today considers to be
'supplementation' may tomorrow become necessary to satisfy the constitutional mandate for a
general diffusion of knowledge." Id.
499. See supra text accompanying note 452.
500. See Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 733. David Anderson, General Counsel of the Texas
Education Agency, explained the public policy considerations behind the creation of the
"biennium lag":
The entitlement of the school district was based on three factors: average daily atten-
dance, tax rate, and property value. None of those are known with any exactitude
ahead of time. The legislature only knows one year's property value .... Out of six
variables for those three years, it's only got one that it knows with any certainty. The
school districts uniformly, through all the years of school finance plans, raised their
taxes more than expected to draw state aid. In the last biennium of the old system, be-
fore Senate Bill 7, there was almost a billion dollars in proration-in entitlements of
school districts... that the state had not appropriated for. As late as April in the
school year, school districts would find out that they weren't going to get a bunch of
state aid that they were counting on, which created a vicious cycle when they again
raised their taxes a little more than needed the next year to account for the anticipated
proration, which caused more proration. It was an awful system.... Almost 90% of it
[proration] was being caused by unanticipated tax increases. So what [the Legislature]
did in Senate Bill 7 was say, "OK, you can set your tax rate at whatever you want to
but you're only going to draw state aid up to the tax rate you had in the last year of the
previous biennium-the last tax rate we know of when we do the appropriation. And
we will pay you based on estimates [of attendance and property values] that match the
appropriation.... We will know when we do your budget how much state aid you can
count on, and then we will settle up with you the following year." The system has been
fairly successful.
Interview with David Anderson, supra note 286.
501. Before Senate Bill 7, "the voters of a school district could petition for a rollback elec-
tion whenever the district raised its tax rate by $0.08 or more. A successful rollback election
operated to limit the rate the district could adopt for the following year." Edgewood IV, 917
S.W.2d at 733. Senate Bill 7 changed some of the rules for rollback elections, making
"significant tax increases more difficult." Id.
502. See id. at 733-34.
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the Tier One allotment had been reduced from $2,400 under Senate Bill
351 to $2,300, and the Tier Two guaranteed yield dropped from $22.00
per penny to $20.50 per penny, Justice Cornyn reminded the plaintiffs
that the court had never passed judgment on the previous formulas (from
Senate Bill 351), having been sidetracked by other constitutional con-
cerns in Edgewood 111.50' The majority admitted that, relative to Senate
Bill 351, the new law might be considered a "setback" for the poor dis-
tricts but argued that, in relation to the system in place before Edgewood
I, Senate Bill 7 gave the poorest districts "vastly improved access to
revenue."5°4 "In view of these facts," Justice Cornyn wrote, "the differ-
ences between the funding formulas of Senate Bill 7 and Senate Bill 351
do not compel the conclusion that the system embodied in Senate Bill 7
is inefficient."505
Having deflected the constitutional challenges from the poor districts,
Justice Cornyn turned his attention to the arguments offered by the
wealthy school districts. What angered these districts was not the debate
surrounding the meaning of "efficiency" but rather the manner in which
revenue was to be raised and recaptured under the new system, espe-
cially through the use of the $280,000-per-student cap on a district's
wealth. Among a host of objections, three in particular stand out.i 6 First,
the wealthy districts charged that the state had, by relying so heavily on
local property taxes, forsaken its duty to "make suitable provision for the
support and maintenance of public free schools."5°7 The state, by supply-
ing only 43% of the combined state and local revenue in the system, as
compared to the 57% generated locally, was not making "suitable provi-
sion" for its citizens' educational needs, according to this argument.8
503. See id. at 734.
504. Id.
505. Id.
506. Among the arguments these districts made were: (1) the cap violates the "suitable"
provision in the education clause of the constitution, (2) the new finance system effectively im-
poses a state ad valorem tax, (3) the legislature cannot compel one school district to pay for the
education of nonresident students, (4) the law illegally authorizes the use of public funds for
private purposes and constitutes a gratuitous grant of public funds, (5) the law is an unconstitu-
tional delegation of power to the Commissioner of Education, (6) the law improperly impairs
judicial review of the decisions made by the Commissioner of Education, (7) the law unconstitu-
tionally impairs contractual obligations for property that is subsequently detached, (8) school
districts are unconstitutionally required to include property that is not contiguous to the re-
mainder of the district, (9) the detachment and annexation provisions violate the constitutional
requirement that taxes on property be paid in the county where the property is situated, (10)
the law violates the federal Voting Rights Act because it is an attempt to intimidate, threaten,
or coerce citizens for the purpose of interfering with the right to vote, and (11) the law is a local
or special law in violation of constitutional provisions because only 99 districts were affected.
See id. at 734-46; Sparkman & Hartmeister, supra note 413, at 523 n.57.
507. TEx. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
508. See Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 735-36. An attorney for one of the wealthier districts,
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The court shrugged off this challenge by, first, indicating that the word
"suitable" was an elastic term that gave the Legislature a lot of flexibility
in determining how to undertake its constitutional responsibilities and,
second, emphasizing that the clause "contains no specific requirement
that public education be funded completely with state revenue. ' 9
Second, the wealthier districts argued that the new finance system
imposed a state ad valorem tax in violation of article VIII, section 1-e, of
the constitution, one of the charges that felled Senate Bill 351. Senate
Bill 7 gave the state such complete control over the finance system, these
districts argued, that localities had "no meaningful discretion."'51 The
court admitted that the imposition of maximum and minimum tax rates
does limit local discretion, but noted that "[d]istricts are still free to set a
tax rate within a range," '' and that the imposition of such limits does not
presently "so completely control the [levy], assessment and disbursement
of revenue, either directly, or indirectly, that the district is without
meaningful discretion., 12 The court found, therefore, that Senate Bill 7
did not constitute a statewide property tax.
formerly General Counsel of the TEA, crafted this argument. He said:
Once the legislature does define whatever an efficient system is, there is an absolute,
unqualified duty to suitably provide for and support that system. And we argued that
that contemplated, if you look at it historically, a system that was principally supported
out of state revenue with local supplementation, and that what has happened in the
last decade of downloading the cost of reform onto the local property tax was, in and
of itself, unconstitutional.
Interview with J. David Thompson III, supra note 119.
509. Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 736 ("The Legislature alone is to judge what means are
necessary and appropriate for a purpose which the Constitution makes legitimate.") (quoting
Mumme v. Marrs, 40 S.W.2d 31, 36 (Tex. 1931)). In support of its conclusion that the word
"suitable" is not rigid, the court stated: "The word 'suitable' used in connection with the word
'provision' in this section of the Constitution, is an elastic term, depending upon the necessities
of changing times or conditions, and clearly leaves to the legislature the right to determine what
is suitable .... Id. (quoting Mumme, 40 S.W.2d at 36).
510. Edgeivood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 737.
511. Id at 737-38. The court also relied on language from Edgewood I11. See id. at 738 ("If
the state required local authorities to levy an ad valorem tax but allowed them discretion on
setting the rate and disbursing the proceeds, the State's conduct might not violate article VIII,
section 1-e.") (quoting Edgewood 111, 826 S.W.2d 489, 502 (Tex. 1992)).
512. Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 738 (alteration in original). The court warned, however,
that the local discretion could eventually be minimized to such an extent as to make the whole
finance system unconstitutional:
However, if the cost of providing for a general diffusion of knowledge continues to
rise, as it surely will, the minimum rate at which a district must tax will also rise. Even-
tually, some districts may be forced to tax at the maximum allowable rate just to pro-
vide a general diffusion of knowledge. If a cap on tax rates were to become in effect a
floor as well as a ceiling, the conclusion that the Legislature had set a statewide ad
valorem tax would appear to be unavoidable because the districts would then have lost
all meaningful discretion in setting the tax rate.
Id.
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Finally, the wealthy districts pressed the concern that the court's 1931
decision in Love v. City of Dallas13 prohibited the Legislature from com-
pelling a school district to use its resources for the education of nonresi-
dent students. The wealthy districts argued that options three and four
(the purchasing of attendance credits from the state and contracting with
other districts to educate nonresident students, respectively) both vio-
lated this principle. 14 The court pointed out, however, that the wealthy
districts were not being compelled to educate nonresident students, be-
cause options one, two, and five were available to the districts. Addition-
ally, in the event that the districts failed to make a choice, neither default
provision contemplated the use of a district's resources to educate stu-
dents from other districts!" Love was thus not a constitutional hurdle for
Senate Bill 7.
The court, after brushing off some of the other arguments made by
wealthy districts and handling other peripheral matters, finally dealt with
the debate over the financing of facilities that was prompted by Judge
McCown's injunction. The poorer school districts argued that the ab-
sence of a separate component for facilities rendered Senate Bill 7 un-
constitutional. Because facilities in poor districts were older and in
greater need of repair and because debt service rates were higher in
these districts, they had to spend a greater amount of their money for
capital outlay and reduce the amount they spent on their educational
programs. Justice Cornyn admitted that the "evidence at trial shows that
the lack of a separate facilities component has the potential of rendering
the school-finance system unconstitutional in its entirety in the very near
future. ' 16 Still, the court vacated McCown's injunction prohibiting the
issuance of new bonds, because the plaintiffs did not meet their eviden-
tiary burden in proving that Senate Bill 7 failed to provide efficiently for
facilities. The majority found that every district, at least for a short-term,
could simultaneously provide funding for facilities and an accredited
513. 40 S.W.2d 20 (Tex. 1931). As mentioned above, this case has been cited frequently
over the course of the Edgewood litigation. See supra notes 51-53, 250-252, 261; see also Edge-
wood III, 826 S.W.2d at 512-13.
514. See Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 738-39. As one observer pointed out, the group of
wealthy districts chose a risky strategy in pursuing this argument, considering that the court
could have struck down only these two options, leaving the other three intact. Interview with
Scott Hochberg, supra note 382. Coincidentally, these two options turned out to be the most
popular choices for the wealthy school districts. See supra note 436 and accompanying text.
515. See Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 738-39. Justice Cornyn further rejected the conten-
tion that the choices are unconstitutional because they are made under duress, noting that Sen-
ate Bill 7 does not create rights with respect to control of local wealth. Even if these rights did
exist, Justice Cornyn argued, the Legislature must implicitly be able to limit the districts'
authority to tax, since the districts were created and given taxing authority by the Legislature.
See id. at 739.
516. Id. at 746.
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education for its students through the Tier Two Guaranteed Yield Pro-
gram (which would provide state aid conditioned on local tax effort, irre-
spective of whether the taxes were for the educational program or for fa-
cilities).1 7 Still, the court warned that the debate over funding of facilities
was not over:
[I]f the cost of providing a general diffusion of knowledge rises to the point
that a district cannot meet its operations and facilities needs within the
equalized program, the State will, at that time, have abdicated its constitu-
tional duty to provide an efficient school system. From the evidence, it ap-
pears that this point is near.5
8
c. The Reaction to the Ruling
The new governor of Texas, George W. Bush, and other legislative
leaders hailed the ruling. 19 They had finally extricated themselves from
the school-finance morass. Budget planners for school districts were also
relieved finally to have an element of certainty to their enterprise. Nei-
ther the poor nor the wealthy districts were pleased with the court's deci-
sion. Craig Foster of the Equity Center was upset because "[t]he court
totally changed the concept of equality."' 2 He wrote: "Eventually, we
predict, Texas will find it cannot compete effectively with the rest of the
country and the world if all it offers the bulk of its students is Justice
John Cornyn's 'minimally adequate' education."521 MALDEF attorney
Al Kauffman lamented: "We felt like we had a good case and it contin-
ued to be an inequitable system.' 22 On the other side of the debate, one
attorney called the ruling "unbelievable," while another, Earl Luna of
Dallas, said that "it was a state [property] tax, but apparently the state
Supreme Court says it's not.' sz5 Al Kauffman filed a motion for rehearing
on behalf of the original Edgewood plaintiffs, requesting that the court
modify its ruling and return to the previous understanding of
"efficiency," but his efforts were unsuccessful. 524 Senate Bill 7 would
stand, and the curtains had finally closed on the Edgewood drama.
517. See id. at 746-47.
518. lId at 747 (citation omitted).
519. See Walt & Markley, supra note 469.
520. Id
521. Craig Foster, On the Making of Edgewood IV, NEWS & NOTES (Equity Center, Aus-
tin, Tex.), Feb. 1995, at 3.
522. Gardner Selby, Victory For State on School Finance, HOUS. POST, Jan. 31, 1995, at Al.
523. Id.
524. See Plaintiffs File Motion for Rehearing, NEvS & NOTES (Equity Center, Austin, Tex.)
Feb. 1995, at 8.
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d. A Political Explanation for Edgewood IV
One puzzle about the Edgewood IV case was why the court had
abandoned its previous interpretation of "efficiency" in favor of Justice
Cornyn's approach, which had not garnered any support in Edgewood
III. Four justices-Gammage, Gonzalez, Hightower, and Phillips-signed
off on Cornyn's majority opinion after having previously supported the
standard for "efficiency" articulated in Edgewood I, II, & IlL An obvious
explanation for this turnaround was simple exasperation with the school-
finance debate. One observer remarked that both the trial court and the
supreme court wanted to "declare victory and go home," fearing that the
alternative would be a disaster.s2
Moreover, the court was under political pressure from all sides. Had
it struck down Senate Bill 7, there might have been a revolt in the Legis-
lature, particularly among the legislative leaders who had invested so
much into the creation of the law. House leader Libby Linebarger sur-
mised that, had the court declared Senate Bill 7 unconstitutional, the
Culberson amendment would have passed, sharply restricting the court's
jurisdiction over education-related issues. 26 The justices, having been
snubbed by the Legislature on several occasions following their Edge-
wood III ruling, must have known that their relationship with the Legis-
lature would have become even more rocky had its latest effort been
struck down. 27
The court was also mindful of the conservative bent to the November
1994 elections and faced its own electoral pressures from restless voters.
One interviewee said that part of the decision could be attributed to the
court's making amends for striking down the CED plan after having be-
come aware of Senate Bill 351's popularity among school districts only
after deciding Edgewood III.5 8 Another felt that pressure from wealthy
525. Interview with J. David Thompson III, supra note 119.
526. Interview with Libby Linebarger, supra note 181. Craig Foster also hypothesized that
"maybe [the justices) were legitimately concerned that if they sent the system back to the Leg-
islature in the winter of 1995, its chances of getting better were slim-to-none, and its chances of
getting worse were substantial." Foster, supra note 521, at 3.
527. The Legislature snubbed the justices in numerous ways following the Edgewood III
opinion. It first abolished a biannual State of the Judiciary speech given by the Chief Justice to
the Legislature. Legislators also reduced funding for several pet programs of the supreme court.
They ignoreld a series of bills that contained sweeping judicial reforms recommended by a su-
preme-court-appointed commission and strongly backed by Chief Justice Phillips. The Legisla-
ture also requested plans for redrawing the boundaries of many appellate courts to equalize
widely disparate caseloads but did not adopt any of the five changes proposed by the court. An-
other perceived snub occurred when the Chief Justice had been requested to visit the House
floor during a debate of a controversial resolution: Once he arrived, minority lawmakers back-
ing the resolution called for strict enforcement of House rules preventing visitors on the floor.
See Janet Elliott, At the Capitol, Court Wore Dunce's Cap, TEx. LAW., June 7, 1993, at 1.
528. Interview with Kevin O'Hanlon, supra note 136.
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districts and other special interests likely swayed the court, remarking:
"Part of the reason we see some of the stepping back from Edgewood III
to Edgewood IV is not because the definitions of equity changed."' 9
There was no doubt that the frustration with the court and Legislature
was growing quickly, as the public grew weary of the nearly decade-long
saga.53 0 Whatever the reason for the shift in interpretation, the court
clearly believed that it had finally extricated itself from the school-
finance debate with the Edgewood IV ruling.
4. A Conclusion?
Early in 1995, almost twenty-five years after Demetrio Rodriguez
filed suit on behalf of the children of Edgewood School District, the liti-
gation came to a close. Under the new school-finance system, funding
was still tied closely to property taxes, but districts across the state would
have generally equitable access to funding.
Although it was not a crisp finale, Edgewood IV represented in most
observers' minds an end to a truly epic drama. At long last, the Texas
Legislature's education-finance system had the approval of the judicial
branch. At long last, politicians could focus on other issues and other
problems. At long last, the students, teachers, and parents who had
marched in protest in 1968 could sit down and evaluate their accom-
plishments. Temporarily.
IV. THE EDGEWOOD DRAMA: A MODEL FOR REFORM?
A. Substantive Assessment: Texas Education-Finance Today
1. The Equity Numbers
Needless to say, the Edgewood litigation dramatically altered the
education landscape in Texas. Over the course of the litigation, signifi-
cant improvements were made in fashioning a more equitable finance
system and in giving poor districts greater access to funds. Just as they
did when the Edgewood students, teachers, and parents marched in pro-
test in 1968, the numbers tell the story.
Whereas, at the inception of the litigation, there was a 700-to-1 ratio
between the property values per student of the richest and poorest school
districts in Texas, the ratio dropped to 28-to-1 at full implementation of
the Senate Bill 7 system.53' To a large degree, the new finance scheme has
529. Interview with Scott Hochberg, supra note 382.
530. Interview with Libby Linebarger, supra note 181.
531. See Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d 717, 730 (Tex. 1995). Before the litigation, the wealthi-
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relaxed the link between local property values and access to revenues.
During the 1988-1989 school year, the correlation between tax effort and
revenue was only 0.37 while the correlation between wealth and revenue
was 0.75. By 1994, the correlation between tax effort and revenue was
0.81 and the correlation between wealth and revenue was only 0.34.3' Put
another way, in 1989, wealth explained 56% of the variation in revenue
for local districts, while tax effort explained only 13.5%. By 1994, wealth
only explained 18% of the variation, while tax effort accounted for
65%."'
The Foundation Program and the financing system modifications ini-
tiated by Senate Bill 7 have had a sweeping effect on public education in
Texas. In the 2000-2001 biennium, only a small fraction of the overall
revenue in the system, less than 5%, will be unequalized s34 This is a sig-
nificant achievement, considering that, in 1989, 21% of all state and local
revenues were unequalized.35 In 1998, 87% of the students in Texas were
projected to fall within the equalized system, meaning that they will be
getting some amount of state aid through the Guaranteed Yield Program
(Tier Two). 36 In addition, putting aside the wealthiest 10% of school dis-
tricts, the variation in revenue per student across school districts is less
than $500.537 At full implementation of the system, poor districts will have
78% more revenue per student than they had in 19 88-1989 .'3
est district had more than $14,000,000 of taxable property wealth per student while the poorest
districts had approximately $20,000. After Senate Bill 7 was implemented, the wealthiest dis-
tricts would be capped at a property wealth per student of $280,000, whereas the poorest district
at the time had $10,000. Because of the state aid program, the poorest district would also have
much greater access to funding than it had had prior to the litigation. See id. at 728-30.
532. See LEGISLATIVE BUDGET BOARD, REPORT TO THE FOUNDATION SCHOOL FUND
BUDGET COMMITTEE 7 (1994).
533. See id. Another source had the numbers slightly different, reporting that in 1989 more
than 69% of the disparity among districts in per-pupil revenue was due to differences in prop-
erty value, whereas by 1999 aimost 77% of the disparity will be due to tax effort. See U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SCHOOL FINANCE: THREE STATES' EXPERIENCE vITH EQUITY IN
SCHOOL FUNDING 34 (1995) [hereinafter GAO STUDY].
534. LEGISLATIVE BUDGET BOARD, supra note 401, at 23. This percentage of unequalized
revenues was originally forecast to be less than two percent by 1997-1998. See LEGISLATIVE
BUDGET BOARD, supra note 532, at 4-5. Unequalized revenue is generated when districts tax at
a rate greater than $1.50 per $100 valuation to raise money for capital expenditures. See
LEGISLATIVE BUDGET BOARD, supra note 401, at 10; see also supra note 413; supra notes 495-
497 and accompanying text; text accompanying infra notes 621-622. The "hold harmless" provi-
sion, which permits certain wealthy districts to retain property wealth in excess of $280,000, also
allows revenues to be generated outside the "equalized" system. See supra notes 433-434 and
accompanying text; infra notes 618-620.
535. See GAO STUDY, supra note 533, at 35.
536. See LEGISLATIVE BUDGET BOARD, supra note 401, at 23.
537.. See TEXAS EDUC. AGENCY, supra note 400, at 25.
538. See Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d 717,734 (Tex. 1995).
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The amount of overall funding in the system has risen dramatically as
well. While the state's share of education expenses has consistently (if
only slightly) fallen, 539 growth in the overall resources in the system con-
tinues to substantially outpace inflation. Between 1989 and 1994, budg-
eted operating expenditures per pupil increased 30.1% °40 In 1988-1989,
before Edgewood I, budgeted expenditures per pupil was $3,352.5' That
figure rose to $5,282 by the 1996-1997 school year, after Edgewood IV
had been decidedM2 By the 1996-1997 school year, approximately $23.1
billion dollars were being spent on K-12 public education in Texas, 43 a
major jump from the $8.7 billion in 1984-1985.-4 The considerable in-
crease in overall money in the system was caused in part by an influx of
money from wealthy districts, which were forced to raise their tax rates
to maintain their educational programs under the new regime.
2. The Lingering Shadow ofAdequacy
The ultimate purpose of the Edgewood litigation was to improve the
education of children in poor school districts. While the improvements in
access to revenue and financial equity are easy to document, conclusions
regarding improvements in the adequacy of Texas's educational system
as a result of the Edgewood drama are not so easily made. There has
been no consistent test administered to Texan students over the course of
litigation. Although Texas has been administering the TAAS (Texas As-
sessment of Academic Skills) test to measure academic achievement
since 1990, the content of the test has been frequently altered, and the
number of students exempted from the test has varied.545 Analysis of
trends in academic performance across time therefore remains difficult.4 6
539. The state provided 48.7% of overall education revenue in 1987, but by fiscal 1995, this
percentage had dropped to 45.4%. See LEGISLATIVE BUDGET BOARD, FISCAL SIZE UP: 1998-
1999 BIENNIUM, TEXAS STATE SERVICES/ EDUCATION (visited Dec. 28, 1998)
<www.lbb.state.tx.us>. Because of the 1997 increase in the homestead exemption for local
property taxes, the state's share is projected to rise again to 48.7% in 1999. See id.
540. See TEXAS EDUC. AGENCY, supra note 400, at 30. Another source indicates that, be-
tween 1985 and 1995, local spending rose 117%, and state spending rose 60%. See GAO
STUDY, supra note 533, at 35.
541. See TEXAS EDUC. AGENCY, supra note 400, at 30.
542. See TEXAS EDUC. AGENCY, SNAPSHOT 97, at 27 (1998).
543. See id.
544. See School Funding Suit Anniversary, Hous. POST, May 23, 1994, at A15.
545. The process by which certain students are exempted from the TAAS test and certain
students' test results are excluded from the school rating system has come under increasing
scrutiny by the Legislature and threatens to undermine public confidence in the accountability
regime. See LEGISLATIVE BUDGET BOARD, STAFF PERFORMANCE REPORT TO THE 76th
LEGISLATURE 31-41 (Jan. 1999), available at <www.lbb.state.tx.us>.
546. See TAAS Needs Standard Format To Weigh Yearly Results, HOUS. CHRON., June 12,
1996, at A38 ("With these and other changes in the administration and content of the TAAS, it
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Other possible indicators of academic performance are also flawed. For
example, the SAT is not a helpful gauge, because the pool of students
taking the exam is self-selected and varies considerably from year to
year. The dearth of performance studies done by the state prior to the
implementation of the Senate Bill 7 accountability regime also hinders
efforts to assess the changes in the condition of public education over
time.
Despite the uncertainties in testing procedures and in the relationship
between educational inputs and outputs, it appears that, by almost every
indicator, Texas schools have made significant improvements in recent
years. Between 1994 and 1998, the proportion of students passing all
TAAS tests rose from 55% to 77% 47 These gains were achieved despite
the fact that more students were tested and fewer students in special edu-
cation or with limited English proficiency were exempted from the test.
4
8
Minority and economically disadvantaged students have made some of
the greatest gains.- 9 In 1998, 58% of low-income students passed the
TAAS exam, whereas only 33% had in 1994.50 In the school account-
ability regime that grades campuses as either exemplary, recognized, ac-
ceptable, or low-performing, school ratings have consistently improved."'
Texas students have also made significant gains on the National Assess-
ment of Educational Progress Test and have been taking college admis-
sions tests and advanced placement classes for college credit in increasing
numbers. 52 According to a study conducted at Texas A&M University
that was released as this Article was going to press, the improvements
is impossible for educators and others to accurately compare test results from year to year. The
ability to make such comparisons in a way that is meaningful is crucial to knowing how well stu-
dents are really faring in the public schools."); Unexcused; Too Many TAAS Absences Make
Scores Dubious, HOus. CHRON., Aug. 8, 1995, at A16 ("But unless all students take the test, or
the state's exemption policy is more clearly defined and strictly followed, TAAS scores will be
virtually meaningless-at least as a matter of inspiring the public's confidence that they are on
the up and up as a true and honest measure.").
547. See Jim Scheurich & Linda Skrla, School Accountability System Works, AuSTIN AM.-
STATESMAN, Nov. 13, 1998, at A15; see also TEXAS EDUC. AGENCY, supra note 542, at 14-15.
548. See Mike Moses, TAAS Has Improved Our Schools, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May
31, 1998, at 6J.
549. See Scheurich & Skrla, supra note 547; TEXAS EDUC. AGENCY, supra note 542, at 12-
15.
550. See Terence Stutz, Property-Rich District Loses Bid To Avoid School Fund Sharing,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 23,1998, at 32A.
551. See Brooks, supra note 443, at Al. The grades depend on TAAS scores, dropout rates,
and attendance rates. This accountability regime was created as part of Senate Bill 7. See supra
notes 442-443 and accompanying text.
552. See Moses, supra note 548; Scheurich & Skrla, supra note 547; Texas Ass'n of School




that have been observed over the past few years are "clear[ly] link[ed]"
to the equalization reforms brought about by the Edgewood litigation.5 3
B. Procedural Assessment: The Choice To Pursue Equity
The Edgewood plaintiffs filed their original complaint as an equity-
based lawsuit. Throughout the Edgewood drama, however, the debate
often switched, sometimes inexplicably, between concepts of adequacy
and equity. It seems safe to assert that both ideals permeate the Edge-
wood drama and are inextricably linked.
An ongoing task for education reformers and potential plaintiffs
across the country is assessing the prudence of choosing equity or ade-
quacy or both as the basis for their litigation and lobbying. To that end,
the Edgewood drama poses two questions. First, was the choice to bring
a lawsuit on grounds of equity rather than adequacy correct in Texas?
Second, once the plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenors chose to pursue an
equity-based attack, which approach was more successful-the Equity
Center's flexible approach or MALDEF's all-or-nothing strategy?
Clearly, the goal of any education-reform lawsuit, whether based on
"equity" or "adequacy" theories, is to improve the educational lot of
children in poorer school districts. However, there is a vigorous debate
about which theory can best advance this goal. Several academic com-
mentators have recently pronounced the demise of the equity theory in
favor of adequacy-based lawsuits.5 4 These commentators criticize the eq-
uity theory on a number of grounds, including the legislative resistance it
engenders and its questionable success in equalizing educational outputs
or boosting overall educational spending.55 Nevertheless, it appears in
hindsight that an equity-based lawsuit was the correct strategic choice for
the Texas plaintiffs." 6
553. Thaddeus Herrick, Study Labels 'Robin Hood' School Plan Success, Hous. CHRON.,
May 19, 1999, at lA.
554. See, e.g., Michael Heise, Equal Educational Opportunity, Hollow Victories, and the
Demise of School Finance Equity Theory: An Empirical Perspective and Alternative Explana-
tion, 32 GA. L. REV. 543,545-47 (1998); Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions
in School Finance Reform, 48 VAND. L. REV. 101, 101-04 (1995). Another commentator has in
turn pronounced adequacy theory dead, to be potentially replaced by a racially and ethnically-
based "fourth wave" of school finance litigation. See McMillan, supra note 16, at 1881-1903.
555. See Enrich, supra note 554, at 143-66; Heise, supra note 554, at 547.
556. An equity-oriented lawsuit also proved to be a much more successful vehicle for re-
form than a racially-based equal protection suit (MALDEF pursued both claims). MALDEF's
decision to bring a suit based on the disparate impact of the educational inequities suffered by
Mexican-Americans did not appeal to Craig Foster and the Equity Center, who felt that, politi-
cally, an overall indictment of the educational system would be more successful. Interview with
Foster, supra note 73; see supra text accompanying notes 194-196. Foster was hesitant about the
equal protection argument for two reasons. First, the constituency of the Equity Center was
composed of many poor Anglo districts that also wanted to participate in equity-based lawsuit.
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First, in the mid-1980s, when the first Edgewood complaint was filed,
the wave of successful adequacy lawsuits had not yet arrived."5 7 There
was no roadmap for a successful adequacy suit. On the other hand, the
plaintiffs were attracted to the relative simplicity of an equity-based at-
tack."8 An equity-based claim seemed to have much better prospects of
victory, especially given the enormous statistical discrepancies between
rich and poor in Texas.
An equity case was also deemed more promising because it was con-
sidered more justiciable."9 Although the Edgewood drama may cast
doubt on the proposition, courts may be generally reluctant to usurp tra-
ditional legislative functions, such as determining curriculum require-
ments and figuring teacher-to-student ratio. At the same time, from the
perspective of a largely minority plaintiff class, an adequacy strategy car-
ried unwanted connotations. Albert Cortez of IDRA explained that an
adequacy-based lawsuit "puts a lot more pressure on the plaintiff. And
we wanted to stay away from the notion of a minimum education re-
quired for citizenship."5"
The plaintiffs' fears about the difficulty of winning an adequacy suit
were well-founded. Even some of the most ardent supporters of school-
finance reform efforts are troubled by the specter of an adequacy lawsuit,
particularly because of concerns over the court's proper institutional role.
In Edgewood III, Justice Doggett remarked: "I must note my personal
concern that measuring the 'outputs' of the educational system is even
more likely to produce prolonged judicial intrusion than the task on
which we have already embarked." '561 Justice Spector, the lone justice in
agreement with the arguments made by the original plaintiffs in Edge-
wood IV, cautioned that delving into adequacy issues "will mire the judi-
ciary in purely political questions. Even if we could speak coherently on
Second, Foster felt that attacking the inequities for everyone would provide much more politi-
cal leverage in the courts and in the Legislature.
557. The wave of adequacy lawsuits was launched by the Kentucky Supreme Court in Rose
v. Council for Better Education, Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989). See Heise, supra note 554, at
577. The Rose court not only invalidated Kentucky's school-finance system but held that the
state's entire educational system was inadequate and therefore unconstitutional.
558. See supra text accompanying note 199. As Albert Cortez of IDRA explained: "We felt
that the inequities and how the system created those would just be a more straightforward case.
The courts understand it. The plaintiffs understand it. The opponents even understand it."
Telephone Interview with Albert Cortez, supra note 102.
559. Albert Cortez states that the courts "thought that adequacy just wasn't a justiciable
argument." Telephone Interview with Albert Cortez, supra note 102. Al Kauffman agreed,
stating: "We had a much clearer case under equity. It was one thing to ask a court to look at
numbers... versus asking a court to look at curriculum." Interview with Albert Kauffman, su-
pra note 101.
560. Telephone Interview with Albert Cortez, supra note 102.
561. Edgeivood 111, 826 S.W.2d 489,574 (Tex. 1992) (Doggett, J., dissenting).
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such issues, addressing them at all is inconsistent with the proper role of
the judiciary."562 The General Counsel of the TEA, David Anderson, also
has made clear his skepticism about adequacy-based lawsuits:
If they [the justices] get into specific measures of what it costs to build a
building, what the appropriate level of teacher salaries is, how many square
feet should a classroom be, how many children should be in a class, or how
should 3you fund special ed students-we'd get into this morass all over
again.
At another level of detail, the Edgewood drama may be analyzed for
the divergent approaches within the plaintiffs' equity-based strategy.
Once the equal protection claim fell by the wayside in Edgewood I and
the focus of the plaintiffs and the court turned to the equity claim and fis-
cal neutrality, MALDEF and the Equity Center, though often working in
tandem, pursued two distinct strategies.
MALDEF consistently pursued an all-or-nothing strategy with both
the courts and the legislature throughout the litigation. In simplest terms,
MALDEF refused to accept anything below 100% equity. Anderson
characterized MALDEF's perspective as follows: "If someone has three
cents more than me-that's wrong. There should be absolutely no differ-
ence in how much money my district gets if I levy the same tax rate.
'' 4
This strategy was motivated by a fear of the slippery slope. If not 100%
equity, the standard of what was close enough could be ratcheted
down.565
According to many of the key players, the Equity Center adopted a
more pragmatic approach. Its directors were willing to compromise, if
they thought it would improve the chances of the enactment of their fa-
vored reforms. The Equity Center's amenability to compromise stemmed
from its founding purpose. While equalizing access to funds was a major
aim, the Equity Center's primary objective was to maximize funding for
school districts. To that end, it was usually willing to "leave the rich guys
out there and force the state to chase and chase and chase." 67 In other
words, the Equity Center was willing to tolerate some inequalities in or-
der to create leverage in the legislature-leverage that would be used
towards the goal of boosting overall education spending.
The Equity Center's tactics sometimes conflicted with MALDEF's.
Kevin O'Hanlon, who worked both for and against the plaintiffs at vari-
562. Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d 717,768 (Tex. 1995) (Spector, J., dissenting).
563. Interview with David Anderson, supra note 286.
564. Id.
565. See supra text accompanying notes 283-284.
566. Interview with David Anderson, supra note 286; Interview with Libby Linebarger, su-
pra note 181; Interview with Kevin O'Hanlon, supra note 136.
567. Interview with David Anderson, supra note 286.
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ous stages in the decade-long battle, characterized the different strategies
as such: "Kauffman [of MALDEF] thought you could get [more educa-
tion funding] by forcing absolute equity, then everybody would come to
the legislature and want more money, but Foster had less trust in the
legislative process at the Equity Center and wanted a little bit of inequity
so he could threaten litigation." S These divergent approaches were evi-
dent in the struggle to forge the first Senate Bill 1 in 1990. The Equity
Center was much more willing to go along with the "95% compromise"
that emerged in the bill, whereas MALDEF refused to bend to the politi-
cal realties of the day.
It is difficult to say which strategy was superior. Having two different
groups adopting both strategies likely minimized the risk for poor school
districts. MALDEF's all-or-nothing strategy could have been very costly
had it been undertaken in isolation. Practically speaking, MALDEF's
goal of 100% equity was impossible to achieve without cutting the
wealthier districts down to size (as opposed to bringing the poorer dis-
tricts up to the wealthy districts' level). Its strategy of demanding abso-
lute equity provoked a vociferous, determined, and powerful opposition.
Fortunately for the plaintiffs, this opposition did not derail the movement
towards financial reform, though it did come close to doing so at several
points. The Equity Center's pragmatic approach and its behind-the-
scenes dealmaking in the Legislature often greased the lawmaking ma-
chinery to its advantage and kept the engine of reform on track. The
movement for school-finance reform, however, was no doubt aided by
the rhetorically effective calls for absolute equity coming from
MALDEF. The divergent tactics of MALDEF and the Equity Center
collectively pushed both the Legislature and the courts toward reform.
C. Theoretical Assessment: The Legislative/Judicial "Conversation"
1. Separation of Powers in the Edgewood Drama
Education reform litigation, by its very nature, invites separation of
powers dilemmas."9 The issue arose in the Edgewood drama in at least
two contexts. First, the separation-of-powers-based "political question"
doctrine was explicitly considered by the Texas Supreme Court as an in-
dependent legal issue. Second, the very structure and process of the long
"conversation" between the court and the capitol exhibited the incre-
mental, and some would say questionable, entanglement of the two
branches of government over the course of the Edgewood drama.
568. Interview with Kevin O'Hanlon, supra note 136.
569. See, e.g., Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758,790 (Md. 1983).
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The district court's original Edgewood decision was overturned by the
Court of Appeals of Texas on the grounds that school finance is a
"political question not suitable for judicial review."' 70 According to that
court, "under our system of government efforts to achieve [education
equity] come from the people through constitutional amendments and
legislative enactments and not through judgments of courts."' '
Although the appellate court cited no precedent for this doctrine
(and the Texas Supreme Court later rejected its application to the Edge-
wood litigationrn), the "political question" doctrine is a long-standing and
often referenced-though rarely actually applied -3 legal principle that
forbids courts from taking on controversies that should be settled directly
by the people or by institutions politically responsive to them. Closely
tied to the constitutional notion of separation of powers,574 the doctrine
asserts that the proper judicial role is to approve or disapprove the legis-
lature's laws, not to create new ones.
Perhaps its most thorough, and convoluted, elaboration comes from
the United States Supreme Court:
It is apparent that several formulations ... may describe a political question,
although each has one or more elements which identify it as essentially a
function of the separation of powers. Prominent on the surface of any case
held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable consti-
tutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a
lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or
the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to
570. Edgewood ,761 S.W.2d 859,867 (Tex. App. 1988).
571. Id.
572. In doing so, the Texas Supreme Court observed:
[W]e have not been unmindful of the magnitude of the principles involved, and the re-
spect due to the popular branch of the government.... Fortunately, however, for the
people, the function of the judiciary in deciding constitutional questions is not one
which it is a liberty to decline.... [We] cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure
because it approaches the confines of the constitution; [we] cannot pass it by because it
is doubtful; with whatever doubt, with whatever difficulties a case may be attended,
[we] must decide it, when it arises in judgment.
Edgewood 1, 777 S.W.2d 391,394 (Tex. 1989).
573. See PETER W. Low & JoHN C. JEFFRiES, JR., FEDERAL CouRTS AND THE LAW OF
FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 123 (3d ed. 1994) (noting that "successful resort to the political
question doctrine in purely domestic disputes is rare"); Linda Sandtrom Simard, Standing
Alone: Do We Still Need the Political Question Doctrine?, 100 DICK. L. REv. 303, 306 (1996);
Donald B. Tobin, The Balanced Budget Amendment: Will Judges Become Accountants? A Look
at State Experiences, 12 J.L. & POL. 153, 191 (1996). Two of the rare examples of its application
are Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993), and Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973).
574. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210-11 (1962) ("The nonjusticiability of a political
question is primarily a function of the separation of powers. Much confusion results from the
capacity of a 'political question' label to obscure the need for case-by-base inquiry.").
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a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
5 75
Academic commentators have questioned not only the political ques-
tion doctrine's necessity,5 6 but its existence s7 At times, it is relegated to
little more than a statement of judicial efficiency.s7 Moreover, the politi-
cal question doctrine, at least as it applies to federal constitutional chal-
lenges, may not be relevant to the review of state actions in state
courts 79 Elusive as it may be, the doctrine aspires to prevent situations in
which "a judge moves far beyond the normal competence and authority
of a judicial officer, into an arena where legal aspirations, bureaucratic
possibilities, and political constraints converge, and where ordinary legal
rules frequently are inapplicable." 8 '
While the political question doctrine enjoyed but fleeting prominence
in the string of Edgewood decisions,581 it lurked in the background
throughout the litigation. Always on the minds of the defendants in the
most recent (if not the last) Edgewood decision, the issue was rekindled
by Texas Supreme Court Justice Enoch in his partial dissent: "I believe a
credible argument can be made that the determination of what is an effi-
cient, suitable educational system is a political question that this Court is
ill-equipped to answer.'' 2
A second incarnation of separation-of-powers issues appears when all
the Edgewood cases are considered as a holistic progression. Clearly, the
court became increasingly involved in shaping reform proposals over the
course of the litigation. In each successive case, the opinions became
more instructive and advisory. In Edgewood I, the supreme court did lit-
tle more than declare the finance system unconstitutional. In fact, the
court acknowledged that:
[a]lthough we have ruled the school financing system to be unconstitutional,
we do not now instruct the legislature as to the specifics of the legislation it
575. Id. at 217.
576. See, e.g., Simard, supra note 573.
577. See Louis Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976).
578. See Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the 'Political Question', 79 Nw. U. L. REV.
1031, 1031 (1985) ("The so-called 'political question' doctrine postulates that there exist certain
issues of constitutional law that are more effectively resolved by the political branches of gov-
ernment.").
579. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 226.
580. William A. Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judi-
cial Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 641 (1982).
581. The Texas Supreme Court did later invoke the "political question" doctrine in up-
holding a district court decision to decline to decide certain parent-intervenors' claim that they
had a constitutional right to select the school of their choice and receive state reimbursement
for their tuition. See Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d 717, 747 (Tex. 1995).
582. Id. at 751 n.1 (Enoch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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should enact; nor do we order it to raise taxes. The legislature has primary
responsibility to decide how best to achieve an efficient system.sn
In Edgewood II and Ila, the court's opinions read somewhat differ-
ently. Despite its disclaimer that "[w]e do not undertake lightly to strike
down an act of the Legislature, 584 the court went so far as to make spe-
cific recommendations to the politicians in both decisions, introducing
phrases like "tax base consolidation. '
Continuing the trend, the Edgewood III opinion was mired in the
technical language of school reform. The court picked apart the compli-
cated CED proposals in Senate Bill 351, making further suggestions to
the Legislature. s6 By that point, of course, the Legislature had become
exasperated with the court's involvement.
Finally, in its Edgewood IV opinion the court approved the Legisla-
ture's proposal with the declaration that "[W]e have consistently re-
frained from prescribing 'the means which the Legislature must employ
in fulfilling its duty."'5 The high court went on to repeat its Edgewood
III claim that "[w]e do not prescribe the structure for 'an efficient system
of public free schools.' The duty to establish and provide for such a sys-
tem is committed by the Constitution to the Legislature. Our role is only
to determine whether the Legislature has complied with the Constitu-
tion. '
Here is a court exercising a fine sense of irony or wallowing in a pro-
found state of denial. To the court's critics, the Legislature did not create
Senate Bill 7 at all. Rather, the supreme court created that final legisla-
tion by gradually paring down the Legislature's options-a process that
amounted to an unacceptable intrusion into the legislative process. From
the opposite perspective, the court did exactly what it had to do to ensure
a constitutional reform package. In this view, the Legislature was a reluc-
tant, if not obstinate, player in the Edgewood drama. As Libby Line-
barger, former Chairperson of the House Committee on Public Educa-
tion, acknowledged, "the Legislature wouldn't have acted without the
litigation because they only act when there is a smoking gun pointed to
their heads."5"9 The court was thus reluctantly drawn into the specifics of
designing reform because of the Legislature's inability to produce a con-
stitutional alternative.
583. Edgewood 1, 777 S.W.2d 391, 399 (Tex. 1989).
584. Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d 491,498 (Tex. 1991).
585. See id. at 497.
586. See Edgeivood III, 826 S.W.2d 489,504-10 (Tex. 1992).
587. Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d 717, 747 (Tex. 1995) (quoting Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d at
498).
588. Id. at 747-48 (quoting Edgewood III, 826 S.W.2d at 523) (citation omitted).
589. Interview with Libby Linebarger, supra note 181.
Yale Law & Policy Review
Although the term is most often used in reference to federal lawsuits,
this progressive entanglement of the judiciary and the legislature may
qualify the Edgewood litigation for the notorious and largely academic
classification of an "institutional suit."' 9' This genre of cases, in which
federal judges use their injunctive powers to reform state institutions,
have often dealt with school desegregation, prison reform, and treatment
in mental hospitals. To varying degrees, there is the "initiation of a rela-
tionship between the judge and an institution-a declaration that the
judge will henceforth manage the reconstruction of an ongoing social in-
stitution."59'
In the Edgewood drama, the fact that the Texas Supreme Court per-
sistently denied that it micro-managed the reformation of the school-
finance system does not change the fact that it did assume a supervisory
role. Should it have, however?
2. A Prudential Separation of Powers and an Inconsistent
Supreme Court
Beyond its rhetorical utility for opponents of education-finance re-
form, the charge of "judicial activism" in the Edgewood drama raises
profound questions regarding the most basic structures of our democ-
racy. To some, a court's intrusion into a policy issue such as education
"will necessarily sacrifice the legitimacy of the judiciary."'s  Hence, the
argument continues, "such involvement must be regarded as a presump-
tively illegitimate exercise of judicial power."9
590. The Edgewood litigation clearly meets the profile of such suits:
The institutional suits.., are typically brought against state officials to enforce as-
serted constitutional norms. Frequently, such suits are filed only after the plaintiffs
have unsuccessfully exerted pressure on the political branches of the state government
to correct the problems of which they complain. Sometimes, as part of a general at-
tack, such suits are filed concurrently with the exertion of pressure on the political
branches. The subject matter of these suits and the litigants' desire to influence politi-
cal as well as judicial action frequently result in extensive news coverage of the prob-
lems giving rise to the litigation, and, though sometimes to a lesser degree, of the liti-
gation itself.
The structure of an institutional suit tends to be sprawling, with a large number of
parties, intervenors, and amici. The actual trial, during which plaintiffs seek to estab-
lish the existence of a constitutional violation, often involves many witnesses and ex-
tensive testimony ...
If the court does find a constitutional violation, that finding is typically only a prel-
ude to a drawn-out and complex process of devising a decree directing the defendants
to reform their institution and practices.
Fletcher, supra note 580, at 637-38 (citations omitted).
591. OwEN FIss, THE CIViL RIGHTS INuNcrION 7 (1978).
592. F. Clinton Broden, Litigating State Constitutional Rights to an Adequate Education and
the Remedy of State Operated School Districts, 42 RUTGERS L. REv. 779, 809 (1990).
593. Id. at 810.
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While acceptance of the judiciary's "activist" role has grown in the
last several decades "as the concepts of legal entitlement and rights asser-
tion have become central to the American political culture,"5 4 tradition-
alists continue to view a court's involvement in the intricacies of educa-
tion policy as all but apocalyptic. Using courts to affect education policy,
they say, "comes at the expense of one of the central tenets of our demo-
cratic form of government; namely, the separation of powers doctrine." 95
The traditionalist thus condemns the Texas Supreme Court for under-
mining American democracy.
Such a "top-down," formalistic perspective, however, unjustly sacri-
fices all-too-real constitutional violations to ethereal ideals of separation
of powers. The inequitable funding system should, in that view, be left in
place to preserve a supposed "separation." Given the obvious irrational-
ity of an absolute doctrine of separation of powers, even the formalist
must acknowledge that the doctrine offers no bright lines. Since Marbury
v. Madison, '9 this democracy has been experimenting with the accept-
able level of judicial intrusion into the political branches of government.
This is not to say that the notion of "separation of powers" is meaning-
less. Rather, it must be a living and dynamic doctrine. Professor Alex
Bickel was a proponent of just such a "prudential" interpretation of the
separation of powers:
Such is the basis of the political-question doctrine: the court's sense of lack of
capacity, compounded in unequal parts of the strangeness of the issue and
the suspicion that it will have to yield more often and more substantially to
expediency than to principle; the sheer momentousness of it, which unbal-
ances judgment and prevents one from subsuming the normal calculations of
probabilities; the anxiety not so much that judicial judgment will be ignored,
as that perhaps it should be, but won't; finally and in sum ("in a mature de-
mocracy"), the inner vulnerability of an institution which is electorally irre-
sponsible and has no earth to draw strength from.
Pragmatically speaking, the threat to judicial legitimacy posed by re-
laxing an absolutist's view of the separation of powers doctrine is minor
compared to that of a doctrine that would inhibit a court's ability to cor-
rect constitutional violations.
In the Edgewood litigation, the Texas Supreme Court did not violate
the separation of powers doctrine. The key to this proposition is not what
the court did but what the Legislature did not do. Perhaps, if the Edge-
594. Michael A. Rebell, Schools, Communities, and the Courts: A Dialogic Approach to
Education Reform, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 99, 110-11(1996).
595. Becky Stem, Judicial Promulgation of Legislative Policy: Efficiency at the Expense of
Democracy, 45 SW. L.J. 977, 977 (1991).
596. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
597. Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term Forward: The Passive Virtues, 75
HARV. L. REv. 40,75 (1961) (quoting Greene v. McElroy, 254 F.2d 944, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1958)).
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wood IV decision had been its first, the court would have undermined
this doctrine. Instead, the court became more and more involved in the
policy decision of education reform in response to legislative inaction.
Under those circumstances, the court faced the conundrum of stretching
the separation of powers doctrine or letting stand constitutional viola-
tions in Texas's schools.
The Texas Supreme Court found a legislatively-created institution un-
constitutional. The court, therefore, had to order reform of an institution.
Inevitably, in the course of such evaluation, judicial and legislative roles
will overlap. An absolute adherence to separation-of-powers doctrine
would have preserved the incredible disparities among public school dis-
tricts in Texas.
This is not to say that the judiciary should have free rein to draft leg-
islation. Judicial involvement in a policy matter should be avoided if at all
possible.9 8 As a general proposition, however, we agree that "even where
a constitutional violation has been found, a court cannot legitimately re-
solve such a problem unless the political bodies that ordinarily should do
so are in such serious and chronic default that there is realistically no
other choice."59
The most convincing opponents of judicial involvement in tradition-
ally political issues shore up their reverence for the separation of powers
with a competency-based argument. A strong case may be made that
"[c]reating and administering a statewide system of public school educa-
tion requires constant supervision, and courts are simply not designed to
undertake such monitoring activities." 6 While this assertion may be true,
however, there is little evidence that legislatures are much better de-
signed to undertake such monitoring activities. As a matter of fact, if a
court declares the unconstitutionality of some institution, some legislative
body has presumably failed in that task.
More importantly, the competency-based, pro-separation-of-powers
argument may be countered with an efficiency-based call for judicial ac-
tivism: Allowing judicial intrusion in traditionally legislative arenas in
certain circumstances is a more efficient path to creating constitutional
systems and institutions. If, for example, the Texas Supreme Court had
merely told the Legislature that its system was unconstitutional and had
given no guidance as to what policies to adopt at all, the politicians would
have been left guessing as to what direction of reform to pursue. Policy-
making by a random process of elimination is surely less efficient and de-
598. For a comprehensive proposal to use community involvement as a means of avoiding
judicial involvement altogether, see Rebell, supra note 594.
599. Fletcher, supra note 580, at 696.
600. Stem, supra note 595, at 1006.
Vol. 17:607,1999
Edgewood Drama
sirable than some level of judicial guidance that would help the legisla-
ture to close in on a constitutional system of financing.
Unfortunately, the very premise on which this idealized theory is
based was missing in the Edgewood drama. The judicial activism in the
Edgewood cases, particularly in Edgewood Ha and III, seems only to
have undermined the Legislature's policy-making ability. Worse than
giving the legislature no guidance at all, the court repeatedly changed its
directions. By shifting its definitions of "efficiency" over time, the court
did not give the Legislature an opportunity to answer its demands.
Consistency must be the first requirement of judicial activism. Ac-
cording to Justice Doggett, the court's unsolicited "judicial tampering"
only impeded resolution of the problem. The court thus erred even ac-
cording to our holistic and prudential concept of separation of powers.
Of course, in culling the Edgewood drama for morals on judicial ac-
tivism, one must remember that the justices were themselves political
creatures. One of the rationalizations for the political question doctrine is
that certain institutions need to be monitored and reformed by persons
who can be held accountable for their actions. The Texas Supreme Court
is politically accountable for its actions, blurring the legislative-judicial
distinction from the start.
V. THE DENOUEMENT: EDGEWOOD AS A "HOUSE OF CARDS"
In the years following Edgewood IV, education reformers have been
put on the defensive. Every legislative session presents an opportunity
for opponents of reform to chip away at the plaintiffs' gains. Former
Lieutenant Governor Bob Bullock compared the school-finance system
to a "house built of cards"-"You remove one card and the whole house
may fall down."' ' Texan politics, both judicial and legislative, lend an air
of unpredictability to the situation. The wisdom of one prominent com-
mentator in 1991 holds true today: "Even Nostradamus would be out of
his depth in predicting the future of school finance reform in Texas." 6
A. School Finance in the Legislature after Edgewood IV
1. Responses to Property-Tax Pressures
The considerable improvements in financial equity came at a cost,
mainly in the form of increased property taxes. The total average effec-
tive tax rate was $1.38/$100 in 1993-1994, a 77% increase from the 1987-
601. Wayne Slater, Bullock Urges Caution on Property-Tax Changes, DALLAS MORNING
NEWs, Dec. 3, 1996, at 17A.
602. Yudof, supra note 39, at 505.
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1988 average of $0.78/$100.6 In 1993-1994, 94% of the districts had an
effective tax rate over $1.00/$100, whereas only 18% of districts were
taxed above this level in 1987-1988.6 At the time of the adoption of Sen-
ate Bill 7, this heavy reliance on local property taxes sparked consider-
able concern among even those players celebrating the reforms as a vic-
tory. Craig Foster noted that "a lot of superintendents and school boards
are finding it difficult to maintain support in their communities for pro-
gressive programs and new building programs because of increasing con-
cern about high property taxes."6'6
The dramatic rise in property taxes has dominated Texas politics
since 1994, playing a major role in the ouster of Democratic governor
Ann Richards and spawning an "anti-Robin Hood" wing of the Republi-
can party. The Texas Republican Party tapped into the hostility to the
school-finance reforms and the accompanying property tax increases in
shaping its "Compact with Texas," its 1996 legislative campaign platform
that was modeled on the national party's "Contract with America."60
Increases in property taxes have already played a large part in shap-
ing the two most recent legislative sessions, in 1995 and 1997. In the first
session, Governor Bush was not able to honor immediately his 1994
campaign pledge of reducing the state's reliance on the local property
tax.6 Soon after the Edgewood IV decision, the Legislature passed and
Governor Bush signed into law Senate Bill 1, which rewrote the educa-
tional code while largely keeping the financing structure of Senate Bill 7
intact. Only minor alterations were made to the funding scheme: The
603. See TEXAS EDUc. AGENCY, supra note 400, at 26. Effective tax rates are different
from nominal, locally adopted rates in that they are standardized by the state. See id. Widening
the time frame by only a few years, the Legislative Budget Board reported that the average
school district effective tax rate jumped 128% between 1984 and 1995, from $0.601$100 to
$1.37/$100. See LEGISLATIVE BUDGET BOARD, supra note 539.
604. See TEXAS EDUC. AGENCY, supra note 400, at 26.
605. Interview with Craig Foster, supra note 73.
606. Craig Foster had harsh words for the purveyors of the "Compact with Texas":
The message they are trying to get out is, one, if your school property taxes have gone
up in recent years you can blame Robin Hood for it. Number two-Robin Hood taxes
and Robin Hood increases are being spent for arbitrary, unnecessary, non-essential
enrichment .... And third, if you help us get rid of Robin Hood, then your property
taxes will go down and the state will increase its appropriations, and you'll have a
really good basic essential education. Then, once that is in place, then what little is left
of the property tax will be used for enrichment purposes in those schools that can have
enrichment. And once again, you'll be back to 700-to-1 wealth disparities. Of course,
people proposing this are taxpayers and residents of those 100 districts from which the
state is recapturing money. They want the other 938 districts to believe that they are
all in the same boat, that all the tax increases are the result of Robin Hood, when in
fact in those 938 other districts, their property tax increases are lower than they would
be without Robin Hood.
Id.
607. See A. Phillips Brooks, Bush Says Bill Does Little To Boost State's Share of School
Funding, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, May 27,1995, at B3.
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guaranteed yield in Tier Two was bumped from $20.55 to $21.00 per
penny; the basic Tier One allotment was increased from $2300 to $2387
per student; and the Legislature appropriated $19 billion for public edu-
cation for the 1996-1997 biennium, an increase of 14% from the previous
biennium.6 These measures brought the state's share of public education
costs only up to 47%, a far cry from the 60% that Governor Bush had
promisedf and represented merely a fine-tuning of the Senate Bill 7
610school-finance system.
Although the focus of the Senate Bill I was elsewhere, Bush did not
retreat from his goals of reforming the tax structure. Warning of the po-
tential for a "local property-tax revolt," Bush made property-tax reform
the centerpiece of the 1997 legislative session.611 Bush placed three re-
strictions on any new tax system: (1) it must be "revenue neutral,"
meaning it must not raise any more money than it replaces, (2) it must be
fair and uncomplicated, and (3) it must not include a personal income tax
of any size.612 His initial proposal envisioned major cuts in local property
taxes, with the lost revenue replaced by a slight hike in the state sales tax,
budgetary savings, and a new broad-based state business-activity tax.
613
Bush's proposal ran into vociferous opposition, sparked mostly by in-
terests that would have been hurt by the business-activity tax. When it
became clear that Bush's proposal lacked legislative support, the focus
shifted to a House tax bill that would have cut local property taxes by as
much as 50% in some districts. Instead of using a business-activity tax,
the House bill would have replaced the lost revenue by raising numerous
state taxes, transferring $1 billion in state budgetary savings to the public
schools, and by having the state, rather than local districts, tax commer-
cial property.6 4 The plan would have required a constitutional amend-
ment to repeal the prohibition on a statewide property tax.
608. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 42.101-.302 (west 1995); Brooks, supra note 607.
609. See Brooks, supra note 607.
610. The foundation of the new law, however, was the major shift in power from the state
to the local districts. The power of the TEA was sharply constricted by the law, as its duties
were limited to those expressly provided for in the law. Senate Bill 1 also allowed for limited
experimentation with charter schools, home rule schools in particular, which with voter ap-
proval will free these schools from most state regulations. See Kathy Walt, Education Law Re-
turns Power to the Schools, Hous. CHRON., May 31, 1995, at A19.
611. Wayne Slater, Governor Renews Call for Tax System Review, DALLAs MORNING
NEvs, Feb. 7, 1996, at 12D.
612. See Wayne Slater & Rich Oppel, Property-Tax Panel Appointed; Bush Seeking Public
Opinion on Ways To Relieve Burden, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 20, 1996 at 18A.
613. See Clay Robison & Kathy Walt, Bush Unveils Sweeping Tax Plan, HOUS. CHRON.,
Jan. 29, 1997, at Al.
614. See Clay Robison, Tax Plan Would Aid Rich Most, Hous. CHRON., Apr. 19, 1997, at
Al. The House bill would have lowered the cap on residential property taxes for school opera-
tions from $1.50 to $0.70 and would have set the business-property tax rate at $1.05. See id.
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Both Bush's original proposal and the House tax bill he supported
would have promoted greater long-term fiscal equity. Governor Bush
declined the political opportunity to use the anger generated by the rise
in local property taxes to undo the progress made in equalizing school
funding, as some "Robin Hood" opponents would have preferred. In-
stead, the House plan would have increased the state's share of public
education funding from 46% to 80% and thus would have alleviated the
biggest source of inequity in the system-the widely disparate resources
of the local school districts.615 Governor Bush and his supporters in the
House, however, could not overcome Senate opposition to a hike in state
taxes. Bush's dramatic effort to restructure the state tax system failed af-
616ter a contentious 1997 legislative session. Instead, the Legislature set-
tled for only minor property tax relief, using $1 billion in budgetary sav-
617ings to boost homestead exemptions across the state.
Because of the failure of the tax-reform effort, school finance is still
largely dependent on local property tax revenues. This dependence re-
quires the continuation of the politically unpalatable recapture and redis-
tribution of local tax revenue from wealthy districts (those with over
$280,000 in property value per student) if the state is to stay within the
Edgewood mandates. These aspects of the system, combined with the
continuing pressures to boost revenue to keep up with the influx of stu-
dents, put the finance system under a great deal of political and economic
pressure-pressure that could result in major modifications in the legisla-
tive arena in the near future.
2. Other School-Finance-Related Legislation
Though the Legislature did not make any major modifications to the
overall tax structure or the school-finance system in the 1995 or 1997
legislative sessions, it took several steps that angered poor school dis-
tricts.
First, the "hold harmless" provision, originally set to lapse after three
years, was extended twice, and is now effective through the 1999-2000
school year. This provision allows certain wealthy districts to stay above
the $280,000 cap on property value per student. The Legislative Budget
Board calculated that, in 1996-1997, approximately $2.3 billion of the
state's tax base was not recaptured because of the "hold harmless" provi-
615. See Clay Robison, Plan Could Be 'Mother of All Robin Hoods', Hous. CHRON., May
4, 1997, at 2.
616. See Clay Robison, Unusual Legislative Session Ends with Mixed Results, Hous.
CHRON., June 2, 1997, at A13.
617. See id. Even this minor tax relief was partially negated when almost half the state's
school districts raised their tax rates in 1997. See Clay Robison, School Tax Hikes Partially Ne-
gate Bush Relief Plan, Hous. CHRON., Apr. 9,1998, at A25.
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sion, resulting in a loss of $27.4 million in recaptured funds. ls Poor school
districts assert that the additional four-year extension cost the state $240
million in recaptured funds;619 the state puts this figure closer to $100 mil-
lion.62
Second, the Legislature has altered certain formulas related to the
manner in which school districts raise money for debt service. In 1995,
the Legislature repealed the total tax rate limitation of $1.50/$100 that
was part of Senate Bill 7. The $1.50 cap on maintenance and operations
taxes was retained, but districts were permitted to levy up to an addi-
621tional $0.50/$100 to pay for bond indebtedness. In 1997, the Legislature
excluded from recapture the revenue raised by wealthy districts to pay
for debt service for facilities. z Poor school districts estimate that $56
million in recaptured funds were lost as a result of this measure.2
In the years after Edgewood IV, the Legislature did begin to address
the court's concern over funding for facilities. The Edgewood IV court
acknowledged that the state was fast approaching a point where poorer
districts would not be able to meet both their operational and facilities
needs within the equalized program.62 The Legislature responded by
providing $170 million in the 1996-1997 biennium for grants to help dis-
tricts construct or improve facilities.62' In 1997, the Legislature created an
"instructional facilities allotment" (IFA), which changed the mechanism
for distribution of funds for capital projects. Under the revised program,
618. See LEGISLATIVE BUDGET BOARD, supra note 539. The loss for 1995-96 was esti-
mated at $55 million. See WALKER & CASEY, supra note 27, at 44.
619. See Plaintiff-Intervenors' Petition for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 9, Edge-
wood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, No. 362,516 (Travis County Dist. Ct., 250th Jud. Dist. of Tex.,
filed May 7, 1998) [hereinafter Plaintiff-Intervenors' Petition].
620. State Defendants' Motion to Strike, Plea to the Jurisdiction, Special Exceptions, and
Original Answer at 3, Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, No. 362,516 (Travis County Dist.
Ct., 250th Jud. Dist. of Tex., filed June 1, 1998) [hereinafter State Defendants' Motion]. The
Legislative Budget Board has recently calculated that the net reduction in "recaptured" reve-
nue due to the hold harmless provision is about $30 million per year. See LEGISLATIVE BUDGET
BOARD, supra note 401, at 18.
621. See WALKER & CASEY, supra note 27, at 70; LEGISLATIVE BUDGET BOARD, supra
note 401, at 10 (discussing "rollback" elections where voters can reduce proposed tax increases
above a specified limit and noting voter approval of rate increases in school districts between
1982-1998).
622. See 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 592, § 1.02 (codified at TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN.
§ 41.093(a)); LEGISLATIVE BUDGET BOARD, supra note 401, at 18 & n.22; Plaintiff-Intervenors'
Petition at 10-11; Cindy Horswell, Schools Push Ahead with Bonds, HOuS. CHRON., Oct. 11,
1998, at A37.
623. See Plaintiff-Intervenors' Petition at 11.
624. See supra text accompanying notes 516-518.
625. Interview with Joe Wisnoski, Coordinator for School Finance and Fiscal Analysis at
the Texas Education Agency, in Austin, Tex. (Mar. 19, 1996); see also WALKER & CASEY, su-
pra note 27, at 25.
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eligible districts will receive yearly support to pay long-term-debt service
costs rather than one-time cash awards."' The Legislature appropriated
$200 million through the IFA in the 1997-1998 biennium, which, accord-
ing to the state, has leveraged $3 billion in construction.6"2
The 1999 legislative session brings another major challenge for the
Edgewood plaintiffs. Poor districts fear that recent offensives by pro-
voucher groups threaten to alter the education equity landscape. In the
last year, a well-endowed pro-voucher group-as much in the interest of
political capital as of educational enhancement-offered $50 million in
private school tuition to Edgewood students.60 Thus far, over 700 stu-
dents have accepted the "scholarships," resulting in a loss of $4 million in
state funding and further eroding the activist base that has for so long
fought for equity in the public school system.620 Sparked by Governor
Bush's support for a pilot voucher program, the debate over vouchers
promised to reach a crescendo in the 1999 legislative session.6,
B. School Finance in the Courts After Edgewood IV- Will There Be an
Edgewood V?
In addition to legislatively-induced disturbances of the status quo,
there are potential challenges waiting in the judicial arena as well. After
Edgewood IV was decided, many observers believed that the equity issue
was dead. The supreme court was exasperated with the question. Ob-
servers also believe that, by approving the finance system created under
Senate Bill 7, the court had essentially constitutionalized the equity ratios
in existence at the time. Prior to the Edgeivood IV decision, legislators
had to try and figure out what qualified as "substantially similar" and
were frustrated by the vague language. Now they could simply look to
the financing system in place at the time of the Edgewood IV decision.
The Texas Supreme Court had given its constitutional blessing to a sys-
tem in which 85% of students fell within the equalized system, 98% of
the revenue in the system was equalized, the gap between rich and poor
did not exceed $600 per student at the maximum tax rate, and the varia-
626. See 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 592, §1.04 (West) (codified at TEX. EDUc. CODE
ANN. § 46.001-.011 (West Supp. 1999)); State Defendants' Motion at 3.
627. See LEGISLATIVE BUDGET BOARD, supra note 401, at 28-29; see also State Defen-
dants' Motion at 3.
628. See Kathy Walt, Voucher Foes Take Case to Austin, HOUS. CHRON., Feb. 4, 1999, at
32A.
629. See id.; see also No Magic Bullet Fix, Including Vouchers, for Bad Schools, Hous.
CHRON, Nov. 29, 1998, at 2.
630. See R.A. Dyer, Education To Take Legislative Spotlight, FORT WORTH STAR-
TELEGRAM, Jan. 11, 1999, at 1; Clay Robison, Bush Urges Joint Efforts by Legislators, Hous.
CHRON., Jan. 28, 1998, at 1A.
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tion in revenue available to the poorest districts did not exceed 15% of
the revenue available to the wealthiest districts.63' As long as these targets
were met, many presumed, the system would be safe from an equity-
based challenge.
Despite the conventional wisdom, a few legislators predicted that the
equity battle would return to the courts. Representative Scott Hochberg
cautioned that "[I]f we stray too much, the Equity Center will have us
back in court., 632 Former chairperson of the House Committee on Public
Education, Libby Linebarger predicted:
There will be a challenge within the next ten years, because I don't think our
system will stay equitable because we rely on the property tax. Until we
change our tax structure in the state, you are not going to really have a real
equitable financing system. This was the best we could get in my opinion with
our tax structure.... The Legislature, in my opinion, is going to start backing
off and backing off and backing off from funding it. Our system depends on
its being fully funded ... but historically, the Legislature has started backing
away. When that happens, it's going to get out of kilter and there will be an-
other lawsuit.
633
Both Hochberg and Linebarger proved prophetic. On May 7, 1998,
the Plaintiff Intervenors Committee, 64 represented by attorney Buck
Wood, filed a petition for declaratory and injunctive relief in Judge Scott
McCown's state district court.65
631. Some of these "target" numbers were specifically mentioned in the Edgewood IV
opinion, see 917 S.W.2d 717, 731 & n.12 (Tex. 1995), and all are used by the Legislative Budget
Board in projecting the school finance system's compliance with the supreme court's equity
mandates, see LEGISLATIVE BUDGET BOARD, supra note 532. These statistics are explained
above. See supra notes 534-537 and accompanying text.
Kevin O'Hanlon weighed in on the importance of these targets:
I think we are done in a lot of respects with fiscal neutrality. We have a measure now,
we know what passes muster in the supreme court, we can calculate what those ratios
were and we have got a distinct notion of what it's going to take. What the legislature
wants is certainty. How much do we need in order to get over the line? In the first
couple of cases, the words were "substantially sinilar"-well, what's that? They were
wiggle words and it drove the legislators nuts. Now they can look at the ratios in exis-
tence at the time Edgewood IV was passed. They have a target.
Interview with Kevin O'Hanlon, supra note 136.
632. Interview with Scott Hochberg, supra note 382. The possibility of the Legislature un-
derfunding its portion of the system is a prospect that some interviewees take very seriously,
especially given the court's warning that "the amount of 'supplementation' in the system cannot
become so great that it in effect destroys the efficiency of the entire system." Edgewood IV, 917
S.W.2d at 732.
633. Interview with Libby Linebarger, supra note 181.
634. The Plaintiff Intervenors Committee is a group of 126 property-poor school districts,
led by Alvarado I.S.D., that has long been involved in the Edgewood litigation.
635. Kathy Walt, School Districts File Suit to End Funding Loopholes, Hotus. CHRON., May
8, 1998, at A37. Out of the 126 districts on the Plaintiff Intervenors Committee, 110 have de-
cided to join in the lawsuit, although Wood expects more to join after the end of the 1999 legis-
lative session. Telephone Interview with Randall "Buck" Wood, attorney for the Plaintiff Inter-
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The plaintiff-intervenors assert that, after Edgewood IV, the Legisla-
ture provided breaks to wealthy districts and spumed the poorer ones.
Craig Foster characterized the Legislature's attitude as: "We got our sys-
tem declared constitutional, now we'll just damn well do what we
please." 636 Buck Wood asserted: "The Legislature has handed out a half
billion dollars to rich school districts, mostly over the last four years."637
The poorer school districts allege that legislators have begun to fall down
the slippery slope towards greater inequities.63'
Among the legislative actions and omissions decried by the plaintiff-
intervenors are: (1) the extensions of the "hold harmless" provision, (2)
the exemption of revenue raised for facility construction and renovation
from the recapture provisions of Senate Bill 7,639 (3) the creation of a dis-
crepancy between wealthy districts and others in the speed in which de-
clines in property value are recognized, and (4) the absence of a revenue-
equalization mechanism for certain old debt service payments.6 The
plaintiff-intervenors also emphasized the irony in the wealthy districts'
pursuit of a "hold harmless" provision from the Legislature. Whereas
these districts once argued that money did not matter, 1 they now argue
that they cannot provide an adequate education to their students within
the Senate Bill 7 limits.642
The plaintiff-intervenors charge that cost inflation and the legislative
changes outlined above have eroded the equity targets that were estab-
lished in Edgewood 1V.6 3 The State disagreed, asserting that other legis-
lative adjustments, including the increase in the basic Tier One allotment
and the increase in the Tier Two guaranteed yield, have actually im-
proved equity figures.( 4
venors Committee (Jan. 13, 1999).
636. Telephone Interview with Craig Foster, Director of the Equity Center (Jan. 13, 1999).
637. Walt, supra note 635.
638. See supra text accompanying notes 564-565.
639. See supra note 622 and accompanying text. The plaintiff-intervenors assert that
wealthy districts have exploited this loophole by "converting expenditures that were tradition-
ally funded from current maintenance and operations to debt financing." Plaintiff-Intervenors'
Petition at 11. Craig Foster contends that some districts have even bought supplies using short
term bond issues with negligible interest, because these districts can save $100 in recaptured
funds for every dollar they pay in interest. Telephone Interview with Craig Foster, supra note
636.
640. See Plaintiff-Intervenors' Petition at 8-12; see also LEGISLATIVE BUDGET BOARD, sit-
pra note 401, at 32.
641. See supra text accompanying note 136.
642. See Plaintiff-Intervenors' Petition at 6.
643. Telephone Interview with Craig Foster, supra note 636; Telephone Interview with
Randall Wood, supra note 634; See Plaintiff-Intervenors' Petition at 6.
644. See State Defendants' Motion at 2.
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The lawsuit has been put on hold during the duration of the 1999 leg-
islative session. Wood has suggested that his clients filed the suit to bring
lawmakers to the negotiating table.645 Poor districts hope to persuade the
Legislature to expand its investment in the IFA. Legislators, however,
have not reacted favorably to the lawsuit. Teel Bivins, chairman of the
Senate Education Committee, remarked: "I don't see how this lawsuit
benefits the schoolchildren of Texas."64' Bill Ratliff, the chairman of the
Senate Finance Committee, said that the lawsuit "is tantamount to put-
ting a gun to our head, and I don't work well with a gun to my head....
My attitude now is 'Go to the Supreme Court if you can get a better
deal."'6 7 He predicted that the poorer districts "might lose ground"
there. s
Should a trial occur, adequacy issues might come to the fore. Ironi-
cally, the potentiality of an adequacy debate was significantly enhanced
by Justice Cornyn's choice of words in Edgewood IV. The General
Counsel of the TEA, David Anderson, blamed Cornyn for opening Pan-
dora's box: "The bad news in Edgewood IV was that the court opened
the door to adequacy litigation, which previously had not been part of
the mix and which the trial court had rejected."649 By redefining or en-
larging the constitutional standards of "efficiency" and "general diffusion
of knowledge," and equating these standards with a "minimally ade-
quate" education in Edgewood 111,6'0 and an "accredited" education in
Edgewood IV,51 Justice Cornyn may have opened another angle of at-
tack for the plaintiff-intervenors. In addition to the equity angle, the
plaintiff-intervenors might try to prove, in either this lawsuit or a future
one, that an accredited education does not imply a minimum level of
adequacy-that the state is setting the bar too low.
Whether or not adequacy issues seep into the case now before Judge
McCown, both sets of the original Edgewood plaintiffs predict that the
chances of an adequacy lawsuit being brought in the future are good.
Craig Foster said: "There are studies ongoing right now that assume we
are going to have an adequacy lawsuit before we are finished with this
645. See Walt, supra note 635.
646. Id.
647. Id.
648. Terrence Stutz, Schools' Fund Fight Reignited; Officials Say Wealthy Aren't Being Fa-
vored, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 8, 1998 at IA. Notably, after the November 1998 elec-
tion, the Texas Supreme Court is composed exclusively of Republicans. Only one member of
the Edgewood IV majority, Chief Justice Tom Phillips, remains on the court. Democrat Rose
Spector, the only justice in Edgewood IV who stood by the earlier standards of efficiency, was
defeated in her bid for reelection.
649. Interview with David Anderson, supra note 286.
650. See supra notes 335-337 and accompanying text.
651. See EdgewoodIV, 917 S.W.2d 717,730 (Tex. 1995).
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thing in Texas. I think it is a good bet that it is coming in Texas. 52
MALDEF attorney Al Kauffman agreed that "there is an adequacy case
out there." '653
There are other potential causes of action, in addition to an ade-
quacy-oriented case, that could be brought by future plaintiffs. A re-
vamped equal protection suit is always a possibility, especially consider-
ing the prominent role of MALDEF in the school-finance saga.6M The
trial court in the original case did rule that the school-finance system
violated the equal protection clause in the state constitution. The court of
appeals overturned this decision,15 and the supreme court never consid-
ered it, having been sidetracked by the violations of the education clause
of the Texas Constitution. The MALDEF plaintiffs still feel very strongly
that remaining inequalities disproportionately impact Mexican-
Americans and are still attracted to the equal protection argument.6
One key observer hypothesized that since "results matter" was the main
message of Edgewood IV, MALDEF would be poised to make an equal
protection claim based on racial disparities in academic performance
rather than in appropriations. 6s A similar claim recently proved success-
ful in Connecticut's highest court.68
Another aspect of the Edgewood V decision could also spark litiga-
tion in the near future. The court insinuated that, if the $1.50 cap became
"a floor as well as a ceiling," then districts would have lost all meaningful
discretion in setting their tax rates, practically converting the finance sys-
tem into an unconstitutional state ad valorem tax. 659 In other words, if dis-
tricts have to tax at the maximum rate of $1.50/$100 just to provide a
"general diffusion of knowledge," then their lack of discretion would
transform the finance system into a virtual state property tax. Many in-
terviewees expressed skepticism that this development would occur. If
many districts are running into the cap, they theorized, the Legislature
652. Interview with Craig Foster, supra note 73.
653. Interview with Albert Kauffman, supra note 101.
654. MALDEF has recently filed a federal class-action suit against the State of Texas, the
TEA, and the State Board of Education, claiming that the TAAS test, the state's standardized
high school exit exam, discriminates against black and Hispanic students. See Hispanic Group
Files Suit Against Use of Exit Exams, Hous. CHRON., Oct. 15,1997, at 1.
655. See Edgewood 1, 761 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. App. 1988).
656. Telephone Interview with Albert Cortez, supra note 102; Interview with Albert
Kauffinan, supra note 101.
657. Interview with Kevin O'Hanlon, supra note 136.
658. In Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1281 (Conn. 1996), the Connecticut Supreme Court
concluded that "the existence of extreme racial and ethnic isolation in the public school system
deprives schoolchildren of a substantially equal educational opportunity" as required by the
Connecticut Constitution.
659. See Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d 717,737 (Tex. 1995).
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will correctly perceive that there is not enough money in the system to
provide a "general diffusion of knowledge" and will likely raise the cap
to alleviate the problem. °
Whether the most recent petition will turn into Edgewood V remains
to be seen. According to Foster and Wood, a full-fledged legal battle can
only be averted by affirmative relief from the Legislature. One thing is
certain: If the school-finance reformers believe that the poorer districts
are being treated unfairly, they will not hesitate to turn to the courts for
relief.
VI. CONCLUSION
Few would dispute the critical importance of educating children. Per-
haps an equally small number would dispute the proposition that the
quality of a child's education should not be a function of affluence, loca-
tion, race, sex, or the property values around campus. The ideal of equal
opportunity to achieve success is a fundamental tenet of American soci-
ety. Nevertheless, to this day drastic disparities in the quality of educa-
tion provided to public school students remain institutionalized by ineq-
uitable school-finance schemes. As indicated by the waves of school-
finance litigation that continue to inundate state courts across the coun-
try, Edgewood and Alamo Heights school districts are not exceptions,
but representatives-representatives of both the stark disparities created
by many states' school funding programs and also the dramatic im-
provements attainable through litigation.
Of course, it would be naive to assume that as a result of decades of
litigation these two neighboring school districts today provide equally
valuable academic opportunities to their students. The point of the
Edgewood drama is not that equal funding creates high quality-or even
equal-education. Rather, the point of the Edgewood drama is that, even
in the face of overwhelming political, logistical, and constitutional obsta-
cles, reform is necessary and possible. As education reformers continue
to do in almost every other state, the Edgewood players blazed a trail
through the morass of tensions between equity and adequacy, separa-
tion-of-powers dilemmas, recalcitrant legislators, and politically sensitive
judges. After twenty-five years of literal and figurative marching, Edge-
wood's protesting students, teachers, and parents earned relatively equal
access to education funding for every child in their state.
660. Interview with David Anderson, supra note 286; Interview with Kevin O'Hanlon, su-
pra note 136; Interview with Joe Wisnoski, supra note 625. A TEA spokesman, Omar Garcia,
also reiterated this point: "As time goes on, more and more districts will be bumping up against
the cap. But it will take an act of the Legislature to raise it. This is something that will have to
be dealt with." Cindy Horswell, "Robin Hood" Fails To Cure Schools' Ills, HOUS. CHRON.,
June 2, 1996, at Al.

